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Abstract
This thesis examines the process of ideological evolution in the Armenian genocide, 
the Holocaust and Serbian aggression against Bosniaks during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. It notes that, as a key element of power in the twentieth century, the role 
of ideology in genocidal states has been under-acknowledged, particularly in 
comparative studies. Making use of Mommsen’s theory of cumulative radicalisation, 
I look at key themes important in nationalist movements: extreme otherness, the 
nation and homeland. Following a discussion of methods and literature, I propose a 
new perspective on addressing otherness in genocidal states, identifying the extreme 
other-group as ‘anti-nation’ and go on to discuss the role of the anti-nation, nation 
and homeland in radicalising ideology. In doing so, I show that ideology is both a 
form of structure and of agency and thus provides unique insight into how 
institutions participate in radicalising states. Looking at the evolution of ideology 
allows me to test Mahoney’s theory of path dependency by taking an episodic 
approach to research and applying it to these radicalising states. My conclusion 
discusses the complexities of the thematic cumulative radicalisation of ideology, 
ideology as structure and agency and whether or not path dependency is applicable to 
studying ideology in radicalising states.
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LT. COL. G R1FFITH -JO N ES: D o yo u  th ink that it w ou ld  have been po ss ib le  to carry ou t the  
exterm ination o f  6 m illion  Jew s in 1921 ? D o yo u  th ink  the G erm an p eo p le  w ou ld  have s to o d fo r  it?
D o y o u  th ink  it w ou ld  have been po ss ib le  under any reg im e in 1921 to have carr ied  ou t the m urder o f  
6 m illion  men, wom en, a n d  children o f  the Jew ish  race?
STRE1CH ER: W hether that w ou ld  have been po ss ib le  w ith the know ledge o f  the p eo p le  -  no, it w ould  
no t have been poss ib le ...
LT. COL. G R1FFITH -JO N ES: W as it p o ss ib le  to exterm inate p eo p le  in that w ay on ly  a fter  som e 20  
y e a rs  o f  incitem ent a n d  propaganda  by y o u  a n d  o ther N azis?  Is  that w hat m ade tha t possib le?
STRE1CH ER: I  deny tha t the popu la tion  was incited. I t  w as enlightened, a n d  som etim es a harsh w ord  
m ay have been d irec ted  aga inst the o ther side as an answer. I t w as enlightenm ent, no t incitem ent.
(Lieutenant Colonel Mervyn Griffith-Jones o f  the British Prosecutorial Delegation to Julius Streicher
at the Nuremberg Tribunals 29.04.1946)
Research questions and purpose
In this thesis, I analyse the way ideology evolves by evaluating the radicalisation 
process in genocidal states. The changing nature of ideology in states radicalising 
toward genocide strikes at the centre of discussions on power in twentieth century 
Europe. Ideology is not the only source of power (Mann 1986) nor is it the only 
reason why people become willing participants in genocidal activity (Mann 2005; 
Goldhagen 1996). However, it is a key aspect in movements of extreme nationalism 
in twentieth century Europe. The three primary questions I seek to answer in the 
course of my research are as follows:
1. Does radicalising ideology evolve in a similar way in cases of modem 
genocide? Using the theatre of modem Europe, I take a macro-approach to 
looking at radicalising ideology. Though I am interested in the detail of 
individual state approaches to ideology, my research interests centre around 
radicalising ideology generally. I aim to research various cases of 
radicalising ideology in order to establish whether or not a pattern exists in 
how states adopt genocidal ideologies.
2. What are the thematic similarities and differences in this evolution? If the 
first question is a macro-question, this question seeks to assess the micro-
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level case-specific aspects of ideological shift. Ideology is extremely 
complex and, though I am looking for patterns, I want to examine various 
aspects of its thematic complexity by looking for variations within each case.
3. Lastly, why does that evolution occur? or What happens to further the
radicalisation process? Here, I am hoping to address whether or not there is a 
relationship between ideology and events and, if a relationship between 
ideology and events does exist, then I am interested in which is more 
important to the radicalisation process. In other words, which is the 
independent variable and which is the dependent variable?
The intended outcome of this PhD is that, through the analysis and discussion of the 
questions posed above, discussions of genocidal ideology can be brought into the 
dialogue of comparative genocide studies. Ideology is generally viewed as either 
constant, inflexible political and cultural platform established early in the life of a 
political regime and providing a rationale for most policy decisions or ideology is 
dismissed as the deluded justifications expressed by elite individuals when it suits 
their desires, shifting and changing with little regard to the geo-political minutiae 
present at the time of conflict. Equally, while there is a substantial amount of 
literature written regarding the ideology of some genocides, there is relatively little in 
the field of comparative genocide studies. This PhD will evaluate ideology through 
the lens of structure and agency. Through the analysis of the evolution of 
radicalising ideology, this thesis will show that ideology provides both structure and 
agency in radicalising states depending on the status of the relationship between 
ideology and policy. Ideology legitimates policy; state-driven policies provide 
sanction and justification for action. Policy, then, is a normative outcome of the 
inductive relationship between structure and agency in radicalising states.
Identifying ideology
The process of evaluating ideology begins with a brief explanation of the term itself. 
At its most base level, ideology is a set of closely held beliefs characteristic of a 
group or a community (Plamenatz 1979: 15); in other words, ideology is a cohesive, 
non-contradictory set of commonly held beliefs. Within the social sciences, secular 
forms of ideology have been thoroughly researched, particularly within the
15
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economic-political model of Marxism (Apter 1964; Blackburn 1972; Sayer 1991; 
Schwarzmantel 1998). My interest, however, has been political, rather than 
economic, forms of ideology and tends to side with Eccleshall’s summary of the role 
of ideology in society, that people need ‘both to feel at home in the world and to act 
with good conscience: to make sense of everyday reality as well as to clothe their 
interests and aspirations in the finery of moral principle. The powerful have to 
reassure themselves as well as convince others of the rightness of their might: that 
power is a trust held for the common good rather than self advantage’(1984: 23).
This allusion to power taps into Mann’s assertion that, as the social organisation of 
meaning is necessary to societal life, power is gained by those who can monopolise 
ideological norms (1986: 22) and aims at something more specific than ideology as a 
cultural system, as expressed by Geertz (1964: 49). Equally, ideology is primarily a 
mobiliser across class delineation (unlike economic power) and across gender 
delineation (unlike military power). Eric Wolf introduces ideology as being ‘unified 
schemes or configurations developed to underwrite or manifest power’ since ‘ideas 
and idea-systems [such as the state] are often monopolized by power groups and 
rendered self-enclosed and self-referentiaf(2002 [1999]: 4, 7). This characterization 
alludes to the monopolisation of norms from above; in modem Europe, the 
monopolisation of norms is most often found through control of the state. Therefore, 
though ideology can be conveyed through various different institutions and be held 
by individuals and groups alike, ideology in this case should be taken to be linked 
with the state. Thus, for the purpose of this PhD, I mean ideology to be the state-led  
expression o f  commonly-held belief. In other words, the term ideology refers to a 
certain set of ideals, symbols, myths, principles, and values maintained by the state, 
outlining a distinct political and cultural order which may not be adhered to by all 
citizens of that state.
This delineation of ideology is in line with Hall’s identification of institutions more 
generally, that ‘institutions are instruments the actors use to negotiate the complexity 
of the world’ (1997: 217). Ideologies contain the ideals of the regime which 
implements them; therefore, ideologies represent the ideals of power elites within
16
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political sphere in the nation. Interestingly, however, ideology constrains power as 
well. In his discussion on institutional creativity, Sheingate reflects that ‘even where 
they are ambiguous, rules still set parameters on the permissible range of action; they 
establish what can and cannot happen’ (2010: 181). Ideology expresses the rules by 
which elites can implement policy. In this role, ideology can be positive or negative; 
ideologies of multi-culturalism and public freedom are as much ideologies as 
ideologies of discrimination and slavery. Such clarification begins to illuminate the 
iterative nature of ideology as both structure and agency. Ideology in this case 
provides the structure in which agents act and also stands as agency influencing 
changing constraints.
Even with this delineation of terms, it remains that even though these ideologies 
exist, the fact of their existence does not explain the rationale behind their 
implementation, particularly regarding the implementation of genocidal ideologies. 
The intention of my research is to explain how and why this implementation occurs 
through an exploration of the relationship between ideology and events. Many 
ideologies are infused with ideas of political superiority which takes on the role of 
religion and moral supremacy, seeking salvation through the defeat of national 
enemies. It is these ideas which lead to ‘organised social action’ which has, so often, 
been detrimental to the lives of many others. Thus, in the course of this PhD, I am 
concerned with analysing the changing nature of elite-expressed social beliefs in 
states where the beliefs expressed attempt to legitimise action.
In undertaking this research project, I do not intend to concern myself with the 
spread or comprehensiveness of ideology; I focus on what elites tell people to 
believe, rather than the extent to which the citizens of the state believe it. Neither do 
I mean to claim that ideologies expressed by national elites are universally held. 
Indeed, genocidal ideology is, in every case researched here, always partial, even 
within the persecuting group, hence strong resistance movements and assassination 
attempts, such as the ‘Valkyrie Level II’ assassination attempt on Hitler’s life on 20
17
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July 19441. Mann expresses this well, noting that ‘whole nation groups never act 
collectively. The perpetrators are some Germans, some Serbs, some 
Hutus...Ethnonationalists must first overcome dissidents in their own ethnic 
community, and in fact they often kill more people from their own ethnic group than 
from the out-group’ (Mann 2005: 20-21). Equally, ideological goals are sometimes 
sacrificed in order to achieve other aims. For example, many Jews under the Nazi 
state were kept alive as slave labourers rather than being immediately exterminated 
upon their arrival at extermination camps. This free labour was vital to the Nazi war 
effort and became more important as the war continued -  so much so that the 
numbers of Jews ‘saved’ from immediate extermination from 1944 through the end 
of the war increased significantly; many of these Jews were even imported to the 
Reich proper after it had been declared ‘Jew-free’(Bloxham 2009a: 253).
Thus, the purpose of this PhD is not to claim that ideology is the only source of 
power in radicalising states, nor the only rationale leaders have in making policy 
decisions. Nonetheless, ideology is one of various reasons why people participate in 
mass killing which provides us with an impetus to further seek out the relationship 
between ideology and policy, particularly because ideological organisation is 
sociospatially transcendent. Thus, while being a power source on its own, ideology 
is especially geared to generate a ‘sacred’ form of authority (Mann 2005: 27, 1986: 
23) which is vested in the state.
Thesis outline
This thesis proceeds in Chapter Two where I discuss my methods of research 
gathering and my methodological approach more generally. I begin by discussing 
the strengths and weaknesses of historical sociology as a macro-approach to 
comparative research. Historical Institutionalism (HI) and path dependency will be 
introduced as approaches favoured in this thesis. The following chapters will gauge
1 For information on assassination attempts in Nazi Germany, see Moorhouse (2007), Thomsett (1997: 
Ch. 13) and Burleigh (2001: Ch. 9). For reading on resistance movements in genocidal states, see 
Phayer (1993) and Gaut (2006).
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whether or not path dependency is an appropriate means for looking at the evolution 
of radicalising ideologies. The chapter continues on to provide the rationale for the 
choice of cases and to address the unique research challenges facing each case in the 
research-gathering process; I finish by addressing these challenges and situating 
them within the context of HI.
Chapter Three provides a review of the literature pertinent to this research project. I 
focus primarily on the primordialist/modemist/ethnosymbolist debate. This is 
critical, as it provides the rationale for the macro-structure of the thematic approach 
to the thesis. I then go on to discuss genocide literature more particularly, refining 
the definition of genocide amongst a broader perception of mass murder and death 
before going on to address the secondary literature applicable to my three case 
studies.
I use these case studies to transition into Chapter Four, which provides the historical 
background for each case, focusing particularly on the historical events used to 
structure my episodic approach to comparative research. Here, I discuss the geo­
political background of each case and then identify and justify the critical events I 
use to structure future chapters.
Chapters Five and Six begin the qualitative analysis of my research. Introducing the 
term ‘anti-nation’ as a more appropriate way to discuss otherness in genocidal states, 
Chapter Five traces the persecution of this group, both in policy and in ideology in 
the years preceding the Committee of Union and Progress, Nazi and Serbian 
Democratic Party’s assumption of power. Chapter Six goes on to discuss the role of 
the anti-nation in radicalising ideology. I address perceptions of dehumanisation, the 
effect of the anti-nation on the nation and other influential themes as they arise 
through an individual assessment of each case.
In contrast to the anti-nation, Chapter Seven discusses the ideological role of the 
nation in the radicalisation process. I begin by addressing how an ethnic perception 
of ‘us versus them’ exists in nationalising states more generally and then go on to
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compare this with a more extreme sense of ‘nation’ present in radicalising states. I 
look particularly at how a sanctified portrayal of the nation serves to legitimise 
extreme policies by rationalising extremism through the language of protection.
Chapter Eight is my final thematic chapter in which I address the role of the 
homeland in radicalising ideology. Unlike in the previous three chapters, I open this 
chapter with a discussion on the difference between the Nazi perception of 
Lebensraum and the idea of homeland. Then I move on to address whether or not 
radicalising ideology intimates that the continued existence of the homeland is 
predicated on the eradication of the anti-nation from the nation, thereby completing 
the triangular relationship between the three themes used to structure this PhD. Each 
of my thematic chapters looks at each of my three cases individually before 
addressing the themes comparatively in the analysis section of each chapter.
In my final chapter, Chapter Nine, I conclude that there are three main stages of 
ideological evolution in states radicalising toward genocide. This chapter follows the 
themes as they progress through each stage and I discuss how ideology both effects 
and is effected by events against particular geo-political backdrops. I then move on 
to address the way ideology evolves, looking particularly to see if the radicalisation 
process can be properly placed within a path-dependency model. I conclude by 
suggesting a more nuanced way this research approach can be applied in order to 
widen the results I have found and presented in this dissertation.
2 0
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Problems and challenges in genocidal research
'G od forb id  that we should give out a dream o f  our own imagination fo r  a pattern o f  
the w orld’ -  Francis Bacon (1910 [1620])
Introduction
As with any social science research project, seeking to answer the questions set out 
in Chapter One leads to particular problems, some being general challenges faced by 
many comparative analysts and others unique to the research questions themselves. 
The main point of this chapter is to provide a review of the problems necessary to 
consider when addressing the research questions at hand and to discuss how the 
methods I employed whilst conducting my research allowed me to solve or 
circumvent many of these problems.
Specifically, my research questions present two overarching problems I address in 
this chapter. The first challenge is to find an approach effectively allowing me to 
research radicalising ideology as structure and agency; the second challenge is how 
to appropriately compare three cases across space and time. Though many types of 
research would have allowed me to study genocidal ideology at some level, it was 
clear to me early on in the data-gathering process that a comparative historical 
analysis would be necessary to focus on the evolution of ideology across various 
cases throughout the twentieth century.
Thus, I decided to structure this chapter around the challenges arising from this type 
of research project. To achieve this aim, this chapter is broken down into four main 
sections. The first section addresses the method and rationale behind my choice of 
cases. I discuss the benefits and complexities of comparison as well as the 
relationship between the three case studies. The following two sections seek to 
explain how my methodological approach fulfils the demands of a complex 
comparative research model. Here I introduce historical sociology (HS); since much
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of my topic deals with causation and with structure and agency, I also look at the ties 
HS has with historical institutionalism (HI) and, through HI, path dependency. I then 
move on to my final section, which outlines my research strategy as structured by the 
relics of ideology. Here I introduce the various types of sources available for each 
case and the problems of comparing these sources before concluding.
Case Selection
As discussed in Chapter One, this dissertation deals with three connected questions, 
all of which evolve from the first question, namely ‘does radicalising ideology 
evolve in a similar way in cases of modem genocide?’ From this question, two 
intriguing secondary questions arise: firstly, ‘what are the thematic similarities and 
differences in this evolution?’ and secondly, ‘what happens to further the 
radicalisation process?’
Aside from the emotional challenges faced by every genocide scholar, I was 
immediately aware of some substantial challenges to embarking on a research project 
with this type of scope and objective. The first problem I encountered when faced 
with these questions was that of choosing my case studies. My primary research 
question deals directly with modem genocide; it is also inherently a question 
necessitating some sort of comparison of cases in order to properly assess the past 
century of modernity. Thus, I knew I would need multiple ideologies to compare. 
Bryman sums up the problems inherent in doing so when he says
Not all writers are convinced about the merits of multiple-case 
study research. Dyer and Wilkins (1991), for example, argue that a 
multiple case study approach tends to mean that the researcher pays 
less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in which 
the cases can be contrasted. Moreover the need to forge 
comparisons tends to mean that the researcher needs to develop an 
explicit focus at the onset.
(Bryman 2004: 55)
To make matters worse, an ideal research project on my topic would incorporate 
every instance of genocide occurring in the 20th and 21st centuries; however, within
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the scope of the timeframe provided, I knew I would have to limit the number of 
cases. Based on previous work I undertook through my MSc, I decided that three 
would be the maximum number of cases I would be able to effectively research. This 
is, of course, typical of the comparative method in that ‘it resembles the statistical 
method in all respects except one. The crucial difference is that the number of cases 
it deals with is too small to permit systematic control of partial correlations’ (Lijphart 
1971: 684; see also Skocpol and Somers 1980: 182, 193).
This lack of systematic control made me realise that in order to make my research 
outputs acceptable to my audience and possibly applicable to other cases outside of 
the three cases selected for this project, I would need to ensure that these cases 
covered a wide variety of critical elements, including sociological, geographical, 
technological, historical and political factors. At this point, I was also looking 
forward to the research gathering aspects of this type of project and knew it would be 
vital to be aware of various types of documents available for research. While I was 
drawn to Rwanda and Cambodia, I knew language barriers would prevent me from 
accessing primary research materials. I decided early on I would not consider work 
in Darfur as the state is still embroiled in conflict and I did not want to put myself in 
a possibly dangerous situation. Therefore, I began to consider Turkey and the 
Armenian genocide during the First World War, Germany and the Holocaust during 
the Second World War, and Serbian aggression against Bosniaks as my three case 
studies.
There are strong ties between the three cases that provide equivalence and 
connectivity. It was these links and similarities that brought me to decide on these 
three instances of genocide as being strong choices for this type of research project. 
The first of these links is geographical. Using these three cases gives me an 
empirical link bridging East and West against the background of changing Europe 
through the twentieth century. Much of the geographic space creating the homeland 
or the theatres of war in each case is also somehow involved in the other cases as 
well. This shared European geography goes on to provide a historical link between 
cases. As Figure 2.1 shows, each case is strongly influenced by a historical
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relationship with the other two cases, which has effected the nature of aggression in 
each state and has established a circular relationship between the three.
As I show in more depth in Chapters Four and Five, the Balkan peninsula was at the 
outer edges of the Ottoman Empire; the Balkan wars of independence in the early 
20th century left a substantial number of Muslims in the region, but encouraged a 
mass movement of people to the Ottoman Empire. Many of these individuals 
suffered great cruelty at the hands of Christian groups which fomented a sense of 
distrust towards the Christian Armenian population. Equally, the German alliance 
with the Ottomans in WWI provided infrastructure, technological advances and 
eyewitness accounts to the genocidal acts perpetrated against the Armenians. Based 
on this history, the Nazis put significant pressure on neutral Turkey to form an 
alliance with them during WWII. The Nazis successfully allied with the Croatian 
Ustasha regime which carried out savage attacks against the Serbs, providing the 
modern Milosevic regime a historical platform from which to foment fear against 
‘others’ during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Among many other complex factors, 
German recognition of an independent Croatia provided a spark for war in the 
region, leading to genocidal aggression carried out against the descendants of those 
Muslims remaining in the Balkans after the Balkan wars.
This triangulation between the three cases also helps make my fieldwork possible 
linguistically, namely the alliance between Germany and the Ottomans in WWI, 
German aggression against the Serbs through during WWII, and Turkish-Serbian 
relations during the break-up of the Soviet Union. As I speak German, these 
relationships allow me access to certain historical information unavailable in English. 
Chapter Four seeks to largely expand Figure 2.1, looking at the links between cases 
in greater detail. In seeking three cases representative of genocidal aggression in the 
20th century, I would have been remiss to dismiss the strong sense of 
interconnectedness provided by the Ottoman Empire, the Nazi state and the Balkan 
Peninsula.
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Figure 2.1 Connections in Case Studies
• Turkish-German 
alliance during WWI 
•German construction 





against Serbs in WWII 
•Yugoslavia absorbed 
by the Third Reich in 
WWII
•NATO supporter/anti­
conflict power during 
Serbian aggression 
•Germany was main 
recipient of Bosnian 










•Ottoman Empire colonised Yugoslavia 
•Colonisation ensured Muslims moving to 
predominantly Orthodox and Catholic areas
Table 2.1 gives a broad explanation of the types of questions I raised regarding 
which cases to select. Many of these questions will be addressed through the 
upcoming chapters; for now, I want to draw attention to a few immediate areas.
First, I want to draw attention to the fact that every case of genocide is unique and 
distinct. In fact, as a qualitative researcher, it is vastly important to view each 
individual case as unique, but also to view it as what Stake refers to as ‘common’ -  
assessable to and comparable with other cases: ‘Understanding each [event] requires 
as understanding of other cases, activities and events, but also an understanding of 
each one’s uniqueness’ (1995: 39, 44). Nonetheless, in the last quarter of the 20lh 
century, scholars have emphasized -  to varying degrees and often to their own 
detriment -  the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust above all others (Schapiro 1972; 
Poulantzas 1974; Conway 1980; Katz 1982; Katz 1981; Payne 1995; Braun 1994).
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The Holocaust is indeed a distinctive case. This is not to say that no connections or 
links exist between the Holocaust and any other distinctive case of genocide. Indeed, 
I will make a strong show of the relationships between the Holocaust and my other 
case studies. Regardless, it does not stand representative of any other cases of 
genocide or ethnic cleansing which has yet occurred.
Thus, though the Nazi genocide against the Jews is unique, the same measure should 
and must be extended outward to each case of genocide. I find it important to stress 
that Cambodia is no better or worse a comparison for Rwanda or Armenia than 
Germany is; this is one of the reasons why comparative studies are challenging to 
carry out. To underestimate the differences between cases immediately sets up 
research for failure as it leads to misrepresentations and misunderstandings of 
extremely complex circumstances. I expect these differences will help shape the 
characteristics of the ideology I am going to be explaining. They will show how 
different themes of genocidal ideology take precedent, while other themes continue 
to be in support, depending on outside sources, such as the type of war, the time 
period, the geography of the genocidal state and the technological advancement of 
that state.
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Table 2.1 Case Selection Overview
Turkey Germany Balkans
Type of war 
involved
inlemational with 




military, civilian military police/military, civilian
Central leader 
present?
no yes: Hitler moderate: M ilosevic, 
M ladic and Karadzic
















Sudan, pre-m odem  
ethnic conflicts
no moderate: Cambodia, 






loss o f WWI, 
economic depression
crumbling empire, 
T ito’s death and fall o f 
communism
Intervention 
occurring due to 
aggression?
no, cessation of 
conflict ended with 
Axis loss o f WWI
no, cessation of 
conflict ended with 
Axis loss o f  WWII 
though camp liberation 
was a part o f  Allied 
intervention
yes, direct NATO and 
UN involvement, led 
by US negotiators
Resulting in war 
crimes tribunals?
yes, but incomplete yes yes, ongoing
Particular notes of 
interest
contested in Turkey 
though only rarely in 
western academic 
scholarship
substantial amount o f 




movements in the 
region from 1999 to 
the present
Of course, choosing these three cases within the context of answering my research 
questions throws some considerable challenges in my path. The main difficulties are 
brought about through the historical spread of cases. Throughout the twentieth 
century, there have been vast shifts in technology, education, political systems,
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scientific discovery, et cetera. These changes, and most particularly changes in 
technology and changes in literacy rates, mean that different kinds of sources are 
available in each case and different sources remain in each case. Some primary case 
material has been lost or destroyed over time. Some material, particularly in the 
Ottoman case, is inaccessible to Western scholars. To compound the problem, even 
when primary sources are available, there are significant linguistic challenges. None 
of my cases have a shared spoken language; all three cases have produced significant 
primary material in multiple languages. My own language ability is limited to 
English and German, which hampers my ability to work with these documents. As 
section three of this chapter will show, I have attempted to work through these 
challenges as best as possible whilst still remaining sensitive to the differences in 
each case. However, doing so has necessitated using varying types of sources in 
order to get a valid picture of ideology over the course of each case.
Methodological Approaches to Mapping Ideology
This led me to the next major challenge of this research project, namely, how I was 
going to manoeuvre through historical research while maintaining a strong sense of 
political analysis. Though by conducting research on this topic, I was inherently 
going to be conducting a historical project, it was important that it continue to be a 
project focused on the study of state-sponsored ideology. My research questions are 
less concerned with individual experiences of ideology and more concerned with 
how ideologies evolve at state level. This research deals less with the relationship 
between the macro- and micro-level structures within a state than with comparing 
macro-level structures and macro-level evolution between states across time.
Through such critical assessment of the interaction between theoretical perspective, 
methodology and methods, a more specific approach thus begins to emerge from my 
own research assumptions. Firstly, in accordance with Crotty, I approach 
methodology as ‘the nature of knowledge’, or how we know about what we can 
know (1998: 8). Theoretical perspective entails the more specific connections 
between epistemology and theory. Methodology is not necessarily based in 
ontology; it is not a belief, but a tool used to shape and refine research.
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As regards my own epistemological perspective, I do not deny the existence and 
importance of certain patterns and repeated sequences occurring throughout modem 
history and, specific to my own research, in nationalist states. I also believe 
causation occurs in the social world, a belief necessarily reflected in my 
methodology. Hence, like Mann (1994), I draw from early philosophy and describe 
myself as an ‘as i f  positivist; facts -  once discerned -  are interpretable, but only 
reflect meaning when drawn into significant categories and analysed. As will be 
discussed later at length, historical sociologists draw heavily upon historian’s data 
and treat their findings as true; from this we are able to generate larger analytical 
theories.
However, I must concede that I also have certain ontological reasons for claiming 
that I am also ‘minimally’ a constructionist: (i) I do not believe that only one single 
actor can entirely influence the path of a social structure. Instead, I believe that an 
‘intervening possibility’ can exert more power over the acts of a mass group. If, for 
example, a state’s ideology is moving along the path to becoming genocidal, one 
would hope there could be intervening factors changing the course of that ideology. 
This could be anything from political intervention from a neighbouring state, to 
sanctions or perhaps a natural disaster. Part of this research project assesses to what 
extent this is true, if at all.
Equally, I assume that (ii) if constructionism finds that meaning is not discovered, 
but constructed, then any study in ideology is constructionist, especially if Abrams is 
right in his projection that human agency ‘is the problem of finding a way of 
accounting for human experience which recognizes simultaneously and in equal 
measure that history and society are made by constant, more or less purposeful, 
individual action and that individual action, however purposeful, is made by history 
and society’ (Abrams 1980: 7). Ideological manipulation in these cases is the 
manipulation of the culturally constructed belief of the individual by state elites. 
Ideological beliefs are not facts, but often people, on an individual and a collective 
level, act as i f  they were facts -  a point arguably much more important than any 
factual evidence. Thus, I classify myself as ‘minimally’ constructionist. Presented in
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this manner, my choice for taking a theoretical approach as opposed to a quantitative 
one becomes clear. These types of studies differ from the later in that they entail a 
shift in orientation which involves a greater degree of abstraction (Gottschalk 1945: 
201).
In order to continue on through a methodological analysis of ideology, it is important 
to remember, as set forth in Chapter One, that ideology is both structure and agency 
and, through its iterative nature, plays a ‘crucial and autonomous role in shaping 
political behaviour’ (Lecours 2000: 511). As such, we can identify ideology as an 
institution. This understanding was critical in deciding on my methodological 
choice, as it allowed me to focus on the work of historical institutionalists in order to 
constrain the methodological approach to my analysis. Historical institutionalism 
(HI) is generally categorised into ‘new’ and ‘old’ institutionalism. Old 
institutionalists are generally credited with a strong sense of the importance of 
historical context and the autonomous nature of institutions as well as evolutionary 
and holistic economics. Hira and Hira describe old institutionalists as being 
‘whimsical advocates of an unrealistic and basically empirical research programme’ 
whose focus lies overmuch on the socio-economic relationship of modern states 
(2000: 268 -269).
Nonetheless, over the past twenty years through the emergence of new 
institutionalism, institutionalism has changed from is traditional restriction to the 
economic paradigm. Most key institutionalist theorists do have backgrounds in 
economics (Immergut 2002; Rothstein 2002; Thelen 2002); therefore they rightly use 
institutionalism as a theory in their own models and theories. However, new 
institutionalism loosens the theory from the bonds of economics and freely applies it 
in other areas of social science. Political science in particular has found much use of 
institutionalism in scholars such as Theda Skocpol (1979; 1995; 2003).
Thus, my use of HI helps place my work firmly within a political framework; this is 
particularly helpful as ‘Genocide Studies’ is a multi-disciplinary field. As an 
approach to politics, the strengths of historical institutionalism are varied. The most
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important is its ‘ability to explain variation and irregularities in political outcomes’ 
(Lecours 2000: 521). New institutionalisms conclude primarily that political 
institutions affect both structure and outcomes of competition between groups in all 
social strata. These institutions are often unbalanced, profiting some groups and 
excluding others, particularly with regards to ethnical and historical variants 
(Lecours 2000: 510, 513, 514). This definition forms the ‘theoretical core’ of 
historical institutionalism.
HI also has an interesting relationship with the ideas of power which play a key role 
in any society, but are critical in radicalising states. According to historical 
institutionalists, ‘institutional factors can shape both the objectives of political actors 
and the distribution of power among them in a given polity’ (Thelen 2002: 6). 
Identities, such as ethnicity, religion and culture, are not classified as given, but as 
constructed. This construction occurs when political actors exert power over cultural 
practices and symbolic content, thereby producing and reproducing a number of 
symbolic codes which have a great influence on social and political actions (Lecours 
2000: 512).
Understanding institutions in this light sheds understanding on the role of institutions 
in genocidal situations. As we will see in Chapter Nine, legitimising ideology as a 
means to power has a linked relationship with legitimising genocidal policy; 
understanding connections between powerful institutions and between the 
individuals these institutions vest with power is key to understanding the 
consequences of behaviour radicalising towards genocide. According to historical 
institutionalism, these affiliations ‘are structured by institutions, and that, therefore, 
struggles for power follow different patterns and produce different outcomes partly 
as a result of institutional factors’ (Lecours 2000: 514; see also Skocpol 1995: 105).
As mentioned above, an institution is not merely a corporation or academic 
organisation. To most historical institutionalists, an ‘institution’ can be a formal 
organisation, but it also includes ‘informal rules and procedures that structure 
conduct’ (Thelen 2002: 2). As historical institutionalism is most concerned with
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politics, institutions included voting procedures, political party structures, relations 
among governmental branches, economic structures, and so forth. One of the 
strengths of institutionalism as an approach is that it highlights the fact that some of 
these institutions usually remain constant amidst turmoil in other areas; they are 
highly resistant to change even though they themselves cause change to occur in a 
subtle way over long periods of time (Thelen 2002: 18). When dealing with 
genocidal institutions this version of institutions does not always hold true. As will 
be shown in Chapters Five through Nine, ideology itself is a highly volatile 
institution; thus, I propose that when state institutions are in a period of crisis and 
rapid change over a short period of time, opportunities for new social contracts are 
established and thus, ideological radicalisation is likely to occur.
Understanding institutions as being the primary source of influence in political 
spheres allows scholars to analyse change, particularly as the power distribution 
available within those spheres strongly influences other aspects of society. With 
change comes conflict and institutions define terms of conflict, thereby shaping 
ideology and creating foundations for political manoeuvring, military function and 
the roles of others within the realm of the state (Immergut 2002: 85). Thus, HI is 
particularly useful to comparative historical sociologists as it ‘explains the causes for 
cross-national differences and similarities of particular phenomena. This method 
consists of analysing ‘slices of history’ from different social systems and focusing on 
the effect of political institutions’ (Lecours 2000: 515).
In seeking to comply with this aim, I then turned to Charles Tilly who identifies the 
use of historical analysis in social science across four main veins. The first approach 
is metahistorical, in which one attempts to identify temporal patterns across all 
human history; the second he calls world-systemic, in which one traces the shifts and 
changes in world systems such as states; the third approach is macrohistorical which 
examines large-scale structures -  such as state-led institutions -  within these world 
systems; finally, the fourth approach is microhistorical, where one would study the 
experiences of individuals and smaller groups within the limits of world- and sub­
world systems (Tilly 1988: 706). Naturally, choosing to participate in research in
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any one of these tour approaches to incorporating history into social science results 
in a more selective approach methodologically (Gottschalk 1945: 201). As my 
project pertains to the study of modem state institutions, it comfortably fits into the 
third macrohistorical category. Thus, macro-historical sociology (HS) began to 
emerge as a valuable methodological approach applicable to my research. As Tilly 
himself expounds, HS can ‘draw in important problems that are prominent in 
historical analysis and in lived history, but somehow remain neglected in sociology’ 
(1988: 710).
Though it seems to be in the midst of a recent renaissance, HS is, of course, one of 
the oldest methodological approaches in modern academia. Weber himself, though a 
sociologist, was a historical sociologist, investigating ‘the past by developing 
abstract categories and typologies for identifying generalisable and recurring 
patterns’ (Lustick 1996: 610). The term ‘historical sociology’ leads some to believe 
that this is a union between history and sociology in which the two fields meld into 
one (Burke 1980: 30). Like Abrams, I believe this claim is ‘too simple and too 
bland to do justice to a tangled, difficult relationship which is actually productive just 
because it is tense, distanced and complicated, because it is built on antithesis as well 
as on community of interest’; there is however a relationship between the two fields 
in which they can be viewed as distinct ventures with their own characteristic 
‘discourse of proof (1980: 4, 5).
Indeed, sociologists can never truly produce theories entirely devoid of history, but 
the intentions of both fields differ. Historians, claims Goldthorpe, are concerned 
with discovering evidence from relics; in contrast sociologists ‘invent evidence’ 
which constitutes the foundations of modem sociology (Goldthorpe 1991: 212). I 
find this to be harsh and side with Mann who defines sociology as the ‘science of 
society’ which uses systematic methods to generate generalized forms of knowledge; 
most of history does not participate in this way with its data. The other difference 
here is that macro-sociologists sometimes have a broader understanding of social 
theory than historians, again allowing for meta-theoretical outcomes. ‘Thus, the
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methodology of macro-sociologists differs considerably from that of most historians 
today, but it differs little from that of other sociologists’ (Mann 1994: 42).
HS is defined as discovering and testing hypotheses by ‘engaging theory with 
history’ which inspires new theoretical insights and interpretations of social 
happenings, both historically and in the present day (Mahoney 2001: xi). Indeed, as 
we have already seen, HS is theoretically based. While it is true that I will become a 
specialist in genocidal states, I have broader theoretical agendas than becoming a 
specialist in any one particular conflict. Instead, HS allows me to focus a ‘narrow 
but powerful searchlight’ on genocidal ideology, ‘finding patterns in the data to 
which historians had not been sensitive and finding inconsistencies or 
implausibilities in the accounts’ (Mann 1994: 43). HS’ particular strength in this 
area, providing it is used well, is the use of general theory (Kaiser and Hechter 
1991), rather than focusing on one specific methodological approach. Thus, it allows 
me the flexibility needed in order to subsume my quasi-positivist cum constructionist 
perspective described earlier in this chapter. As Dannreuther and Kennedy so aptly 
describe it, ‘HS has rightly viewed itself as a broad church, which is agnostic 
towards and willing to borrow from any potentially useful theoretical approach or 
methodological tool’ (Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 7).
Secondly, HS is not bound by time, per se. It uses history because it addresses large 
themes which stretch across time. Skocpol and Somers classify this type of research 
as macro-causal analysis as it is particularly focused towards producing new 
historical generalisations by ‘selecting or referring to aspects of historical cases in 
order to set up approximations to controlled comparisons’ (1980: 182). As Abrams 
critically suggests, HS allows for time to be considered as a means for social 
structuring (1980: 12). Vesting itself thus allows for the accomplishment of a 
number of things, namely the analysis of major transitions in the twentieth century, 
the construction of the modem world system, revolution and now, in this work, 
genocide.
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Naturally, sociologists are drawn to this sort of work, as it allows them to extend 
theories to see how widely over time and space they apply. Perhaps even more 
importantly, it can draw on important themes which have been overlooked in 
sociology, politics, anthropology and history (Mann 1994: 50-51; Tilly 1988: 710). 
In many ways, History and Sociology are a matched pair, even if a bit unevenly 
matched at times.
Such a sense of what the study of the social world is about is 
thoroughly serious, penetrating and fully justified by the past 
practice of both historians and sociologists. And from such a point 
of view history and sociology are effectively the same 
enterprise...sociology must be concerned with eventuation because 
that is how structuring happens. History must be theoretical 
because that is how structuring is apprehended. History has no 
privileged access to the empirical evidence relevant to the common 
explanatory project. And sociology has no privileged theoretical 
access.
(Abrams 1980: 5)
Sometimes sociologists tend to take this interpretive approach too far; as Tilly has 
suggested, sometimes it is as if sociologists have ‘built a discipline in which time and 
place served merely as convenient markers, not as systematic objects of analysis or 
ever-present bases of variation’ (Tilly 1988: 704). In order to be efficient scholars of 
genocide, it is vital that HS scholars continue to consider the context of history, 
something that will be discussed at greater length in the upcoming Chapter Four.
There is, however, one obvious disassociation between HS and studies in modem 
genocide. Most projects engaging HS deal with ‘big issues’ such as revolution, 
power and rebellion; generally these are considered macro-issues, issues which 
supersede a specific time period or geographical place. These research projects 
strive to discover generalized causation (Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 7;
Mahoney 2000: 508). Again, this is not to say that every case presented by 
historical sociology is ‘the same’, nor is it to say that there will never be instances 
where the theory ceases hold. My work again shows the difference between more 
metahistorical approaches and macrohistorical approaches; in my case, I am trying to
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generally say something about the evolution of ideology in modem states radicalising 
toward genocide. It is much more specific. Thus, I will use historical sociology 
primarily as a means of what Mann calls historical-causal analysis, which considers 
the conditions under which modem institutions, such as ideology, evolve to a place 
of power (Mann 1994: 39) rather than an attempt to test more abstract theories of 
human experience.
Dannreuther and Kennedy aptly sum up the key strengths and themes of HS, the first 
of which being this very open willingness to focus on the larger picture of history, 
and thus ‘challenge received wisdoms, and to de-naturalize social givens and reified 
conceptualizations’ (2007: 7). In dealing with questions of genocide, assumptions 
are rife and varied, both from scholars and non-scholars alike. Throughout the 
course of my work, I hope to unravel some of the more accepted stereotypes 
regarding radicalising ideology and ascertain which of these are earned and which 
are unearned.
HS is also a methodological approach specifically dealing with causation and rejects 
the separation of events from their rightful historical placement. Thus, though being 
a proponent of general theory, HS does separate itself from certain post-modem 
theories, particularly interpretivism and other anti-positivist accounts that have a 
more ‘arbitrary’ approach to selecting evidence that is outside historical accounts. 
‘This is not to say that HS does not fruitfully include quantitative data.. .or even 
elements of rational choice theory.. .but only in ways that support, rather than 
violate, the four main principles of research in HS’ (Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 
9 see also 7 - 8) as articulated by Tilly above. In this project, both in its aims and in 
its outcomes, causation is of key concern. In looking at the shifts in ideology and 
asking how those shifts occur and the events they are connected with, I am inherently 
addressing issues of causation and, critically, I am testing causal propositions. In 
doing so, the work of John Mahoney is of particular interest to me. Mahoney is one 
of the leading scholars in an approach close to HS: path dependency.
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HI suggests that institutions have an enduring nature (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; 
Price and Romantan 2004; Rahm, Brehm, and Carson 1999); Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010) go on to point out that this makes HI an appropriate method when explaining 
continuity rather than change. Path dependency offers an approach within HI to 
track changes in institutions. I am interested in path dependency because the 
research questions I propose inherently hypothesize whether or not a pattern of 
ideological progression exists. If it does exist, how is this progression expressed? If 
indeed genocide is a path dependent process and the creation of genocidal ideology is 
a significant and contingent part of that process, then the probability of preventing 
genocide is greater than if it were otherwise. This is true because ‘final outcomes 
cannot necessarily be predicted on the basis of early events in a sequence, even if the 
sequence is governed by rigid mathematical laws’ (Mahoney 2000: 529 - 530). 
Indeed, possible interferences may occur to change or influence the sequences; these 
interferences can be natural disasters, political, military or economic intervention, a 
change in power or a change in stability. Therefore, a greater understanding of the 
path dependent nature of genocidal ideology could provide the political community a 
stronger foundation upon which to implement interventionary measures, providing 
the set of conditions identified as the ‘reversal’ of path dependence is applicable. 
Reversals can occur because political decisions in any institution are not 
independent, but are created based on a sequence of events involving different actors 
at different times (Mahoney 2000: 511; Immergut 2002: 630). Chapter Nine 
readdresses these questions through the lens of my research analysis.
One cannot assume that because terms such as ‘paths of development’ and ‘pathways 
to change’ are used, that study is one examining path dependence (Mahoney 2000: 
507, 532). Instead, as Lecours suggests, path dependency is the idea that ‘institutions, 
once created, take a ‘life of their own’ and may generate processes not intended, nor 
foreseen, by their creators’ (2000: 517). Similarly, Sewell defines path dependency 
as ‘that what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible 
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (in Mahoney 
2000: 510). Path dependency asserts that certain events are necessary in order for
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other events to follow; the link between early events and final outcomes are causal 
mechanisms, which generally follow a clear order and process within a sequence.
Thus, within path dependency, causal processes ‘are highly sensitive to events that 
take place in the early stages of an overall historical sequence’ (Mahoney 2000: 510). 
Mahoney is supported in this claim by Paul Pierson who finds early events of much 
higher value to sequential outcomes than events which appear later. In fact, the same 
event occurring later in the sequence may have little or no effect, while occurring 
early in the event may be one of the most influential factors in the outcome (in 
Mahoney 2000: 510). Critically, Mahoney also claims that path dependent process 
tend to follow a deterministic, causal pattern, similar to inertia -  ‘i.e., once processes 
are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend to 
stay in motion and continue to track this outcome’ (Mahoney 2000: 511). This is due 
to path dependency’s characterisation of historical sequences as having deterministic 
properties, particularly in relation to institutional patterns and designs. In short, we 
find that Arthur’s assertion is Mahoney’s basis, that ‘when things happen within a 
sequence affects how they happen’ (in Mahoney 2000: 511).
Mahoney helpfully breaks down path dependency into two different fields, self- 
reinforcing sequences and reactive sequences. Most studies of path dependency, 
particularly in the field of economics, focus on self-reinforcing sequences. These are 
characterised by institutional reproduction mirroring early events and by the 
formation of institutional patterns (2001: xi); within a self-reinforcing sequence, we 
find increasing benefits for the institution over a long-term period, making the 
institution particularly resistant to change (2000: 508). Self-reinforcing sequences 
are circular, as opposed to linear, lending themselves to the age-old adage that 
‘history repeats itself.
In contrast, reactive sequences can and often do transform, reverse, or even negate 
early events. This type of sequence is not a reproduction of past events, but is 
generated by an event which sets in motion a set of linked reactions and 
counterreactions. Here, each following event is reactive and is causal, reacting to the
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previous event and causing the following event. As each event is causal and caused, 
they are ‘reactive’ and therefore they are ‘dependent’ (Mahoney 2000: 508, 526, 527, 
2001: 6); this is more than a representation of connected events influencing 
institutions and, in conducting path dependent research, it is important to show clear 
evidence of contingency. In Dark Side o f  Democracy, Mann (2005) does this to 
great effect, showing his readers clear proceedings from the state’s political ‘Plan A’, 
caused the shift to ‘Plan B’, then ‘Plan C’ and so on, until culminating in ethnic 
cleansing. He is able to show the ‘inertia’ Mahoney relies so heavily on, creating the 
reactions and counter-reactions creating the ‘inherent logic’ of path-dependency.
There is a singular way in which using reactive sequencing can be problematic. As 
noted above, it requires there be a primary event starting the sequence. As a 
historical sociologist, it is easy to continue to regress into history looking to find 
‘one more causal event’ and therefore never actually begin the sequence2. To lapse 
into this type of historical mongering is to merely say again that ‘history is 
important’ which, as we have already seen, is not the purpose of path dependency. 
Mahoney goes on to explain that path dependent sequences begin with a ‘critical 
juncture’. The critical juncture in any sequence is what Mahoney describes as the 
‘key actor choice point’ (Mahoney 2001: 6), is characterised by the selection of a 
particular option from among multiple alternatives and is often of ‘great historical 
significance’ (Onorna 2010: 89). The critical juncture then shapes institutions in 
such a way as to trigger one of the two sequences above. The idea of ‘critical 
juncture’ adds significantly to the deterministic properties of Mahoney’s explanation 
of path dependency as, after the occurrence of a critical juncture, the interferences 
expressed above are less likely to be significantly influential and giving states fewer 
options for change. Mahoney expresses this well, saying
once an option is selected, it becomes increasingly difficult to
return to the initial point where multiple alternatives [are] still
2 We see this often in biographies o f important political figures, such as Adolf Hitler. The Holocaust 
is claimed to have occurred because Hitler was denied a place in art school, because his sickly mother 
was doctored by a Jew, because he was born in Austria and so on.
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available...Not all choice points represent critical junctures.
Critical junctures are specifically those choice points that put 
countries (or other units) onto paths of development that cannot be 
easily broken or reversed.
(Mahoney 2001: 7)
There is a certain amount of tension between HI and path dependency because of the 
necessary balance in path dependency of maintaining conditions in sequence. As 
most historical sociologists are focused on grand theory, they can easily make the 
mistake of explaining the outcomes of their case studies without appealing to any 
contingent events. As mentioned above, this is not path dependency. This is not to 
say that this work is not profitable or that it does not broaden the realm of knowledge 
and understanding in any way; it is simply not path dependency.
We then find ourselves faced with a particularly interesting set of questions: As 
ideology is an institution and the process of change in some institutions is path 
dependent, is the process of evolution in radicalising ideology path dependent? Do 
we find critical junctures quite early on in the process of radicalisation as Mahoney 
suggests? Thus, one of the more abstract purposes of this project is to test 
Mahoney’s theory of path dependency in states which become genocidal. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Mommsen’s theory of cumulative radicalisation suggests that 
genocidal processes are reactive, pointing towards the applicability of the reactive 
sequence to the radicalisation process. Based on the significance Mahoney places on 
the linked, sequential nature of events in path dependent cases, I have chosen to 
shape my research around an episodic approach which forms a story-board for each 
case against which we can trace ideological evolution.
This episodic approach provides the structure for my research project, allowing me to 
fully examine both the relationship between ideology and the event at each episode 
and to test Mahoney’s theories of the importance of a critical juncture and the 
formulation of the reactive sequence in the ideological radicalisation process. I will 
be discussing whether or not it is necessary for radicalising ideology to adopt 
particular characteristics at certain points in the sequence in order for the next level 
of ideological radicalisation to occur. This approach considerably strengthens the
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output of my research as I am not only going to be examining a descriptive process, 
but also endeavouring to contextualize the relationship between ideology and events 
within the context of the causal reactive sequence. Of equal importance, due to 
Mahoney’s focus on the role of institutions as actors in the path dependent process, 
adopting this approach also addresses the challenge presented in the introduction of 
this chapter, allowing me to research ideological shifts across time and space within 
the context of ideology as both structure and agency.
Thus, path dependency within historical institutionalism brings conceptual and 
methodological tools to this type of research initiative, not in the least because path 
dependency characterizes specific instances in history where incidents occur in 
multiple cases. As contingency without theory is completely invalid, researchers 
using path dependency must be aware that it is primarily a ‘theory-laden process’ 
(Mahoney 2000: 508, 536); historical sociology provides the theoretical substance 
for the path dependent framework. HI serves as the connection between the 
conceptualization of ideology as expressed in Chapter One and path dependency and, 
through path dependency, links to the episodic approach expressed in each of my 
thematic chapters in the PhD.
Conducting HS Research
As do most historical sociologists, I am taking certain historical events as given; it is 
not my purpose or intention to prove that the Warsaw ghetto did exist, that there 
were death camps in Yugoslavia or that there was intentional, ethnic killing on a 
genocidal scale in Turkey during the First World War. I am taking it for granted that 
these events did occur based on what is generally understood by the historical 
community to be true3 and am moving forward from there. To attempt, in this 
dissertation, to prove again the occurrence of the Holocaust would be disastrous; 
frankly, other scholars have committed generous amounts of time and energy
3 The most arguable case is, o f course, the Armenian one as the Turkish state denies genocide ever 
occurring within its borders. However, based on the sources I am using and on my definition o f  what 
genocide entails, the Armenian case rests firmly within this comparative study as a case o f genocide.
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elsewhere to make that very argument. For me to use their impressive work in 
another way does, 1 hope, no disservice to them. I mean it to have the opposite effect 
entirely. Most of the sources I use throughout the body of my work are secondary.
So it is with many historical sociologists. This I see as not a weakness, but as a 
strength, of this approach. HS puts the facts and circumstances gathered by 
historians to use in a larger picture, thus deriving macro-and mid-level theories that 
can be applied across socio-spatial spheres. Historical events are not the outcome of 
historical sociological research; historical events are instead the foundation of 
historical sociological research.
In Goldthorpe’s famous ‘Uses of History in Sociology: A Reply’ (1994), he claims 
that ‘it is relics, and only relics, that can provide our knowledge of the past’ (69). 
This, however, depends entirely on the past itself and on the kind of research you 
want to derive from the past. Relics may indeed help one very much in proving the 
existence of events. For instance, relics such as Auschwitz-Birkenau and the various 
paraphernalia left after the fall of the Nazi regime will certainly help historians prove 
the camps existed and will help identify what the camps were used for; however, the 
ovens will not tell us why Hitler came to power nor why he found it necessary to kill 
millions of German citizens whilst fighting an international war. For that, a one must 
expand ‘relics’ to documents, ideological references and historical analysis, as 
Goldthorpe allows. In all three of my cases, this type of historical analysis has been 
done. ‘If a topic is too big for purely primary research and if excellent studies by 
specialists are already available in some profusion -  secondary sources are 
appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study’ (Skocpol 1984: 382). 
The trick, of course, is to establish which studies can be classified as ‘excellent’ 
enough to provide the range of knowledge, understanding and data necessary for a 
seemingly ‘excellent’ piece of historical sociological work. That is not to say that 
none of the criticisms Goldthorpe raises are worth considering.
‘Where a recourse to history is made.. .it must then be accepted that certain, and 
perhaps quite crucial, questions may have to be left without any adequate answer, 
simply on account of the limitations of the relics available’ (Goldthorpe 1994: 63).
42
Chapter 2: Problems and challenges
Here, Goldthorpe does indeed point to a fact important to both historians and 
historical sociologists, though perhaps for different reasons. If there is a lack of 
relics on a particular historical event, then it can be assumed that there will also be a 
lack of historical analysis. Where there is a lack of historical analysis, then 
competent HS cannot occur. This limitation, however, does not necessarily apply in 
my case. Genocide leaves tell-tale signs of occurring; these signs are ever more 
prevalent in the twentieth-century as the amount of news media and technology 
increases on a daily basis.
Chapter Three provides an overview of the literature for each of my three cases, 
providing a brief historiography and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
literature in general. It is from these secondary sources, based firmly in primary 
research, that I am basing much of my theoretical supposition. I am certainly not, as 
Goldthorpe claims, assembling the past ‘willy-nilly’ and ‘then, in ‘scissors-and paste 
fashion,’ selecting items to be combined, reordered and marshalled’ in order to 
create a new, fictional version of the past based solely on these secondary sources 
(1994: 65). In order to sidestep this very issue and to fill in the gaps left in the 
literature as discussed in Chapter Three, I have pursued primary documentary 
analysis in the course of this research project. Documentary research is not a clear- 
cut, organised category. It is usually laborious, even with helpful research tools like 
indexing and the internet. However, accessing these documents was worthwhile as 
they offer theoretical analysis, verification of fact and illustration of hypotheses and 
possibilities (Gottschalk 1945: 202, 231; see also Platt 1981: 31).
Truthfully, as a comparative historical sociologist, it is impossible for me to conduct 
the amount of primary research necessary to complete this project were primary 
research the only recourse left to me. In her innovative work on revolution, Theda 
Skocpol asserts that ‘redoing primary research for every investigation would be 
disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research’ (Skocpol 1984: 
382). I must rely on historical sources. Acknowledging this helps my efforts ‘to find 
opportunities for study in which cases outnumber variables’ by paying attention to
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historiography in my selection of source material and ‘in the construction of stylized 
background narratives’ (Lustick 1996: 605, 614).
Nevertheless, there is one significant problem which surfaces and resurfaces when 
participating in HS-led research: selection bias. In order to keep my analysis from 
devolving into ‘loose interpretations of a second order kind’ (Goldthorpe 1991: 223) 
it is absolutely necessary that I address this problem. As both Goldthorpe (1991) and 
Schwartz (1987) warn, when social scientists study history, they tend to develop and 
use methods which end up distorting history instead of enlightening history almost 
solely due to selection bias. Thus, it is particularly vital to comply with 
Stinchcombe’s imperative, that a social scientist ‘does not apply history to theory; 
rather one uses history to develop theory’ (1978: 1).
Historical sociology is not the only methodology which finds bias problematic.
Often research is biased on terms of gender, race, political influence, availability of 
data or even within quantitative analysis itself. In fact, selection bias can be evident 
in any analysis which draws upon one-dimensional work to produce background 
narratives and assumptions, even more so when a vast number of documents exist in 
relation to one topic (Mann 1994: 38; Lustick 1996: 606; Platt 1981: 37). 
Nonetheless, bias is a serious and problematic issue which has plagued historical 
sociology since its origins, particularly as it is much more than distinguishing ‘true’ 
accounts of history from ‘false’ ones. Not even Weber (1948) attempted to address 
the problems of bias and data-gathering. Ian Lustick is one of the only theorists 
grappling with this problem who has actually attempted to offer an answer.
In other words, searching for ‘facts’ which may be necessary to test 
a theory of interest to an historically minded social scientist may 
mean, as Skocpol indicates, searching high and low for 
monographic work containing the kinds of information and 
narratives needed, organized in roughly the necessary ways, or 
even constructing the work oneself, with one’s own theory as a 
guide for data collection. But here is the nub of the issue. Such a 
search may well entail, and can logically be supposed to entail, a 
heavy selection bias toward works by historians using implicit
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theories about how events unfold and how people behave very 
similar to the theory under consideration by the social scientist.
(Lustick 1996: 607)
For my own work, context is vital: not leaning on snippets of what one or another 
theorist has said, but checking and cross-checking that information within the greater 
body of literature in order to ensure a true representation of historical fact and 
interpretive analysis (Lustick 1996: 605, 606). Though, as Lustick reminds us, I may 
never be able to provide a theory capable of encompassing the approach of every 
historian who works in my field, this type of triangulation does significantly improve 
the confidence with which FIS and path dependency may be effectively used (Lustick 
1996: 616).
Lustick suggests three ways applicable to approach historiography in order to avoid 
selection bias, the first being a forthright discussion of historiographical debates 
within the context of the research. In doing this, historical discrepancy becomes 
transparent and can even illumine analysis (1996: 614). As it is such a contested 
case in modern dialogue, I will undoubtedly use this technique when dealing with 
Turkish aggression against the Armenians, particularly as there will be problems of 
access it will help me address. Similarly, this approach will also be helpful when 
dealing with the Holocaust. However, the vast amount of literature produced on 
WWII serves as entirely different situation, and is problematic in its own way. I will 
here attempt to follow the second strategy Lustick suggests, that is to ‘grant explicit 
consideration to the historiographical terrain at the outset of the study, identify the 
particular approach or school of historiography whose work is most convincing, and 
indicate its distinctive...theoretic commitments and biases’ (1996: 615). This 
restricts my focus to a manageable amount of information, and will help to construct 
a plausible narrative as required for this analysis. The last approach I plan to 
implement is to presume, especially in the case of Yugoslavia, that the narratives of 
historiography comprise a normal distribution of theoretical commitments. ‘[The] 
more powerful the theory, the more about historiographical patterns could be 
explained, despite the influence of sociology of knowledge factors on the
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orientations and conclusions of historians working in relevant and proximate fields’ 
(Lustick 1996: 615).
This again reflects the theoretical basis from which I am working, emphasising once 
more the theoretical approach to historical sociology as a grand-theory methodology. 
Nonetheless, it is unusual to find any piece of historical sociology totally devoid of 
what is generally known as ‘primary’ sources. John Mahoney (2001), Michael Mann 
(2005) and Ian Lustick (1996) all use some primary data to formulate their theories, 
chiefly because primary data can help support links between cases and sustain 
broader applications of their theories to various other situations.
‘Thus between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ research lies borderline territory where we 
may derive original data from ‘secondary ‘ sources’ (Mann 1994: 44). Herein lies 
the key to historical sociology: the things over which many historians debate are not 
necessarily pertinent to historical sociologists. Though certain historians, such as 
Bloxham, Kallis and Ramet, situate their work in a broader context of history, much 
information is presented in secondary sources which other historians of one 
particular period or occurrence fail to see in a larger picture. This does not take away 
from the necessity of historical research; indeed, without historical analysis, 
historical sociology would cease to exist. As Lustick suggests, the historian provides 
the data, or ‘the depiction of past events ready to be coded’ (Lustick 1996: 605).
This is the work of the historical sociologist within secondary sources -  to analyse or 
‘code’ data to shed light on a particular generalization or theory.
Fulfilling the brief of this research, however limited in its scope, was still challenging 
and, at times, problematic. As Robert Stake so aptly notes, in doing qualitative 
analysis, one finds that ‘the ethical risks are substantial. And the cost in time and 
money is high, very high’ (1995: 45). In order to attempt to constrain these costs, to 
any extent, I became increasingly aware that a viable research strategy was critical; 
in order to find the key to effective research for this project, it was necessary that I 
go back to the heart of my research questions.
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Research through the HS lens
The final significant problem my research questions raise is the problem of 
researching ideology. Every researcher faces problems in dealing with particular 
methodological approaches and with the difficulties raised by looking at multiple 
cases. Bringing ideology into the equation, however, adds another level of 
complexity. Ideology, or the common understanding of what the nation should 
believe as expressed by the state through elites, is made manifest in various different 
ways. It was these paths of expression I wanted to explore in order to consider the 
multidimensional aspect of ideology. As discussed in Chapter One, ideology is a 
breathing, variable and changing thing, rather than a static entity with easily 
identifiable descriptors. Thus, when mapping out the evolution of these ideologies, I 
am tracing ideologies that become, but were not always, genocidal; they are all 
ideologies radicalising toward genocide. It is necessary to research the patterns of 
process while continuing to be sensitive to the geo-political shifts unique to each 
case.
Thus, the first question raised here is ‘ What are the ways in which ideology is 
expressed at an elite level?’ Mann provides a helpful answer: ‘Ideologies are carried 
by communications networks in which some possess greater resources of knowledge 
and persuasion than others. They mobilize social movements and mass media -  
mass marches and meetings, the printed word, and the airwaves -  all of which may 
acquire power over people’ (Mann 2005: 30). This being the case, the second 
question, dependent on the first, and pertaining directly to this research project asks 
‘What relics of these ideologies remain for social historians to access in the three 
cases I have chosen?’ In answering this second question, it was essential that I 
consider the constraints inherent in my own project. Ideology is expressed mainly 
through official documents deriving from elites published through mass media 
outputs. However, historical sociologists can also avail themselves of personal 
documents and communiqués of state elites instrumental in creating ideology and 
policy; all three of these avenues are bolstered by the personal statements and
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material presented during the course of both the Nuremberg and ICTY trials in the 
German and Balkan cases.
At this point in my research project, when I realised I was going to be looking at the 
evolution of ideology across a long-range time period within a large geographic 
space, I knew it was important to consider the problems and challenges this added to 
my research project. Hakim points out that considerations of time and space tend to 
be overlooked when participating in comparative studies (2000: 157; see also 
Barraclough 1965); for my research, however, I knew these considerations would be 
critical as both can effect the sequencing model of path dependency.
Phillips points out that studies within the same space and time are working within an 
‘ordered framework for description and argument’ providing a common background 
that research projects comparing across time are not able to access (Phillips 1994: 
261). Comparability across périodisation, or the compartmentalisation of various 
stages in history, is important in my project as historians tend to focus on one stage, 
or period, in history; my project looks at three different generally accepted stages of 
périodisation: WWI, WW1I and the break-up of the Communist block. Comparing 
cases across the lines of périodisation means that not only am I constrained by space 
in language, but it is also imperative that I assess the constraints placed upon my 
project across time. Phillips’ own work (2002; 1994), along with that of other social 
scientists such as Mann (1986; 1993; 2004; 2005), Greenfeld (1992) and Shaw 
(2007; 2003) amongst others, show us that this type of comparison is possible; 
nonetheless, the problems of analysing cases across time and space are significant.
The problems of analysing cases in this way can largely be summed up in the 
problem of the comparability of empirical sources. Differences in time mean that in 
each case, I am dealing with varying levels of technological development. This 
variance means that each case used slightly different means to communicate ideology 
and that, of those means, varying types of ideological remnants remain. I express the 
problems faced in each case more specifically below, but overall, I became
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increasingly aware that this problem of comparability meant that my analysis and the 
presentation of my case study data would be based on multiple data sources.
One of the greatest helps in overcoming the problem of comparability is that, 
regardless of the varying types of data source, each source is a means through which 
ideology is expressed; thus, on that basis, the sources are comparable. Equally, using 
a mixed source base does help solve the problem of selection bias. As my research 
analysis has come out of a variety of sources across a significant amount of time, 
there is less of a chance of having a skewed outcome due to over-reliance on certain 
secondary sources.
Before going on, a brief note on my use of tribunals in only two of my cases is 
important. ‘Of course, international tribunals are not the only legal venues in which 
cases of crimes against humanity can be heard; they tend to function poorly in 
practice, being susceptible to pressures from powerful states and the prejudices of the 
nation-states involved’ (Akqam 2006: 292); equally, the documents used in these 
tribunals is biased, allowing a certain level of ‘victors justice’ in the courtroom. I 
have done my best to avoid bias within the PhD by triangulating the information 
found therein with secondary sources when available. Nonetheless, these two 
infamous examples of international tribunals have provided lucrative information 
spanning the course of the conflict in both cases as will be seen in the upcoming 
chapters. Early on, I decided against attempting to incorporate information from the 
Istanbul trials into the research process for this project4. Firstly, though there are 
various copies of certain cases in various libraries and collections around the world, 
we are still unsure as to whether or not the complete court records still exist; the 
records that do exist are hailed by sceptics of the genocide as fictitious accounts of 
‘victor’s justice’ (Akqam 2006: 4-5). Secondly, I was aware that in Berlin I would 
be able to access a collection of a workable number of primary documents in a
4 For more information on the trials themselves, see Dawidowicz (1976); during these trials we see the 
introduction o f  the term ‘crime against humanity’, a significant contribution to international law used 
throughout the twentieth century in the prosecution o f war criminals (Akçam 2006: 368), including 
those used in this research in the ICTY trials.
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language I understand pertaining to the Armenian case which would offer sufficient 
insights into the ideology of the regime.
To start looking at my research-gathering in depth, a brief overview of the seven 
months spent doing field work is helpful. I began fieldwork with the Balkan case, 
accessing documents from the ICTY online database. After finalising the initial 
stages of my research gathering on this case, I gained access to the Zentrum für 
Berlin Studien at the Haus Berliner Stadtbibliothek and began my work on the 
Holocaust. Soon after, I began research on the Armenian genocide in the Amerika- 
Gedenkbibliothek, in the collections of iDie armenische Frage und der Genozid an 
den Armeniern in der Türkei (1913 - 1919): Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv 
des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amts’ compiled by Wardges Mikaeljan of the Institute of 
History in the Armenian Academy of Science. Though the original Altdeutsch 
remains in place, compiling copies of the documents involved setting them to 
modern typeface; thus, I was enviably saved from suffering through Altdeutsch 
penmanship and was able to focus on content. With this in mind, the remainder of 
this chapter looks specifically at the official resources, mass media publications, 
personal documents and communiqués used from each case.
Official state publications and media sources
Turkey. I have used only a limited amount of official state publications and media 
sources in this research project; most of the information that would fall under this 
category was originally found either within the personal communiqués described 
below or in a secondary source. The reasons for this are numerous, but most 
importantly, the availability of official Turkish documents relating directly to the 
Armenian atrocities is still limited and they are in a language I am not fluent in.
Thus, I have effectively relied more heavily on pre-existing secondary literature to 
fill these gaps.
Germany. An unparalleled amount of information is available on the Holocaust and 
on the Nazis’ propaganda machine in particular. However, as my work looks at the 
evolution of ideology, the intricacies of the vast Nazi bureaucratic regime have little
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scope to be explored here. Though I was able to garnish some information from 
some of these works, it was easy and helpful for me to expand this knowledge with 
newspaper articles based around particular events crucial in the expansion and shift 
of ideology at the time.
Naturally, as I am using a media sources, there is much historical information given 
to me through the newspaper articles I have analysed in my German case. However, 
the type of document influences the way that information is presented. In many of 
these papers, just as much space is given to printing a poem as to describing the 
German invasion of Poland. It lacks the balance found in my other cases. But again, 
that is to be expected. I have also restricted the amount of historical framing I would 
get from my field documents by limiting myself to only looking at newspapers 
published by the Nazi regime and, specifically in Der Völkischer Beobachter. Der 
Völkischer Beobachter was one of the regime’s most widely read and influential 
media outlets (Kallis 2008: 119). Unlike more discriminatory papers, such as Der 
Stuermer which was contested even within the Nazi party (Tribunals 12.07.1946), 
Der Völkischer Beobachter provides a tool of propaganda accepted by both 
extremists and conservatives. Its wide acceptance has given me a much clearer and 
nuanced view of how mainstream ideology was actually portrayed. Even within the 
context of this more mainstream newspaper, internal news and ‘true’ historical 
events regarding Jews are simply not discussed. In fact, almost all non-biased 
reporting is eliminated; every article I have read is influenced by and biased in 
favour of Vaterland and Führer. Thus, any historical information provided herein 
has been cross-referenced and double-checked for validity before using it as a 
historical reference. Nonetheless, the insight these texts have given me regarding 
ideology has been invaluable.
In order to effectively limit my research base and test Mahoney’s theory of path 
dependency with an episodic approach, I decided to focus my research on editions of 
Der Völkischer Beobachter published around certain key events occurring after the
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Nazis assumed state power'. In an attempt to keep this section from degenerating 
into a mere list of dates and events, I have decided to present the information 
regarding the dates of newspapers I have used listed in Table 2.2. I have 
endeavoured to use six newspaper articles per key event, one from each of the two 
weeks preceding the event, the day the event occurred, the day after the event 
occurred and one from each of the two weeks prior to the event. Unfortunately, no 
papers were available the day after Kristallnacht or for the day after Auschwitz 
became an extermination camp. The paper published immediately preceding 
Kristallnacht on 10 November 1938 was not available in Berlin and had not been put 
onto microfiche. As regards 4 September 1941, the next paper printed by the 
NSDAP was five days after the event; thus, I decided to continue with my 
established pattern and wait until the full week had passed before including the next 
paper.
Table 2.2: Issues of Der Völkischer Beobachter
Book burning at 
Opemplatz




26 April 1933 1 September 1935 26 October 1938 20 August 1941
one week 
before event
3 May 1933 8 September 1935 2 November 1938 
date of event
27 August 1941
date of event 10 May 1933 15 September 1935* 9 November 1938 3 September 1941*
one day after 
event
11 May 1933 16 September 1935* ** **
5 A discussion on why these events were chosen and their importance in context is found in Chapter 
Four.
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one week after 
event





23 May 1933 29 September 1935 23 November 
1938
17 September 1941
*event occurred over both 15 
and 16 September though was 
reported primarily on the 
16.9.35
**no paper 
available for 10 
November 1938
**no paper available for 4 
September 1941
The Balkans'. My reliance on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) is heavily influenced by their extensive archival achievements 
and the translation of most of their documents into English. Using these documents 
allows me to both track the permeation of ideology by seeing how it effects the 
testimonies of those on trial and to use the prosecution’s accounts in a similar way as 
in the Nuremberg trials (see below). However, using the ICTY trials is not without 
its problems. Not only are the trials still going on, but some of the key criminals 
charged with genocide have not been apprehended. I am hoping this changes 
sometime in the very near future. At this juncture, however, I proceed with the cases 
made available; that is, the ones which show most strongly the influence of ideology.
The ICTY has an extensive and thorough online database; my first challenge was to 
naiTow down the available documents in order to better focus on the information 
pertaining to my question. Thus, I limit my research to those trials of individuals 
who have been indicted for genocide and/or extermination. Thus, the pertinent trials 
are those of Biljana Plavsic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Slobodan Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, 
Radovan Karadzic, Sasa Stanisic, Momcilo Persic, Sdravko Tolimir, Milomir Stakic, 
Radislav Krstic, Stojan Zupljanin, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, 
Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, Vinko Pandurevic.
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The majority of those listed above still have ongoing court cases. The exceptions are 
Biljana Plavsic who was convicted of persecutions on political, racial and religious 
grounds and cut a deal with the prosecution, pleading guilty to the above charges and 
thus had the genocide and extermination charges dropped. Milomir Stakic did not 
plead guilty, but evaded the genocide charges he was indicted with and was found 
guilty of extermination, murder and persecutions. Perhaps the most interesting is 
Radislav Krstic who was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide, murders, 
extermination and persecutions, though was not prosecuted for genocide itself. 
Recently arrested, the prosecution is in the early stages of proceedings against 
Radovan Karadzic, whose trial is of continuing interest to genocide scholars and the 
general public alike. Lastly, is the late Slobodan Milosevic, indicted on a lengthy list 
of counts including genocide, complicity in genocide, deportation, extermination and 
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds. Milosevic was not found 
guilty, but died before the end of legal proceedings on 11 March 2006.
As regards ideological information found in official sources, the majority of this type 
of information found in the Balkan case is found in three different types of 
documents gathered from the prosecution of these war criminals, written for two 
different audiences. The first are Case Information Sheets (CIS). The purpose of a 
CIS is to inform a very broad audience about the perpetrator, their backgrounds and 
their involvement in the Yugoslavian conflict. While they do not go into great depth, 
they offer useful information not easily available in other documents. They also 
include maps, tables, data and information about the trials themselves as well as an 
overview of the historical settings in which the events take place. Every person 
indicted by the ICTY has a CIS available online.
The second type of document are the prosecutorial indictments. I have used nine 
different types of indictments: Initial Indictments, Amended Indictments, Revised 
Amended Indictments, Amended Consolidated Indictments, Second Amended 
Indictments, Second Consolidated Amended Indictments, Third Amended 
Indictments, Fourth Amended Indictments and, in the case of Biljana Plavsic, Guilty 
Pleas. The purpose of these indictments are to incriminate. Thus, they show the war
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criminal in the worst light, attempting to prove guilt. There are two reasons for the 
large amount of categories; first is that certain changes have had to be made to satisfy 
the defence. Some cases, for instance, have been severed and others have been 
joined. Secondly, and more importantly for my research, is the added admission of 
evidence and information. Naturally, as a certain amount of time goes on, more 
evidence for certain allegations is discovered and needs therefore to be brought 
before council. For instance, the Initial Indictment against Karadzic and Mladic was 
brought forward in July 1995. By October 2002, the date of the Amended 
Indictment against Mladic, the two cases had not only been severed into two 
disassociated trials, but substantial information added to the Mladic case, including 
an increased number of statistics and tables.
I am counting these tables as the third type of document used in this case. Not only 
those presented in the Mladic case, but of the eighteen defendants included in this 
section of my fieldwork, six of these cases included extensive lists of information, 
usually appended in tables. Naturally, as the indictments have grown and changed, 
so too have the tables. Much of the information provided therein was largely 
repetitious, but with small important changes. Thus, I have compiled all of the 
information on each topic from all of the indictments into one table on each topic.
The information I am using is pertinent to detention facilities, killings related to 
detention camps, killings not related to detention camps, sacked towns and villages, 
destruction of sacred sites, the takeover of power in certain municipalities and towns 
and municipality populations broken down, where possible into Bosnian Muslim, 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat percentages. Though this information was not 
made public to the Balkan press, this type of information gives valuable insight into 
various different areas, particularly relating to the differences in ‘otherness’ as 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
Personal documents and communiqués
Gottschalk et al suggest that two of the uses of personal documents are for the 
development of the theoretical elements of research and for the illustration of various 
hypothesis and possibilities (Gottschalk 1945: 202). In my work, these documents
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serve to do both. The personal documents and communiqués used in my research 
were written for an exceptionally informed audience, usually to a consular employee, 
other government official or for their own personal use. Thus, there was no need to 
offer historical information per se, nor was it always necessary or even possible to be 
constantly referring to other communications received in order to hold a 
intercommunicative dialogue. Nonetheless, in the rarer circumstances when 
historical events are described, they are done so in exceptional depth, often being 
very explicit as to what numerous people said, how people were treated, times of 
day, specific numbers and so on. There are, naturally, challenges to working with 
eye-witness accounts as fact (Bryman 2004: 381 - 384). However, by cross- 
referencing the information found in these reports from other accounts by different 
sources, I am confident in my ability to present the information found therein in a 
fluid, unbiased manner.
Turkey: Of all three of my cases, my use of personal documents is strongest in the 
Turkish case. My first step was to narrow down the number of documents from over 
six hundred to a more workable number of two hundred and sixty three. This was 
accomplished firstly by a relatively swift perusal of the catalogue index, dismissing 
documents relating to German troop movements, German and Turkish business 
relations and documents relating to more general news on WWI. Then, I quickly 
read a large number of documents relating to the Armenians, but many were tales of 
suffering and, whilst interesting and heart-wrenching, offered no direct information 
concerning genocidal ideology. From the remaining two hundred and sixty three, I 
identified fifty seven most pertinent to my research by re-reading each text with great 
care. These remaining fifty seven documents are focused in the years 1913 to 1916, 
though a few documents stretch into 1917 and 1918.
My fieldwork focused around five types of documents found in the Amerika- 
Gedenkbibliothek’s collection. The first are field reports from missionaries and 
civilian personnel, particularly Johannes Lepsius, a German missionary contracted by 
the German government early on as a field informer and eye-witness to the Armenian 
atrocities. Whilst interesting and helpful information is offered in the other reports I
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have used, Lepsius’ information is certainly the most thorough and is also the most 
widely referenced of any German informer in academic work relating to this case.
His political aspirations caused him, if anything, to guard against over-antagonising 
the Turks. In fact, some scholars have proposed that he refrained from divulging 
some of the most damning evidence against the Turks until quite late in his life in 
order to maintain the alliance between the Germans and the Turks (Akqam 2006). 
This increased trust between himself and the Turks in power; thus, his understanding 
of the genocidal aims of the Young Turk regime was certainly of a higher level than 
some of the other reports I examined.
The second type of document proving invaluable to my research are reports from 
various German diplomats and military officers. These reports, often coming from 
high level officials are highly nuanced but brutally honest about the purpose and 
intent of policies initiated throughout the CUP’s time in power. Many of the authors 
of these reports were more than aware of the atrocities being committed; some even 
signed deportation orders themselves. As time went on and the scale of the 
aggression grew, their missives and personal writings express more disapproval and, 
in certain cases, disbelief (Akpam 2006: 7, 6; R14098/Ab.4215 24.01.1918; 
R14098/Ab. 10208 17.02.1918; R14099/Ab. 15733 12.04.1918). Many of these 
documents were listed at the time as Top Secret status and have now been released to 
the public. Much of the information on regional insecurity and its relation to the 
homeland, as will be seen in more detail below, is presented through these channels.
Similar a in style are documents sent by the German consulate in Turkey to the 
German State Department, most often in the form of telegrams and short letters with 
attached reports. As with the diplomatic and military reports, a few of these 
documents have been declassified over the last century. The fourth type of document 
I am working with are international consulate messages to the German State 
Department and consulates in Turkey. Primarily coming from French and Belgium 
diplomatic missions, these reports, though few in number, usually relate to 
information not reported by German diplomats for reasons of political nicety. They
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provide information from a different ideological perspective, but maintain the high 
style and information found in the documents noted above.
In total contrast to the previous categories, my fifth type of document, letters from 
Ottoman citizens to the German consular missions in Turkey, lacks diplomatic 
restraint in favour of providing critical eye-witness testimony. Usually these 
accounts come in the form of letters begging for German intercession into the 
atrocities. While most of these letters come from Armenians, a small number were 
written by sympathetic Turks and other minorities, usually Christian.
Germany. To support the various media sources used in my German case, I chose to 
use a variety of personal documents and statements. The most famous of these 
printed sources are both Goebbels’ diaries and Mein K am pf I recognise that Mein 
Kam pf is in a bit of a grey category, being both personal writing and state-sponsored 
publication; however, I have chosen to put it in this category as it reflects the 
personal view of one individual at its time of writing. Only later in the Nazi reign 
did it come to be considered of vital literary importance6.
Of equal, if not greater, interest are the personal statements made by key Nazi leaders 
in the Nuremberg Trials. These I accessed through Yale Law School’s Avalon 
Project, which houses the widest number of legal documents pertaining to the Nazi 
regime and still seeks to expand it’s library. I focused my reading on the twenty-two 
volumes of the ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military 
Tribunal: Proceedings Volumes’. These include personal statements from all of the 
major war criminals, though I focused my research on the cases of Doenitz, Frank, 
Frick, Fritzsche, Funk, Goering, Hess, Sauckel, Speer, Kaltenbrunner, Keitl, Jodi, 
von Neurath, Raeder, von Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Schacht, von Schirach and 
Streicher. The statements these men made whilst in court are of great testament to 
the depth of their belief in a fully fledged ideology.
6 For more information on the history o f M ein K a m p f  (Hitler 2009 [1925]), see D.C. W att’s 
introduction to the text.
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Balkans: As regards this case, I have used only a limited number of personal 
communiqués. A majority of these are to be found in the ICTY trial documents, in 
particular, the statements that the above-listed defendants made in their own defence. 
Unfortunately, language barriers inhibited my ability to access phone transcripts, 
wires and letters as relates to this case. Luckily, many of the secondary sources I’ve 
used for this case do provide substantial amounts of text from these types of 
documents already translated into English.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the questions, problems and challenges 
arising from my research questions and to discuss the ways in which I have dealt 
with them whilst carrying out research. The first section focused on the problems of 
case study selection. The second section addressed my choice of HI as an approach 
and suggested that this research project may be able to test Mahoney’s theories of 
path dependency in the context of radicalisation. It also contextualised ideology as 
an institution, identifying HI as the connection between ideology and the episodic 
approach I take throughout the substantive chapters of the PhD. The third section, 
conducting HS research, discussed some of the weaknesses of HS and how other 
scholars have sought to deal with these weaknesses. Lastly, I have outlined how 
ideology structured not only my research questions, but also my research strategy. 
Using the way ideology is conveyed in order to provide a skeleton for my research 
method has been invaluable in the context of HS and HI.
‘Comparative-historical analysis is designed to discover and test hypotheses by 
engaging theory with history; when successfully employed, it can both inspire new 
theoretical formulations and stimulate new interpretations of historical cases’ 
(Mahoney 2001 : xi). This assertion applies to my work in that herein I am seeking to 
‘inspire new theoretical formulations’ regarding genocide analysis. Much has been 
written on the ideologies of particular genocidal regimes, but how that ideology is 
formed and whether or not there is any similar pattern of formation is still yet to be 
established. Whether or not genocidal ideology evolves in a similar fashion is,
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however, a vital question which must be asked if prevention is ever to be attained. 
This is what I seek to add to theories of genocide and hope, as well, to add to the 
greater body of work in historical sociology.
Of course, HS is not a perfect approach and my interpretation of it as a method is far 
from flawless. As Goldthorpe points out, ‘in some respects data created on the basis 
of field work will indeed offer advantages over evidence derived from relics.. .in 
other respects just the reverse will hold’ (Goldthorpe 1994: 63). The difference lies 
in what is desired from the data. It is not my intention to merely ‘interpret historical 
cases’, as Mahoney suggests, though I will offer some interpretations; my hope is 
that these interpretations will be applicable to present and future cases of radicalising 
states as well as adding to the literature on HI and path dependency through my 
analysis of ideology as structure and agency.
In his noted essay From Exchange to Structure, Michael Hechter describes the 
relationship between methodological holists, those who find that when individuals 
act, they do not do so as individual actors, but as member of a bigger societal 
structure and methodological individualists, those who argue that the ‘dynamic force’ 
of societal structures is purely in the hands of individual agents acting for individual 
gains. At the heart of this relationship is, he argues, power. The ‘root of power -  its 
internal source -  lies in the subjective value that agents place on given goods and 
events’ (Hechter 1991: 49), or, in other words, structure. My research deals with the 
power of ideology in a similar fashion. There can be no denying the role of the 
individual in genocidal action. However, when attempting to describe any grand 
theory of genocidal analysis, I focus not on the individual and the direct action of an 
individual. Instead, I am looking at the kind of power state-led ideology has over an 




A survey of scholarly approaches to genocide
Introduction
As was noted in the introduction, this thesis is about the evolution of ideology as it 
radicalises in states that become genocidal. By comparing three cases in which 
genocide did occur, I am seeking to establish whether or not there is a common 
pattern of evolution and what key themes arise within the ideological shifts. The 
purpose of this section is to develop the backdrop of this investigation into what is 
commonly considered to be one of the vilest instances in modern history. In doing 
so I will trace my own path down the literature of nationalism and genocide while 
also giving a broader sense of the general literature on the subjects and their 
interactions with each other.
I begin, as mentioned above, by accounting for the influence nationalism scholars 
have had on issues of race and ethnicity. This sections focuses primarily on the 
varying approaches to nationalism studies, in particular those taken by 
primordialists, modernists and ethnosymbolists. This discussion is of particular 
import as it allows me to situate genocide studies within the greater scholarship of 
social and political studies. This is then followed on a section detailing the transition 
from nationalism literature to the more focused literature of genocide studies. This 
section is dominated by a review of the definition of genocide, and expands only to 
include a broad introduction to the typologies of genocidal literature. I limit this 
discussion to works that have taken a more theoretical or macro approach to 
genocide studies, leaving the laudable and, particularly regarding my Holocaust case, 
almost indefatigable literature of each of my case studies until the final section. With 
this groundwork established, this Chapter concludes by posing certain questions 
raised by the literature which help guide the reader through the upcoming chapters of 
the thesis.
Chapter Three: Survey o f  approaches
The academic foundations of genocidal literature are found not in accounts of broad 
history nor in critical studies of war and justice; these types of analysis provide 
accounts of important events of conflict, but offer little by way of a macro approach 
to genocide. For that, we must begin by looking to nationalism theory. Nationalists 
of all sorts, look to their movements to provide them with a different and better 
society wherein the rights and freedoms of the ethnic groups can come to full 
realisation. Nationalism scholarship is broken up into two very distinct categories: 
scholars who advocate primordialism, and its counterpart, perennialism, and those 
who support a more modernist, or ethno-symbolist, approach to the nation. In the 
forthcoming section, I am going to discuss both types of nationalism, but the 
discussion on modernism and the various theories of modernist nationalism will take 
up the majority of the discussion.
Perhaps it would be wise for me to quickly justify this choice. The primary 
argument between modernists and primordialists is what constitutes a nation and its 
ties to ethnicity, when ‘the nation’ begins and the possible equivalence of 
comparison between modem and ancient history. Nonetheless, even the most ardent 
primordialists/perennialists, would acknowledge the differences between ancient and 
modem nations. Similarly, there is an argument to be made for the antiquity of 
genocide; Ben Kieman’s Blood and Soil (2007), Michael Freeman’s Genocide, 
Civilization and Modernity (1995) and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s History 
and Sociology o f  Genocide (1990), as well as more specific works such as Ward 
Churchill’s A Little Matter o f  Genocide (1997) and Richard Bauman’s Human Rights 
in Ancient Rome (2000) all serve as examples of arguments where genocide is 
perceived as an historic event. Nonetheless, that modem genocide differs from 
conflicts in pre-history, Biblical times, the Middle Ages and even through colonial 
times has also been well established (see Bauman 2002 [1989]; Mann 2001; Weitz 
2003; Valentino 2004 for examples). In the later sections of this chapter, I will 
develop this to a greater extent; for now, however, let it be justification for my choice
Nationalism
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of focus re nationalism. The modernity of nations leads to a context and framework 
for my analysis of genocide literature more generally; thus, I have chosen to focus on 
modern nationalism more than that of primordialism or perennialism.
Umut Ozkirimli reminds his readers that there are few scholars today who ardently 
advocate a determined view that nations are completely natural (2000: 69), though it 
is Clifford Geertz (1993 [1973]) who has gone to the greatest lengths to explain the 
basic tenets of primordialism and vitally acknowledged the role of ethnicity in 
antiquity. However, Anthony Smith is attributed with introducing perennialism to 
nationalist dialogue, an approach seemingly more accessible to current trends in 
nationalism as it is less radical, by bridging primordialism’s antiquated ethnicity with 
the ethnic groups of today’s societies and nations. Indeed, the most important 
element for Smith seems to be perennialism’s concern with ‘underlining the power, 
longevity and ubiquity of ethnicity/nationality, to trace its roots in both history and 
the human psyche and to vindicate the importance of seeing ethnicity empathetically 
and not to judge it by some externalist criterion of ‘objective reality” (Smith 1998: 
160). Smith goes on to distinguish between sociobiologists such as Joshua Fishman 
(1972; 1999) who promote the idea of direct kinship and ethnic continuity and the 
type of work done by scholars such as Walker Connor (1984; 1987; 1994). In fact, 
even Fishman, a proponent of theories supporting the biological role of kinship ties, 
hesitates to explicitly claim that the nation has been created from nothing at all and 
that nothing existed prior to the nation -  very few theorists would, even the most 
staunch supporters of perennialism. The same can be said for the ethnosymbolists 
such as Connor, Anderson (1983), Hobsbawm (1994; 1990) Hutchinson (2001;
1999) and Smith himself who, through extended fieldwork done on modem national 
movements, find that it is merely a shared belief in ancestry that serves to bind 
individuals to a nationalistic ideal.
This leads us to modem nationalism scholarship and the pertinent civic/ethnic divide.
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Scholars of modem nationalism, unlike perennialists and primordialists, focus on 
nationalism during the advent of the modem political state. Uneven development, 
modernisation, economic division and political displacement feature highly within 
modem nationalist discourse (Naim 1977; Gellner 1983; Breuilly 1993; McCrone 
1998). Modem nationalism sees a shift through the introduction of mass 
participation of the demos into the political realm (Mann 1990, 1993; Snyder 2000).
Nationality, for the modem society, is based around the search for expression 
through ‘the highest form of organised activity, a sovereign state... [the masses] 
identified themselves with the nation, civilisation with national civilisation, their life 
and survival with the life and survival of the nationality’ (Kohn 1945: 18, 19). 
Though since the American Revolution, the definition of demos has shifted to 
include women and minorities, the basic tenants of Kohn’s statement remains the 
same throughout modem/post-modem society. Much of these modern nationalist 
movements fall into Seton-Watson’s classification, ‘official nationalism’ where 
nationalism was imposed from the top down, out of the crumbling empire-states 
(1977: 148). Anderson capitalises on this idea, describing official nationalism as ‘a 
major effort to stretch the short, tight skin of the nation over the vast body of the old 
empire’ (Anderson 2001: 35).
Often, the institutionalisation of popular nationalist movements by the state resulted 
in ethnically-based exclusionist policies; other times, such as in France and Italy, a 
more citizen-based approach to the nation arose (Mann 2005: 181). The ethnic/civic 
divide amongst nationalism scholars is right at the heart of the literature pertaining to 
this project. Indeed, most modern nationalist scholars note the Janus-like distinction 
visible in national movements. Modem nationalism is credited with state-building, 
enhanced levels of cosmopolitanism, high levels of civic participation and 
inclusiveness; equally, modem nationalism is blamed for civil war, separatist 
movements, exclusionist politics and extreme mass conflict. This seeming 
juxtaposition within the character of nationalism has been generally agreed to come 
out of two types nationalism: civic and ethnic. Naturally, because of the problematic
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nature of terminology in academic study, most scholars tend to ascribe different 
terms to the two phenomenon; however, a general understanding exists that these two 
typologies of nationalism describe the variable political outcomes of nationalist 
movements.
Hans Kohn is attributed with introducing this split into the academic dialogue, 
associating the divide between civic and ethnic nationalisms with Eastern and 
Western communities. The rise of nationalism in the West, Kohn attributes with 
being typically a political occurrence, associated with the concepts of individual 
liberty and cosmopolitanism popular in the eighteenth century (Kohn 1945: 329 - 
330). We must take note of the regional bias present in Kohn’s theories; this ‘ages’ 
Kohn’s proposals in that it is, as Brubaker (2004: 133), resonant of a neo-orientalist 
perspective. It is much more common in today’s academic sphere to note differences 
between individual states or national groups, rather than continents or large regional 
swathes.
Nonetheless, Kohn’s theories have allowed for much scholarship discussing 
strengths and limitations of civic nationalism. Brown ( 1999) discusses civic 
nationalism at length, pointing out that it refers to a sense of community based on 
residence within a common territory: ‘involvement in the state and civil society 
institutions of that homeland, generate a distinctive national character and civic 
culture, such that all citizens, irrespective of their diverse ancestry, comprise a 
community in progress, with a common destiny’ (Brown 1999: 283).
Brown also suggests that civic nationalisms appeal to a common institutional past 
while remaining ‘forward looking’ (1999: 283); this, according to Billig, occurs 
through the micro-level inclusion of nationalist symbols into communities resulting 
in a type of ‘banal nationalism’ present in everyday societies. The common usage of 
stamps, currency, driving licenses and other societal symbols of nationhood become 
the ‘ideological habits’ of nationhood (Billig 1995: 8, 41).
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The seemingly beneficial banality of civic nationalism is countermanded by the 
negative associations attributed to ethnic nationalism. As Brubaker reminds us, 
nationalism can be dissimilationist and exclusory, directing policies of 
nationalisation towards spheres of practice rather than groups confined by 
geographic boundaries; this has historically resulted in what he terms the ‘large-scale 
migration of ethnic unmixing’ (1996: 90). Kohn discusses ethnic, or Eastern, 
nationalism as occurring after Western nationalism,
but also generally at a more backward stage of social and political 
development: the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality 
rarely coincided; nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in 
conflict with the existing state pattern- not primarily to transform it into a 
people’s state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with 
ethnographic demands... nationalism in Germany did not find its 
justification in a rational societal conception, it found it in the ‘natural’ 
fact of a community, held together, not by the will of its members nor by 
any obligations of contract, but by traditional ties of kinship and status.
German nationalism substituted for the legal and rational concept of 
‘citizenship’ the infinitely vaguer concept o f ‘folk’, which, first 
discovered by the German humanists, was later fully developed by 
Herder and the German romanticists
(Kohn 1945: 329 -331)
In fact, Kohn’s descriptions of ethnic nationalism as being ‘backward’ and ‘natural’ 
hint that there is something in these nationalist movements that stem from perceived 
historical attachments perfected in some future utopia. In other words, ethnic 
nationalisms are typically built on ideas of myths of common ancestry and thus, seek 
to ‘establish the authentic continuity of their community by proclaiming visions of 
common destiny located in the future’ (Brown 1999: 283).
This belief in a mythic past, found in each of my three case studies to varying 
degrees (see Chapters Six and Seven), is typical of ‘new’ states which Geertz credits 
as being abnormally susceptible to perceiving the ‘congruities of blood, speech, 
custom and so on [.. .as having] an ineffable, and at times overpowering, 
coerciveness in and of themselves’ (1963: 109). Thus, ethnic nationalist movements
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tend to portray the individual as intrinsically bound to other members of the nation 
not through individual choice or need, ‘but at least in great part by virtue of some 
unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself (Geertz 1963: 110).
Mann takes the idea of ethnic nationalism one step farther when addressing 
nationalism resulting in ethnic conflict. Using the term ‘organic nationalism’, Mann 
describes this type of nationalism as being one where the nation is represented by 
one political movement with a professed belief in ‘an enduring national 
character.. .distinguishable from other nations’ which would thus give them the right 
to exclude minorities who ‘would only weaken the nation’. These beliefs are 
expressed through the political platfonn of the nationalist group, reflected in their 
ideology and resonate predominantly in Europe where the relationship of ethnicity- 
to-state was disputed (Mann 2004: 34, 84).
Mann’s perspective here is critical because it places the role of ideology into modem 
nationalist discourse. Nationalism as an ideology> makes a key difference to the 
‘quality and content of nations’(Smith 2003: 360). Nationalist ideology deals 
directly with the relationship between state and society, synchronising the 
relationship between state and ethnie, tying the utopian idea of the ancestral 
homeland with modern policy and political power (Breuilly 1994: 112; Smith 2001: 
19). Claire Sutherland points out that ideology is a particularly useful concept to use 
in analysing both civic and ethnic nationalism because of this relationship, 
combining principle and practise (2005: 188).
This dovetails with Fred Halliday’s argument that nationalist movements inherently 
follow a moral agenda centred around state authority. This authority is manifested 
over the individual which manifests itself through seven different tenets, five of 
which are contingent upon the foundation of any nationalist movement, two of which 
are less foundational but are common nonetheless (Halliday 2000: 163 - 164). The 
first five of these tenets include: 1) all individuals belong to a nation; 2) all 
individuals of a nation owe primary loyalty to the nation to which they adhere and
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thus, 3) commands the loyalty of all others within the nation; 4) nationalism ‘allows’ 
nothing, neither individual nor state, to infringe upon its authority in the name of any 
other sub-groups present within the nation; 5) it is impossible for any individual to 
attain ‘freedom and self-realisation if they are deemed.. .to belong to a group into 
which they are bom’ (2000: 164). These precepts being true, says Halliday, one can 
then infer that the following two statements are also true of nationalism: 1) one’s 
nation is superior to others’ nations and 2) that too much influence from the greater 
world poses a determined threat to the nation (2000: 165 - 167).
The primary problem with this approach is Halliday’s lack of subscription to the 
nuanced but vital difference between nation and ethnic group, a distinction made by 
the ethnosymbolists above. This balance between ethnicity, nation and state creeps 
up numerous times throughout any discussion of nationalist literature and is 
particularly important for establishing the link between nationalism and genocide as 
we will see more clearly in Chapter Five. I cannot disregard the vital importance ‘the 
political’ plays in modern genocide in which elites become political power brokers 
and cultural symbols become rallying points for discrimination, exclusion, partition 
and death. The critical point to remember here is that while nationalism can be 
separate from violent patriotism, in the genocidal cases presented such separation 
does not occur. There is a direct link between the state and the genocide. While this 
point may seem to be obvious in light of the discussion above, it does limit the 
breadth of nationalism and genocide; these genocidal nationalisms require the state 
and are therefore inherently modern in nature.
Thus, we see that this dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalisms has 
presented itself consistently throughout nationalism scholarship. However, some 
scholars note that the delineation between these categories may not be as extreme as 
can be perceived. Both Brown (1998; 1999) and Brubaker (1996; 2004) serve as 
representatives of a growing number of nationalism scholars who note that this 
dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism is problematic and is an overly 
simplistic explanation of a complex relationship between nation and state.
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Nonetheless, as regards the position of my work within the nationalist discourse, 
some acknowledged difference is helpful.
First, as we will see throughout the course of this project, the type of nationalism 
which radicalises to genocide does tend to be based on ethnic division, which then 
allows for the definition of both nation and other-groups7. Similarly, attachment to 
the homeland and the ‘ethnic’ homeland mentality is not based on current state lines, 
but is instead based around historical, often changeable, claims as seen particularly in 
Chapter Eight. This is where the majority of nationalism scholars place work on 
genocide studies; equally, most genocide scholars borrow from the principles of 
ethnic nationalism when describing the radicalisation process of genocidal states.
However, it is important not to forget the civic elements of radicalising states. For 
instance, as we see in Chapter Seven, though these states become increasingly 
exclusionist, members of the nation are ideologically encouraged to engage highly in 
civil society, participating in civic groups, performing community service, 
supporting the national political system, etc.. These elements of exclusionary civic­
ness hearken back to Arendt’s perspective on the modernity of genocide as reliant on 
bureaucracy and Goldhagen’s theories o f ‘ordinary’ participation in genocidal goals 
(Arendt 1958; Goldhagen 1996).
Unfortunately, while there are many other scholars of nationalism whose work has 
been highly influential to shaping this field of study, few of their theories stand up to 
the types of nationalism found in genocidal states. For instance, Gellner, considered 
by some to be the father of nationalism studies, suggests that conflict evolves out of 
uneven growth within societies; friction is caused by the shifting dynamic between 
varying sectors of society and the division of labour (1983: 11- 15, 24). However, 
twentieth-century genocide has occurred outside of industrialisation. It was not 
industrialisation which caused the Turks to attempt the destruction of Armenians, but
7 with varying degrees o f  otherness depending on case. I discuss this further in Chapters Five and Six.
69
Chapter Three: Survey o f  approaches
a finely tuned, shifting ideology paired with a dynamic and unstable geopolitical 
atmosphere.
Similarly, Tom Nairn presents the nation as a circle at whose core is intelligentsia 
and elites and whose periphery is compiled of peasants reticently on their way to 
modernity, looking ‘backwards as much as forwards, and pass from the remembrance 
to the often elaborate reinvention of the worlds they have lost’ (1997: 91; see also 
Naim 1994). However, if this were true in the cases of genocide presented, one could 
argue that the Holocaust should have occurred before the First World War instead of 
during the Second and that ethnic cleansing in the Balkan peninsula was more likely 
to occur during the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century. Thus, based on the 
literature, a highly state-centric ethnosymbolism is where we find the theoretical 
foundation for the remainder of the literature in this project as it relates to genocide 
and ideology more generally and to each of my cases specifically.
From Nationalism to Genocide
As established in the earlier sections of this thesis, the focus of this research is on 
states in transition from nationalism to genocidal nationalism. Tracing this type of 
change places me within a dynamic, young and growing field of scholarship that 
attempts to explain why nationalism is so easily linked with conflict. Many 
nationalist movements exist and thrive without taking up arms against an ethnic 
enemy . Nonetheless, while every nationalist conflict is not genocidal, every case o f  
genocide studied in this work is linked to a case o f  nationalism. This is a critical 
link, not only because it opens up the vast literature discussed above and provides 
theoretical framing for this project, but more importantly it suggests that key themes
8This list includes a number o f  nationalist movements, most o f  which contain a high level o f  civic 
involvement (Snyder 2000: 39; Hutchinson 1999, 2001). For infonnation on non-violent nationalist 
nationalism see Hearn’s Identity , C lass a n d  C ivil Society  in S co tla n d ’s  N eo-N ationalism  (2002), 
Breton’s F rom  E thnic  to C ivic N ationalism : The Case o f  C anada  (2002), K ennedy’s A Sw itzerland  o f  
the north?  (2004), K eating’s Sta teless na tion-bu ild ing  (1997), H aesly’s Iden tify ing  S co tland  an d  
Wales (2005), M orton’s Scottish  righ ts a n d  ‘centralisa tion  ’ in the m id-nineteenth  cen tury  ( 1996) and 
Guibemau’s N ationa l identity, devolution  a n d  secession in Canada, B rita in  a n d  Spain  (2006).
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in cases of ethnic nationalism will also be critical to any study of cases of genocidal 
nationalism, including the three cases presented here. Thus, if assumed kinship, 
homeland, distinct awareness of otherness, religion, language and cultural markers 
are all important in cases of nationalism, then they will remain important themes in 
cases of genocidal nationalism. The link between nationalism and genocide, 
revisited later in this chapter, also gives us cause to look again at the literature to see 
which other scholars have attempted to explain the links between the two.
As regards the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, Jack Snyder’s 
work stands out. In From Voting to Violence, he asserts that democratization is the 
recurring factor in cases where ethnic violence occurs. When a state lacks a 
democratising populace, Snyder argues, it also lacks a strong nationalist movement. 
As democratic ideas grow in popularity, elites establish a stronger element of 
nationalist rhetoric in their ideology in order to elicit power from the masses (Snyder 
2000: 32). Unrest also gives the majority bureaucratic control over minority factions 
through governmental power (Snyder 2000: 27 - 33). Snyder’s other strength is his 
definition of nationalism, which describes nationalism as being ‘the doctrine that a 
people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or 
principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects 
those distinctive characteristics’ (2000: 23). Thus, in nationalist movements where 
geographical boundaries already exist, nationalist ideals can be applied in order to 
result in the ‘purification’ or ‘true establishment’ of a state system controlled by a 
particular ethnic group. The benefit of this definition is that, like Weber’s, it allows 
for the importance of history, symbols, et cetera championed by ethnosymbolists 
without ignoring Heywood’s national chauvinism where nationalist movements 
purposefully incorporate ideologies of ethnic superiority into their policies 
(Heywood 1992: 156- 157)
Though these are admirable strengths and Snyder’s work on the whole offers much 
insight into the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, his work is not 
without flaws. What Snyder fails to point out is that, while transitional democracies
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are often involved in conflict, a genocidal democracy has yet to be established. None 
of my three cases are cases of democracy -  instead, they are cases where democratic 
rhetoric was used in order for elites to establish legitimacy and was then discarded in 
favour of a type of government ensuring continued power would remain in the hands 
of the nation. A more appropriate accounting for the relationship between 
democracy and nationalism is found in Mark Mazower’s work. He reminds his 
readers that though democracy is not necessarily ethnic, in Europe, the shift to 
democracy occurred with the goal to create national states. This was, in turn, 
inherently dangerous for minorities and transnational people-groups like the 
Ukrainians and the Jews (Mazower 1999: 53 - 60). Nonetheless, this only 
moderately clarifies the relationship between nationalism and genocide. In order to 
find an appropriate means of deciphering the conundrums of this relationship, we 
must turn to another scholar who attempts to answer a very similar question.
Due to the breadth and depth of the body of his work, one could safely say that 
Michael Mann is one of today’s foremost scholars of historical sociology; his recent 
work, including The Dark Side o f  Democracy (2005) and Fascists (2004) places his 
work firmly within the remit of genocide scholarship. In one of his first and broadest 
works, The Sources o f  Social Power, Volume I  identifies four sources of power, 
ideological, economic, military and political (IEMP), identified as ‘overlapping 
networks of social interactions’ (Mann 1986: 2). Originally conceived as three 
volumes, this book and The Sources o f  Social Power, Volume //, trace the growth and 
shifts of these four networks until the beginning of the First World War. He posits 
here that ‘political power means state power’ (Mann 1993: 9; see also 2001: 235), an 
idea that supporting the fact that the role of the state and political ideology in 
genocide is so strong that genocide is often excused to the international community 
as an ‘act of state’ in which any intervention is an infringement of state sovereignty 
(par in parem imperium non ha bet); the people involved in the implementation of 
this ideology are, by the laws of the state, required to obey and are thereby released 
from personal obligation to consequences (Arendt 2002 [1963]: 91). Helen Fein 
finds that virtually ‘everyone acknowledges that genocide is primarily a crime of
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[the] state’ because bureaucracy established the state as the modem power source 
and continues to encourage the growth of national states (Fein 2002 [1993]: 79; 
Mann 1993: 445, 734; see also Bauman 2002 [1989]: 111). This is supported by 
Mann’s work, particularly the findings in Volume II, in which he discusses the 
West’s rise to modernity in light of the IEMP model.
While this might, at first, seem an interesting approach to studying the genocidal 
events of the twentieth century, Mann changes tactics with Dark Side o f  Democracy 
in order to attempt to explain why people become perpetrators of ‘murderous ethnic 
cleansing’. His analysis is based around eight points: 1) that murderous cleansing is 
modem because the rise of democracy pits the demos against the ethnos; 2) that 
ethnic tension occurs when ethnicity trumps class as the primary form of social 
categorisation; 3) that seemingly legitimate homeland claims are made by multiple 
ethnic groups; 4) that ethnic cleansing occurs when ethnic states believe that either 
help with come from outside allies or that their own military power is dominant 
enough to cause little moral risk to itself; 5) that murderous cleansing occurs in 
factionalised and radicalised states which often leads to war; 6) that murderous 
ethnic cleansing is rarely the initial intent of the perpetrators; 7) that radical elites, 
bands of militants and core constituencies are the three main levels of perpetrator; 
and 8) that normal social institutions bring ordinary people to murderous ethnic 
cleansing (Mann 2005: 2 - 10).
These eight points are founded on Mann’s assertion that these radicalising 
nationalisms are based in something he terms organic nationalism. In an organic 
nationalist movement, the nation would be represented by one political movement 
with a professed belief in ‘an enduring national character.. .distinguishable from 
other nations’ which would thus give them the right to exclude minorities who 
‘would only weaken the nation’. These beliefs would be expressed through the 
political platform of the nationalist group and resonated predominantly in Europe 
where the relationship of ethnicity to state was disputed (Mann 2004: 34, 84). To 
better explain the possible outcomes of violence emerging from this type of
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nationalism, Mann went on to explain that when ‘compromising or repressive state 
institutions collapse, or when borders shift or geopolitical balance ends, escalation 
towards murderous cleansing is most likely. War itself is the most serious escalator. 
It normalises and legitimises killing’ (2001: 237). In support of this point, Mann 
categorises types of violence and cleansing as seen in Table One:
Table 3.1: The extent of cleansing and violence in inter-group relations
(Mann 2001: 210; 2005: 12)
Extent o f  Violence E xten t o f  c leansing
A: N one B: Partial C: Total
None 1. Multi-culturalism 
and toleration
2. Consociational and 
confederalism
Partial abandoning o f 








Policed Repression Policed repression of 
protesters
1. Policed partial 
repression o f out­
group language and 
culture
2. Policed out-group 
settlement and 
displacement








Violent Repression Policed violence 1. ‘Pogroms’, 
communal riots, some 
forms o f  rape







marriage, some forms 
o f  rape
Unpremeditated mass 
deaths
‘M istaken’ war, civil 
war and revolutionary 
crisis policies
‘Callous’ war, civil 












D arker shading indicates the core  o f  the zone  o f  m urderous cleansing: lighter shad ing  indicates a 
borderline zone in w hich it m ay occasionally occur.
As the majority of Mann’s work is founded in this table, brief analysis of its contents, 
particularly in the darker highlighted areas, is helpful. The first thing that comes to
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notice is the two types of categorical progression presented in this table, progressive 
violence and progressive cleansing. While I support the idea that there is a 
progression to cleansing and also to violence, it would be easy to suppose that Mann 
has gone too far in these clear-cut categorical assumptions, particularly regarding the 
differentiation between policed repression and violent repression, as if policed 
repression is not often quite violent indeed. However, Mann himself notes that these 
two types are ‘rather unstable’ as ‘further violence does typically break out amid 
such practices...Nonetheless, the policies discussed so far try to keep violence under 
disciplined control to achieve specific, limited goals. This normally involves the 
state’ (2001: 213). Similarly, the three categories regarding the progression of 
cleansing can be easily mistaken. Realistically, all three of these categories could be 
termed as ‘partial’ and not merely the middle category. Consociational states can 
have short-term policies of cultural suppression, discrimination or segregation just as 
none of even the most extreme cases of genocide were completely successful in 
eliminating each and every one from their target populations.
Thus, let us turn our attention to more specific quandaries presented in this 
categorisation, particularly Mann’s final three categories of forced 
conversion/politicide/classicide, ethnocide and genocide. To begin, it must first be 
said that segregating these types of killing from genocide as separate categories is 
highly contentious. Though, thanks to a strong argument by the Soviet delegation 
prior to the signing of the document (Shaw 2003: 34 - 35), the United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (also called 
the Genocide Convention) does indeed omit classes and political groups, many 
genocide scholars have made conscious decisions to include both groups into their 
definitions, arguing that the loss of life and detriment to humanity necessitates the 
recognition of these atrocities as genocide (Nersessian 2007; Staub 2000, 1989;
Shaw 2007, 2003; Chamy 1999, 1988; Wood 2001). And here begins the discussion 
necessary in almost all critical pieces of genocidal scholarship -  the problem of 
definition.
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In the academy of social and political research, it is nigh impossible to avoid defining 
the terms of key words, theories, trends and socio-political phenomenon. Most of the 
time, while this can lead to certain quantitative or qualitative problems in research, 
this type of definition help establish the parameters of a project and help the reader 
understand the platform from which the author is speaking. To talk about genocide 
is first to discuss it in the greater context of violence, as Mann does above and as 
other scholars such as Bloxham (2008; 2009a; 2009b) do throughout their work.
There are, of course, many different types of violence. In his Nazi Party and Its 
Violence against the Jews, Nolzen outlines violence as not merely physical violence, 
but any type of persecution at all -  including riots, boycotts and exclusion from 
cultural events. Nolzen’s terminology is based off of Popitz, who defines violence as 
actions that are physically harmful, that cause economic damage and that ‘lead to a 
decreased social participation’ (in Nolzen 2002: 248). This type of language is 
inherently problematic as it projects the image 1) that there was something singular 
about the exclusion of the Jews in the early days of the Nazi regime, 2) that all 
violence is equal and 3) that does not allow for the reader to discern the change and 
the radicalisation of violence. For instance, he posits that ‘from 1936/37, there was 
not longer any difference between harming Jews physically and the ‘legal’ 
destruction of Jewish businesses’ (2002: 264) as if the shift between the destruction 
of objects and the destruction of humans occurred naturally and suddenly and not as 
part of a process of radicalisation that had been taking place for years before 1936.
For the purpose of this analysis, however, violence is used to indicate only the first of 
Popitz’s three points -  personal individual physical harm -  as this aspect of violence 
is the lynch pin at the very heart of genocide.
Defining genocide, however, is not so simple. The problem is greatly exacerbated by 
the legal and moral imperatives entailed upon the definition itself. The key role of 
the Genocide Convention, passed in 1948, was to ensure that in the event of genocide 
occuring again, states would be bound by international law to intervene on behalf of 
the persecuted ethnie (UN Convention 2002 [1948]; Shaw 2003: 34 - 35). However,
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the Convention’s definition itself is highly contentious and quite vague in parts. The 
critical section offering its definition of genocide is Article II which reads:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a) killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children on the group to another group
Article III follows, augmenting the already indistinct language of Article II, 
suggesting the punishable crimes include not only genocide, but also conspiracy to 
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempting to 
commit genocide and complicity in genocide (UN Convention 2002 [1948]). It is 
Article I that holds the 142 signatories of the Convention, reading that ‘the 
Contracting Parties confirm that genocide whether committed in time of peace or in 
time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and  
to punish’ (2002 [1948] emphasis mine); it is this article, perhaps more than any 
other, which causes debate for non-genocidal states regarding the definition of 
genocide.
Contention transpires because, according to this document, when genocide occurs, a 
moral imperative is placed upon states who are otherwise non-participatory, 
incurring action and sacrifice of individual security, financial obligation, time 
commitment and military commitment. Thus, states have a reason to use the vague 
nature of Article II so as to find that genocide is not occuring and that they are thus 
relieved from their legal and moral obligation to intervene (for examples see 
Holbrooke 1999; Neuffer 2001; Power 2002; Gourevitch 1998). Generally, states 
tend to use the most narrow definition of genocide and apply it to only the most
77
Chapter Three: Survey o f  approaches
extrem e ca ses; i f  a c a s e  o f  e th n ic  c o n f lic t  is n o t co m p a ra b le  to  the H o lo c a u s t , th en  
p o litic ian s are ‘e x c u s e d ’ fro m  ta k in g  actio n  (S h a w  2 0 0 3 :  3 5 ).
Scholars, h o w e v e r , are n o t lim ite d  b y  su ch  rea lis t restrain ts. O n e w o u ld  th en  e x p e c t  
to find  w id er  p aram eters, grea ter  v a ria n ce  and a large q u an tity  o f  o p in io n s . In  truth, 
there are a lm o st as m a n y  d e f in it io n s  o f  g e n o c id e  as there are sch o la rs  o f  g e n o c id e ;  
som e, h o w e v er , are m o re  n o te w o r th y  than o th ers and th is sy n o p s is  a ttem p ts to  
an alyse o n ly  a f e w  o f  th e  m o re  cr itica l d e fin itio n s . M o s t  r e v ie w s  o f  th e literature  
attem pt to  ‘start at th e  v e r y  b e g in n in g ’, in trod u cin g  th e term  as e n v is io n e d  b y  
R aphael L e m k in  an d  g o  from  there. In d eed , L e m k in ’s crea tion  o f  and d e f in itio n  o f  
the term  g e n o c id e , w ritten  in  r e sp o n se  to  h is  o w n  p erso n a l horrors and e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  
the H o lo ca u st an d  h is  d eterm in a tio n  for  there to b e  le g a l r a m ific a tio n s  as a 
co n seq u en ce  o f  th is  ‘cr im e o f  c r im e s ,’ se rv e s  as th e b a sis  for  A r tic le  II o f  the  
G en ocid e  C o n v e n tio n . F rom  th e G reek  geno, m ea n in g  ‘tr ib e’, and the L atin  -tide, 
from  caedere, m e a n in g  ‘k i l l in g ,’ L em k in  es ta b lish ed  a term  that c o u ld  d e sc r ib e  ‘the  
destruction  o f  a n a tio n  or o f  an  e th n ic  g r o u p ... [G en o c id e ] is in ten d ed  rather to  
sig n ify  a co o rd in a ted  p lan  o f  d ifferen t a c tio n s a im in g  at th e d estru ctio n  o f  e s se n tia l  
foun dation s o f  th e  l if e  o f  n a tio n a l grou p s, w ith  the a im  o f  a n n ih ila tin g  th e g ro u p s  
th e m se lv e s ’ (L em k in  2 0 0 2  [1 9 4 4 ]:  2 7 ) .
There are so m e  cr itica l p o in ts  o f  n o te  ab out L e m k in ’s d e fin itio n  o f  h is  la u d a b le  term  
to d iscu ss b e fo r e  m o v in g  on  to  o th e r s’ d e fin itio n s . F irstly , o n e  m u st k eep  in m in d  
that w h en  L e m k in  w a s  d e f in in g  g e n o c id e , it w a s  in  a tim e  w h e re  sta te so v e r e ig n ty  
w as even  m ore p aram ou n t than  in to  to d a y ’s c lim a te , w h ere  g e n o c id e  w a s  a cr im e o f  
the state ag a in st th e  c it iz e n s  o f  an oth er state. G u errilla  m o v e m e n ts  and  n o n -sta te  
actors w ere  n o t in h eren t p la y er s  in L e m k in ’s d efin itio n ; n e ith er  w er e  in sta n c es  w h ere  
a state w o u ld  s e e k  to  d estro y  m em b ers o f  their o w n  c itizen ry  r e s id in g  o n ly  w ith in  the  
bounds o f  their state (C h a lk  an d  J o n a sso h n  1990: 9 ). O f  co u rse , as e s ta b lish e d  a b o v e  
in the d isc u ss io n  o n  n a tio n a lism , th e sta te is  cr itica l to  g e n o c id e . P erhap s n o  sc h o la r  
has m ade that c learer than  L o u is  R en e  B e re s  w h e n  h e avers that ‘the sta te is  n o w  a 
p rov id en ce o f  w h ic h  e v e r y th in g  is a cc ep ted  and n o th in g  e x p e c t e d . . .A  sa n c tif ie d
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killer, the state that a c c e p ts  g e n o c id e  g en era tes  an in ce ssa n t search  fo r  th e p ro d u cts  
o f  d isa ssim ila tio n : c a s to f fs ,  m in o r it ie s , th e w re tch ed . T h o u g h  m ired  in b lo o d , the  
search in tranquil and  se lf-a ssu r e d , b o m  o f  th e k n o w le d g e  that its d e e d s  are n e ith er  
in fam ou s n or sh a m e fu l, but heroic’ (1 9 8 5 : 3 9 6 , 3 9 8 ) .
This leads u s to  an o th er  p o in t  in  L e m k in ’s u n d erstan d in g  o f  g e n o c id e :  he e n v is io n e d  
it as b e in g  ab le  to  tak e  p la c e  in  a v a r ie ty  o f  d ifferen t p o lit ic a l c lim a te s  and  th rou gh  
various d ifferen t w a y s , n o t o n ly  g a s  ch am b ers, but a lso  th rough  d ep orta tion  or 
starvation -  in  sh ort, an y  p o ss ib le  w a y  to en su re  th e era d ica tio n  o f  B e r e s ’ ‘p rod u cts  
o f  d isa ss im ila tio n ’. F or L e m k in , g e n o c id e  ‘w a s  a c o m p r e h e n s iv e  c o n c e p t  o f  th e  
socia l d estru ction  o f  n a tio n a l g r o u p s ’ (S h a w  2 0 0 7 : 21; s e e  a lso  L e v e n e  2 0 0 5 :  4 3 ) .  
Sam antha P o w e r  c la im s  that L e m k in  b e lie v e d  th e a cc ep ta n c e  o f  th e term  m ea n t an  
accep tan ce o f  r e sp o n s ib il ity  fo r  th e term , that s in c e  there w a s  re co g n it io n  o f  the  
form alisation  o f  v o c a b u la ry , sta tes  w o u ld  e q u a lly  em b race  the m ora l co n d em n a tio n  
adhering to  the d e f in it io n  (2 0 0 2 :  4 5 ) . U n fo rtu n a te ly , e v e n  in  lig h t o f  th e a b o v e -  
m en tion ed  G e n o c id e  C o n v e n tio n , th is  h as n o t b een  th e c a se  as sta tes  w ill  so m e t im e s  
spend p rec io u s  tim e sq u a b b lin g  o v e r  d eterm in in g  w h e th er  or n o t so m e th in g  f its  th e  
C o n v en tio n ’s d e f in it io n  o f  g e n o c id e  rather than tak in g  actio n  to  h in d er  a g g r e ss io n  
(see  C arroll 2 0 0 4 ) .
Scholars as w e ll  h a v e  so m e t im e s  fa lle n  in to  th e sam e trap; th e ir  ra tio n a le , h o w e v e r , 
has little  to  d o  w ith  re so u rc es  an d  in tern ation a l p o w e r  but in stead  w ith  th e ir  g en era l 
recogn ition  o f  th e w e a k n e s s e s  o f  th e G e n o c id e  C o n v e n tio n  and the lim ita tio n s  o f  
L em k in ’s o r ig in a l d e fin itio n . F or in sta n ce , H e le n  F e in ’s ea r lie st d e f in it io n  o f  
gen o c id e  is ‘th e c a lc u la te d  m urder o f  a se g m e n t or all o f  a grou p  d e f in e d  o u ts id e  the  
universe o f  th e p erpetrator, b y  a g o v ern m en t, e lite , s ta f f  or cro w d  rep resen tin g  th e  
perpetrator in  r e sp o n se  to  a cr is is  or op p ortu n ity  p er c e iv e d  to  b e c a u se d  b y  or 
im peded  b y  th e v ic t im ’ (in  L e v e n e  2 0 0 5 :  7 8 ). A  lau d ab le  d e fin itio n , but, a s M ark  
L even e p o in ts  ou t, F e in  b a u lk s at n o tin g  a d irect re la tio n sh ip  w ith  th e sta te  an d  has 
an u nclear id ea  o f  th e nature o f  ‘g r o u p ’. M e ls o n ’s d e fin itio n , ‘a k in d  o f  m a ssa cre  
w hich  se e k s  p h y s ic a lly  to  e lim in a te  or ex tirp ate a co m m u n a l grou p  from  th e so c ia l
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structure’ (M e lso n  1982: 4 8 3 )  sh o w s  sim ila r  f la w s . C ertain  a sp ec ts  o f  th e se  
d efin ition s are f i l le d  b y  C h a lk  and J o n a sso h n  w h o  h a v e  b een  d e f in in g  g e n o c id e  as a 
‘form  o f  o n e -s id e d  m a ss  k illin g  in  w h ic h  a sta te or o th er au th ority  in ten d s to  d estro y  
a group, as that grou p  and m em b e rsh ip  in it are d e f in e d  b y  th e p erp etrator’ (1 9 9 0 :
2 3 ) for m ore than  tw e n ty  y e a r s 9. T h ey  m ak e particu lar n o te  o f  th e sta te , but d o  a llo w  
for the in flu e n c e  o f  n o n -sta te  actors. T h e k e y  con tr ib u tion  in  b oth  o f  th ese  
d efin itio n s is  the r e c o g n it io n  that it is  th e perpetrator w h o  d e f in e s  th e grou p  and n ot 
the v ic tim . H o w e v e r , e v e n  C h a lk  and J o n a sso h n  s tru g g le  to  a v o id  th e  p ro b lem  o f  
‘grou p ’.
L even e d o e s  w e ll  in  d is c u s s in g  th is w e a k n e ss , p resen t in far m ore  d e f in it io n s  than  
those tw o  n o te d  a b o v e . T h e  p ro b lem  lie s  in h eren t in  L e m k in ’s c h o ic e  o f  u s in g  geno- 
as h is L atin  p rem ise; th e term  ‘tr ib e ’ in d ica tes  s o c io -b io lo g ic a l  t ie s  b e tw e e n  m em b ers  
(L even e 2 0 0 5 : 7 8  - 7 9 ) , so m e th in g  e c h o in g  the p erren ia list d eb ate  d isc u sse d  a b o v e . 
H ow ever , as w e  h a v e  a lrea d y  se en , su ch  b io lo g ic a l t ie s  are n ot freq u en tly  s e e n  in 
cases o f  n a tio n a lism  and th u s are eq u a lly  rare in  c a se s  o f  g e n o c id e . T h u s, sch o la rs  
and ju d ic ia r ie s  a lik e  h a v e  stru g g led  w ith  d e term in in g  the rem its o f ‘g r o u p -n e s s ’; 
even  the In tern ation a l C rim in a l T rib un al for R w a n d a  (IC T R ) stru g g led  w ith  th is  
d istin ction , as ‘H u tu ’ an d  ‘T u ts i’ w er e  n o t term s e a s ily  ca te g o r ise d  in to  n a tio n a l, 
ethnic or racia l g ro u p s a c c e p te d  u nd er th e C o n v e n tio n . T h e ev en tu a l d e c is io n  w a s  to  
a llo w  for ‘e m ic  d is t in c t io n s ’ thus a llo w in g  p ro se cu tio n  to  g o  forth  (H in to n  2 0 0 2 :  5).
L even e h im s e lf  h e s ita te s  to  g iv e  a c lea r  and d istin c t d e f in itio n  for  g e n o c id e  in  
V o lu m e O n e o f  h is  Genocide in the Age o f the Nation State, th ou gh  h e  d o e s  d esc r ib e  
the co m m o n  attributes o f  g e n o c id e  w h ic h  in c lu d e  con tro l o f  th e  state and w ith  the  
lo g is tic s  and re so u rc es  to  u n d ertak e ‘d irect p h y s ic a l e x te rm in a tio n ’ on  o c c a s io n s  
w ith m in im a l in te rfer en ce  from  w ith o u t, a h e ig h te n e d  se n se  o f  threat and  
v ic tim isa tio n  on  th e s id e  o f  th e perpetrator, a p ro lo n g ed  se q u e n c e  o f  k illin g  o v e r  
tim e, p u rsu ed  reg a rd less  o f  a g e  or gen d er , the em p lo y m e n t o f  ‘s ta te -o r g a n ise d ’
’ Nor is Chalk and Jonassohn’s definition flawless. For further debates see Fein (2002 [1993]: 80 -
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m ilitary and p aram ilitary  fo rc e  to  carry ou t the m ajority  o f  the k illin g s , th e in a b ility  
o f  the p ersecu ted  g rou p  to  n o tic e a b ly  d e fen d  th e m se lv e s  and, f in a lly , that ‘the  
targeted group  is th e  p ro d u ct o f  th e p erp etrator’s a sse m b la g e  o f  so c ia l r e a lity ’ 
(L even e 2 0 0 5 : 7 6  - 7 7 , 8 8 ).
T h ese attributes are g e n e r a lly  la u d ed  b y , a m o n g st  o th ers, M artin  S h aw ; h o w e v e r ,  
Shaw  cr it ic ise s  L e v e n e  an d  o th ers v er y  h a rsh ly  a g a in st their m ore  lim ited  ap p roach  
to d efin in g  th e term  g e n o c id e . H is  tw o  recen t b o o k s , War and Genocide ( 2 0 0 3 )  and  
particularly What is Genocide? ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  p ro v id e  sch o la rs  w ith  th e m o st re ce n t in - 
depth h isto r io g ra p h y  o f  m o d e m  g e n o c id e . T h o u g h  restr ic ted  b y  a se lf -n o te d  la c k  o f  
case stu d ies , S h a w  r e v ie w s  th e w o rk  o f  a lm o st a ll k e y  au thors in  th e f ie ld  w h o  w rite  
from  a m ore s o c io lo g ic a l  p e r sp e c t iv e  and d o es  so  su c c in c tly  -  an im p r e ss iv e  fea t  
con sid erin g  th e w id th  an d  b readth  o f  g e n o c id a l literature thu s far. A t th e en d  o f  
What is Genocide?, S h a w  p r o v id e s  u s w ith  h is  o w n  d e f in itio n  o f  g e n o c id e  w h ic h  
attem pts to  in corp ora te  w h a t h e  c a lls  th e ‘m iss in g  c o n c e p t ’ : th e nature o f  the 
relationship  b e tw e e n  th e  c iv il ia n  and n o n -c iv ilia n  actor in g e n o c id a l sta tes  (S h a w  
2007: 113 - 130). T h e  d e f in it io n  he o ffe rs  fin d s that g e n o c id e  is  ‘a form  o f  v io le n t  
soc ia l c o n flic t, or w ar, b e tw e e n  arm ed  p o w e r  o rg a n isa tio n s  that a im  to  d estro y  
c iv ilian  so c ia l g ro u p s an d  th o se  g ro u p s and o th er actors w h o  res is t  th is  d e s tr u c t io n ’ 
(2007: 154).
T hough  I co n ten d  that S h a w  fu lf ils  h is  g o a l o f  c la s s ify in g  th e  v ic tim  grou p  as a 
c iv ilian  so c ia l grou p , there are o th er sch o la rs  w h o  w o u ld  co n ten d  that v ic tim  g ro u p s  
can a lso  b e co m b a ta n ts , at le a st  on  a m in o r  sc a le , or h ad , at o n e  tim e , b een  
com batants (D ad rian  2 0 0 4 ;  L a m p e 1996; M irk o v ic  1996; S u n y  199 6 ). H o w e v e r ,  
though th is is  a cr itica l is s u e  n o w  o p en  for further d eb ate , it is n o t o f  u tm o st  
im portance to  m y  p articu lar argu m en t. S h a w ’s w o rk  se rv e s  as rep resen ta tiv e  fo r  a 
large group o f  sc h o la r s , w h o , u n lik e  F ein , L e v e n e , W e itz , M an n  and, to  a le s se r  
extent, C h alk  an d  J o n a sso h n , argu e stro n g ly  that th e first step  to re fo rm in g  th e term
81), Dadrian (1991) and Shaw (2007: 30 - 32).
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‘g e n o c id e ’ is to  e x te n d  it. S ch o la rs  h a v e  y e t  to  agree  on  h o w  far th is e x te n s io n  n e e d s  
to go , but it is a k e y  tren d  in  th e o re tic a l g e n o c id a l sch o la rsh ip . A c a d e m ic s  o f  th is  
field  in c lu d e  n o t o n ly  S h a w , b u t a lso  B en ja m in  V a le n tin o  (2 0 0 4 )  and L e o  K u p er  
(1981 ).
The p rob lem  w ith  th is  ap p roach  is  that a w id er  d e f in itio n  o f  g e n o c id e  is  in e f fe c t iv e  at 
both a ca d em ic  and p o lic y  le v e ls .  In order to  w a tch  for  m arkers o f  g e n o c id e , to  
attem pt to im p lem en t p o l ic ie s  at th e ea r lie st s ta g es  o f  g e n o c id e , there has to  b e a 
d efin itive  u n d erstan d in g  o f  w h a t that a c tu a lly  is. G e n o c id e  o ccu rs for  d ifferen t  
reasons than p o lit ic id e  or c la ss ic id e ;  it lo o k s  d ifferen t on  th e grou n d  and th e m ark ers  
leadin g up to  the k illin g s , at so m e  le v e l,  vary . W h en  a p e o p le  grou p  is k ille d  b e c a u se  
o f  e th n ic ity  or race, th e  ra tio n a le  b eh in d  the k illin g s  is a d ifferen t o n e  than i f  a p e o p le  
group is k ille d  b e c a u se  o f  th e ir  p o lit ic a l a ffilia tio n  or their  c la ss  or th e ir  r e l ig io n 10. 
This is, as I w il l  d isc u ss  later in greater d eta il, m o stly  b e c a u se  th e se  o th er n o n -e th n ic  
categories are c h a n g ea b le . W h ile  it is  p o ss ib le  to ch a n g e  y o u r p o lit ic a l a ff il ia t io n , it 
is im p o ssib le  to  ch a n g e  y o u r  b lo o d .
The reason  w h y  sc h o la r s  are so  q u ick  to  d em an d  e x p a n s io n  o f  the term  g e n o c id e , and  
w hy S h aw  h as b erated  M a n n ’s c h o ic e  to  se g re g a te  th e se  term s from  o n e  an oth er  in  
Table O n e, is  b a sed  in  a m ora l b e l ie f  that m a ss  k illin g  o f  th is  nature d e se r v e s  eq u a l 
co n seq u en ce , retr ib u tion  an d  ju s t ic e  w ith  g e n o c id e . T h is  is a b e l ie f  that I sh are. B u t  
the p rob lem  h ere is n o t w ith  th e d e f in itio n  o f  g e n o c id e  per se, th o u g h  I d o  su pp ort  
ch an ges in the C o n v e n t io n ’s d e fin itio n , but w ith  the ju d ic ia l w e ig h t  L e m k in ’s 
defin ition  and th e G e n o c id e  C o n v e n tio n  g iv e  to  g e n o c id e  that is  la c k in g  in  o th er  
cases o f  m a ss k illin g . In stead  o f  a ttem p tin g  to ch a n g e  in tern ation a l la w , as L e m k in  
did, m ost sch o la rs  h a v e  a ttem p ted  to  m orp h  g e n o c id e  in to  so m e th in g  it w a s  n e v e r
10 Though, o f  course, religion has played a large part in the three cases o f  genocide 1 present, it is only 
here ever a secondary actor to ethnicity -  which will be made clear in the upcoming chapters. For 
more information on mass killing based primarily on religious affiliation see Fox (2004a; 2004b), 
Levine (1986) and Frisch and Sandler (2004).
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in tended to b e -  a p h rase  to  c o v e r  a ll le v e ls  o f  m a ss  k illin g  an y w h ere  in  th e w o r ld  at 
any tim e. T h is  is  a cr it ica l p ro b lem  in th e literature o f  g e n o c id e  stu d ies .
This b e in g  th e ca se , I u se  a re str ic tiv e  d e fin itio n  o f  g e n o c id e , n ot ou t o f  a c h o ic e  to  
exclu d e an y  grou p  fro m  th e  ju s t ic e  th e ir  su ffer in g  has earned  th em , but in stead  
b ecause e x a m p le s  o f  m a ss  k ill in g  that fit th is d e fin itio n  h a v e  s im ila r it ie s  and  
d ifferen ces o f  p articu lar im p ort sep arate from  ex a m p le s  o f  m a ss  k illin g  that d o  n o t f it  
w ithin  its rem it. T h e  d e f in it io n  I u se  is lo o s e ly  b a sed  on  a later d e f in it io n  o f  
gen o cid e  o ffe r e d  b y  F e in  (2 0 0 2  [1 9 9 3 ]) ,  th o u g h  I h a v e  ch a n g ed  so m e  e le m e n ts  in  
order to in c lu d e  v ita l p o in ts  e s ta b lish e d  in  o th e r s’ d e f in itio n s . I d e f in e  g e n o c id e  thus: 
the premeditated, intentional action by a nation with control o f  the institutions o f  the 
state to physically destroy a perpetrator-defined ethnic group, sustained regardless 
of the surrender or lack o f  threat offered by the victim.
Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide and Nationalism
In order to  p o s it iv e ly  a n sw e r  th e q u e stio n s  p o se d  in C hap ter O n e, it is im p ortan t to  
clarify that o f  the th ree c a s e s  o f  g e n o c id e  I h a v e  se le c te d  for  th is p ro jec t, tw o  are 
cases o f  to ta l g e n o c id e , w h ile  m y  Y u g o s la v  c a se  is m ore  c o m p le x  (s e e  Sch errer  
2003: 74  - 7 5 ). It h as e le m e n ts  o f  g e n o c id e , but is  w id e ly  a c k n o w le d g e d  as a c a se  o f  
ethnic co n flic t. H o w e v e r , as I sh o w  in  C hapter F our and in u p c o m in g  ch ap ters, there  
are even ts  w h ic h  are e x p lic it ly  g e n o c id a l, c o n fo rm in g  e x a c t ly  to  th e d e f in it io n  a b o v e . 
This is  a v ery  in te re stin g  and h e lp fu l c a se  w h e n  a ttem p tin g  to  id en tify  th e k e y  
id eo lo g ica l sh ifts  o ccu rr in g  d u rin g  the p ro ce ss  o f  ra d ica lisa tio n  tow ard s g e n o c id e .  
M any sch o lars m a k e  a g g r e s s iv e  a rgu m en ts that g e n o c id e  and e th n ic  c o n f lic t  are, in  
fact, the sam e th in g . H o w e v e r , p articu lar ly  s in c e  so  m u ch  o f  m y  p rim ary literature is  
based in in tern ation a l la w  an d  le g a lly  there is an im portan t d ist in c tio n  b e tw e e n  the  
tw o o ccu rren ces, I d o  d iscr im in a te  b e tw e e n  the tw o  term s.
In this case , the U n ite d  N a tio n s  p ro v id es  th e d e fin itio n  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  I u se  
throughout th is th esis; it read s that e th n ic  c le a n s in g  can  b e d e f in e d  as ‘ren d er in g  an
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area e th n ica lly  h o m o g e n o u s  b y  u s in g  fo rce  or in tim id a tio n  to  r e m o v e  from  a g iv e n  
area p erson s o f  an o th er  e th n ic  or r e lig io u s  g ro u p ’ (S /1 9 9 4 /5 5 5  1 9 9 4 ). T h e  fo c u s  h ere  
is on the p h y s ic a l d isp la c e m e n t  or rem o v a l o f  an e th n ic  grou p , rather than  on  
in tentional k illin g . T h is  th en  a llo w s  A r tic le  II to  fo c u s  o n  w h a t th e y  term  the  
in tentional p h y s ic a l d estru ctio n  o f  th e grou p , rather than m u d d y in g  a n ti-g e n o c id a l  
p o licy  w ith  o th er ty p e s  o f  c o n f lic t  (S ch a b a s 2 0 0 8 ) .
B y  this d e fin itio n , m o s t  c a s e s  o f  g e n o c id e  w o u ld  b e  co n sid er ed  acts o f  e th n ic  
clean sin g . G e n o c id e  is , in  fact, a su b sid ia ry  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  as s u c c e s s fu l c a se s  
o f  g e n o c id e  d o  in d e ed  ‘r e m o v e  from  a g iv e n  area p erso n s  o f  an oth er e th n ic  g r o u p ’. 
H ow ever, e th n ic  c le a n s in g  n e e d  n ot b e  g en o c id a l;  th e k e y  d iffe r e n c e  is  in  the  
in tention ality  o f  th e k illin g . B y  a llo w in g  th e pure d e fin itio n  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  to  
stand, no o n e  n e c e s sa r ily  n e e d s  to  b e  k ille d  in  order for e th n ic  c le a n s in g  to b e carried  
out e f fe c tiv e ly . T h o u g h  d isa stro u s ly  h ig h  n u m b ers o f  p e o p le  d o  g e n e r a lly  d ie  as a 
result o f  fo rced  m ig ra tio n , th e se  d eath s are th e b y -p ro d u ct o f  e th n ic  d isp la c e m e n t  
rather than th e d irect in ten t o f  that p o lic y .
In order to  co m m it g e n o c id e , h o w e v e r , in ten tion  to d estro y  a n a tion a l grou p  b y  
putting th em  to  d ea th  is  n e c e ssa r y . T h e b y -p ro d u ct o f  g e n o c id e , then , is  o fte n  an  
eth n ica lly  h o m o g e n o u s , or p red o m in a n tly  h o m o g e n o u s , reg io n . T h u s, th o u g h  c a se s  
o f  g en o c id e  are a lm o st  a lw a y s  c a se s  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g , e th n ic  c le a n s in g  n eed  n o t  
n ecessar ily  b e g e n o c id a l. M y  three c a se  stu d ies  a llo w  u s to  a s se ss  the d iffe r e n c e  
b etw een  th e id e o lo g y  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  in Y u g o s la v ia  and th e id e o lo g y  o f  to ta l 
gen o cid e  in T u rk ey  an d  G erm an y . C hap ters F iv e  and S ix  p articu lar ly  illu m in a te  k e y  
d ifferen ces in  th is  area, w h e n  d isc u ss in g  the ro le  o f  th e an ti-n a tion  in th e p r o c e ss  o f  
rad icalisation . T h is  d iffe r e n c e  a llo w s  m e to  id e n tify  the id e o lo g ic a l th e m e s u n iq u e  to  
the d ev e lo p m en t o f  a g e n o c id a l id e o lo g y .
Let m e b e clear: I d o  n o t p e r c e iv e  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  as b e in g  a ‘le s s e r ’ cr im e  than  
gen ocid e . Just as I b e lie v e  c la s s ic id e , e th n o c id e  and  g en d erc id e  to  b e h e in o u s  and  
v ile , I b e lie v e  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  and g e n o c id e  to  be eq u a lly  so . I b e lie v e  th e m ora l
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co n seq u en ces o f  a ll o f  th e se  cr im e s  sh o u ld  b e p ro secu ted  w ith  eq u a l fervour; 
h ow ever, from  an a c a d e m ic  and a p o lic y  p e r sp e c tiv e , it is n e c e ssa r y  to  a c k n o w le d g e  
and understand  th e  d iffe r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  th e se  cr im es. T h o u g h  th e n u m b er o f  d ea th s  
resu lting from  th e se  e v e n ts  can  b e an d  are h is to r ic a lly  s im ilar , it is  cr itica l to  
a ck n o w led g e  that th e  ra tio n a le  in itia tin g  su ch  p ersec u tio n s  can  d iffer . It is p o s s ib le  
that th ey  w ill  h a v e  a d iffer en t ra d ica lisa tio n  p ro ce ss  fro m  that p resen ted  h ere and, 
thus, the w a y -m a rk ers, in te rv e n tio n  stra teg ies  and p o s t-c o n f lic t  reco n stru ctio n  
p o lic ies  sh o u ld  d iffer . N o n e th e le s s ,  th is research  p roject is  a ttem p tin g  to  id e n tify  a 
particular pattern  o f  id e o lo g ic a l ra d ica lisa tio n  tow ard s g e n o c id e  b y  lo o k in g  at tw o  
cases o f  tota l g e n o c id e  in  T u rk ey  and G erm an y and o n e  c a se  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  w ith  
gen ocid a l e p iso d e s  as s e e n  in m y  Y u g o s la v  c a se  and I m u st le a v e  o th er  ra d ic a lisa tio n  
p rocesses to  o th er sch o la rs.
W ithin th is co n te x t , furth er d isc u ss io n  re la tin g  to  the re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  g e n o c id e  
and n a tio n a lism  is  a lso  p o ss ib le . T h ere are su b stan tia l o v er la p s b e tw e e n  the tw o  
m ovem en ts; in  fa ct, as a I su g g e s te d  earlier in  th is ch ap ter, ea ch  c a se  p resen ted  in  
this stud y in v o lv e s  a c a s e  o f  n a tio n a lism . H o w e v e r , n a tio n a lism  and g e n o c id e  are 
not the sam e th in g  an d  o n ly  rarely  o ccu r  con cu rren tly . U n lik e  the su b sid ia ry  
relationship  b e tw e e n  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  and g e n o c id e , g e n o c id e  is  n o t a su b -ty p e  o f  
n ationalism .
N ation a lism  is  a so c ia l m o v e m e n t  w h o s e  p u rp ose is  to  attain  le g it im a c y  for  a n a tion a l  
group through  g a in in g  co n tro l o f  or w ith in  th e p o lit ic a l m a ch in a tio n s  o f  th e state. 
G en ocid e , as d esc r ib ed  a b o v e , is  in ten tio n a l actio n  b y  a n a tion  w ith  co n tro l o f  th e  
in stitu tions o f  the sta te to  p h y s ic a lly  d estro y  a p erp etra tor-d efin ed  e th n ic  group .
Thus, w e  se e  that th e  p ersec u to r  grou p  has a lread y  es ta b lish ed  p o lit ica l le g it im a c y .  
E qually, there is  a lrea d y  a su b stan tia l am ou n t o f  p o lit ic a l p o w e r  c la im ed  b y  
perpetrator e l ite s  as th e y  h a v e  con tro l o f  state in stitu tion s. In short, in  m y  c a s e s  o f  
gen o cid e  and, to  a large ex te n t, in  m y  c a se  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g , n a tio n a lis t  g o a ls  h a v e  
been greatly  a c h ie v e d  b e fo r e  g e n o c id e  occu rs. E xtrem e n a tion a l sen tim en t, 
id en tifica tion  and fear o f  th e an ti-n a tion  and e x p a n s iv e  h o m e la n d  c la im s are n o t
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n ecessar ily  n a tio n a lism  but are cer ta in ly  p rev a len t in  g e n o c id a l id e o lo g y  as I c lea r ly  
show  in th e u p c o m in g  ch ap ters. B e fo r e  g o in g  d irectly  on  to  th is  a n a ly s is , it is  h e lp fu l 
to h ave a b etter u n d ersta n d in g  o f  th e se co n d a r y  literature in  ea c h  o f  m y  th ree c a s e s .
Germany
Literature on  W W II and th e  H o lo c a u s t  d w arfs literature on  a lm o st an y  o th er su b jec t  
in m odern h istory . A  ch r o n ic le d  a sse ssm e n t o f  the en tire b o d y  o f  th is literature in  all 
the various la n g u a g e s  resea rch  is  b e in g  carried  ou t in is a n igh  im p o s s ib le  task  and  
one c lear ly  o u ts id e  th e  b o u n d s o f  th is p roject. N o n e th e le s s , there are so m e  cr itica l 
them es and v a ry in g  a p p ro a ch es in the literature g en er a lly  that that are k e y  w h e n  
approaching a n y  h isto r io g r a p h y  o f  th e  H o lo c a u st.
To start, there is a g en era l sp lit  a m o n g  sch o la rs o f  th e H o lo c a u st, b e tw e e n  w h a t  
M oses term s id e o lo g ic a l- in te n t io n a lis ts  and stru ctu ra l-fu n c tio n a lists  (1 9 9 8 :  199 - 
209). In ten tio n a lists  ten d  to  fo c u s  on  the ro le  o f  lead ers and p arties in g e n o c id a l  
states, that w ith o u t H itler  an d  h is  stron g  a n ti-S em itic  rh etor ic the H o lo c a u s t  w o u ld  
never had occu rred  (G e lla te ly  and K ie m a n  2 0 0 3 :  10 - 12; K ersh a w  1989: 69;
B loxh am  and K u sh n er  2 0 0 8 :  6 4 , 6 7 ) . It is Ian K ersh aw , w h o  p erh ap s d esc r ib e s  the  
id e o lo g ica l/in ten tio n a lis t  s ta n c e  b est , sa y in g  that, v er y  ro u g h ly , for  a in te n tio n a lis t  
‘the reason  w h y  th e  J e w s  o f  E u rop e w e r e  m urdered  in their m illio n s  w a s  b e c a u se  
Hitler, th e d icta tor  o f  G erm a n y , w a n ted  it -  and h ad  d o n e  s in c e  h e en tered  p o lit ic s  
over tw o  d eca d es  ea r lie r ’ (1 9 8 9 :  8 5 ) . A t th e h e lm  o f  th e m o st  ardent in te n tio n a lis ts  
is D an ie l G o ld h a g en . H is  d y n a m ic  and d eb atab le  w o rk , Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  c la im s  that G erm an y  had, e v e n  b e fo re  th e N a z is  ca m e to  p o w e r , 
a strong id e o lo g y  o f  w h a t Ian  W a lle r  ca lls  eliminationist antisemitism, w h ic h  
G old h agen  argu es is  d iffer en t from  a n y  o ther k in d  o f  a n ti-S em itic  id e o lo g y  
(G old h agen  1996: 8 0  - 8 3 , 4 4 4 ;  s e e  a lso  W a ller  2 0 0 2 : 3 7 ) . G o ld h a g en  a rg u es that 
‘ideas about J ew s . . .  w e r e  p e r v a s iv e  in  G erm an y , and h ad  b e e n  fo r  d e c a d e s , in d u ced  
ordinary G erm an s to  k ill u n arm ed , d e fe n c e le s s  J ew ish  m en , w o m e n  and  ch ild ren  b y  
the th ou san d s, sy s te m a tic a lly  and w ith o u t p ity ’ (G o ld h a g e n  1996: 9 ). In sh ort, it w a s
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the h a te fu ln ess  o f  a p e r v a s iv e  id e o lo g y  a cc ep ted  b y  a g en era l p o p u la c e  that lead  
directly to  th e H o lo c a u s t. G o ld h a g en , th o u g h  h is w o rk  is so m e t im e s  c o n s id er ed  
rev ision ist and  is  q u ite  c o n te n tio u s  (G reg o r  2 0 0 3 ; W eh ler  1997; A sc h h e im  1 9 9 7 ) , is 
far from  a lo n e  in h is  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  an in ten tio n a l fo u n d a tio n  and is  jo in e d  b y  th e  
w ork o f  su ch  o th er n o te d  sch o la rs  as E d w ard  K is s i ( 2 0 0 3 ) ,  B arrac lou gh  ( in  M o s e s  
1998), L u cy  D a w id o w ic z  (1 9 7 5 ;  1 9 8 1 ), W o lfg a n g  B e n z  (B e n z  1 9 9 5 , 1999 ; B e n z  an d  
D unlap 2 0 0 6 )  and R aul H ilb erg  (1 9 6 1 ) .
In tention alists ten d  to  fo c u s  o n  th e  ro le  o f  the N a z i state o u ts id e  o f  th e c o n te x t  o f  the  
Great W ar, b y  w h ic h  I m ea n  that in stea d  o f  fo c u s in g  o n  the e v e n ts  o f  an in tern ation a l 
war and on  th e greater  g e o p o lit ic a l a tm osp h ere , in ten tio n a lis ts , p articu lar ly  th e o n e s  
noted a b o v e , fo c u s  on  th e  w a y  th e N a z i sta te in teracted  w ith  their o w n  a n ti-S e m itic  
p o lic ies , th e to p -d o w n  in f lu e n c e  o f  m ed ia  and in -d ep th  stu d ies  o f  ro le  o f  p articu lar  
N a zis , n ot o n ly  H itler  (R o b er ts  2 0 0 1 ;  K ersh aw  1 9 8 7 , 1 9 9 1 , 1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 1 a , 2 0 0 1 b ,
2008; H eid en  1980 ; M a n v e ll and F raen k el 1978; S ig m u n d  2 0 0 6 ) ,  but a lso  su ch  k ey  
figures as G o e b b le s  (M o e lle r  2 0 0 0 ;  H a c h m eiste r  and K lo ft  2 0 0 5 ;  M ic h e ls  1992;  
H eover 1992; B arth  1 9 9 9 ) , G o e r in g  (O v er y  1984; G ritzb ach  1973; B u tler  and  Y o u n g  
1989; M o s le y  1 9 7 4 ), H im m le r  (B re itm a n  1991; A ck erm a n n  and H im m ler  1970 ;  
M an vell and F ra en k el 1 9 6 5 ) an d  S treich er (B y tw e rk  1983; E h lers 1 9 7 6 ) ju s t  to  n a m e  
a few . In in te n tio n a lis t  w r it in g s , as M o s e s  su g g e s ts , it is that a c tio n  fo l lo w s  in ten t, as  
intent c lea r ly  la id  o u t for  a ll to  s e e  v er y  early  in  th e p ro ce ss  (M o se s  1998: 2 0 1 ) .
The sch o lar ly  a c h ie v e m e n ts  o f  in ten tio n a lis ts  are n u m erou s; it is  th e y  w h o  h a v e  
g iven  us in s ig h ts  in to  th e p erso n a l and p o lit ic a l l iv e s  o f  k e y  N a z is  ( s e e  a b o v e  
b iograp hies), h o w  th e  N a z i sta te  w o rk ed  (S tach u ra  1978; M itc h e ll 1988; A ly  2 0 0 7 )  
and, in particu lar, h o w  th e  p erso n a l id ea s  and c o n v ic tio n s  in flu e n c e d  p o lic y  o v e r  th e  
course o f  their tim e  in  p o w e r  (B a n k ie r  1988; R y b a ck  2 0 0 8 ;  K ersh a w  2 0 0 8 ) . K ersh a w  
perhaps d esc r ib es  it best: ‘T h at th e q u est for Lebensraum an d  th e ex term in a tio n  o f  
the Jew s, far from  re m a in in g  th e w ild  rav in gs o f  a lu n a tic -fr in g e  b eer -h a ll rab b le-  
rouser, b eca m e h o rrific  rea lity  an d  w ere  im p lem en te d  as g o v er n m e n t p o lic y  b y  a 
regim e led  b y  H itler , s e e m s  to  p o in t  c o n c lu s iv e ly  to  the v a lid ity  o f  the ‘in te n t io n a lis f
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argum ent”  (K er sh a w  1989: 6 9 ) . H o w e v e r , th is ty p e  o f  a n a ly s is  le a v e s  certa in  
aspects o f  th e H o lo c a u s t  u n e x p la in e d , in  p articu lar th e ro le  o f  th e m a sse s  in  th e  
im p lem en ta tion  o f  th e H o lo c a u st. In ten tio n a lis ts  a lso  ten d  to  s tru g g le  w h e n  
h istorical d o cu m e n ts  ten d  to  ex p re ss  a n y th in g  o th er than  th e im p lem en ta tio n  o f  
gen o cid a l p o lic y ;  fo r  in sta n c e , th e fact that b oth  th e R S H A  and H itler  w e r e  a d v o c a te s  
o f  b rin g in g  J ew s b a ck  in to  G erm a n y  to  in crea se  th e a m ou n t o f  s la v e  lab our is  o fte n  
o v er lo o k ed  as it d o e s  n o t s it  co m fo rta b ly  w ith  the id e o lo g y  at the tim e  (B r o w n in g  
and M atthau s 2 0 0 4 ;  B lo x h a m  2 0 0 1 : 172 , 178 ) or H it le r ’s d e c is io n  to  red u ce  the  
pow er and in flu e n c e  o f  th e m o re  rad ica l e le m e n ts  o f  th e S A  in  19 3 4  (M o m m se n  
2003a: 2 6 ) . T h ere a lso  ten d s to  b e a trend in in te n tio n a lis t  w o rk  to o v e r lo o k  the  
in tention al m urder o f  m illio n s  ‘o th e r s ’ n ot c la s s if ie d  as J ew ish  (W a lle r  2 0 0 2 :  4 5 ) .  
F inally , to o  o fte n , th e in te n tio n a lis ts  ten d  to  fo c u s  o v er m u c h  o n  th e ‘u n iq u e n e s s ’ o f  
the H o lo c a u st, an e m p h a sis  o cc u r in g , as B lo x h a m  and K u sh n er  rem in d  u s, in th e  late  
n ineteen  s ix t ie s  and se v e n t ie s  (B lo x h a m  and K u sh n er 2 0 0 8 : 6 7  - 7 4 ) .
There is  a s e c o n d  c a te g o r y  o f  H o lo c a u s t  sch o la rs w h o se  w o rk  o ffe rs  an oth er  p o s it io n ,  
that o f  the stru ctu ra l-fu n ctio n a lists . W h ile  the in te n tio n a lis ts  ten d  th e v ie w  the  
H olocau st as the fu lf ilm e n t o f  g o a ls  es ta b lish ed  in  th e ea r lie st e x p r e ss io n s  o f  party  
platform  and id e o lo g y , th e stru ctu ra l-fu n c tio n a list  ap p roach  a ttem p ts to  ex p la in  
ch an ges that h a p p en ed  e n a b lin g  th e se  g o a ls  to  b e fu lf illed ; th e ir  w o rk  ten d s to  fo c u s  
on the structure o f  N a z i ru le , th e  p articu lar nature o f  p o lic y  c h o ic e s  and the te n d e n c y  
to sh ift fo cu s  from  th e in te n tio n a lis ts ’ em p h a sis  on  H itle r ’s ro le , b o th  in  sh a p in g  
p o licy  and in H o lo c a u s t  h isto r io g ra p h y  i t s e l f  (K ersh a w  1989: 65; L e e  2 0 0 3 :  2 4 7 ) .
K ey fu n ctio n a lis ts  are R aul H ilb e rg  ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  H an s M o m m se n  (2 0 0 1 ;  2 0 0 3 a ;  2 0 0 9 )  
and M artin  B r o sza t (1 9 8 7 ;  1 9 8 9 ).
Let m e b e  c lear, it is  n o t that s tru ctu ra l-fu n ctio n a lists  ig n o re  or d isp u te  the  
im portance and ro le s  o f  th e f ig u r es  in p o w er , but that th ey  ten d  to  v ie w  th em  as 
p rop agand ists, rather than  lead ers w ith  a c lea r  and d e fin ite  p lan  o f  a c tio n  e s ta b lish e d  
before or d uring  the e a r lie st  y ea rs o f  N a z i p o lit ic a l p o w er. M o m m se n , fo r  in sta n c e ,  
d escrib es the N a z i r e g im e  o f  1943  and its lead ers as w ea k , u n co o rd in a ted  and
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rudim entary (2 0 0 3 b : 1 1 1 ) b ut n e v e r  d ism is se s  th e im p o rta n ce  o f  th e sy m b o l th e y  
represented  for  th e  G erm an  p e o p le  and, in  p articu lar, th e G erm an  w a r effort.
S im ilarly , H ilb e rg  in tro d u ced  th e ev er-p o p u la r  fo c u s  o n  th e b ureau cratic  nature o f  
the H o lo ca u st ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  su p p o rted  la ter b y  A re n d t’s th e s is  on  the ‘b a n a lity ’ o f  th e  
H olocau st (2 0 0 2  [ 1 9 6 3 ]) .  C h ristian  G erlach  su g g e s ts  that A r e n d t’s w o rk  p ortrayed  
E ichm ann as a ‘d ilig e n t  b ureau crat, an adm in istrator w h o  d id  h is jo b  u n aw are that he  
w as a participan t in  a cr im e, w h o  had n ot h ated  th o se  w h o se  d eath  h e  fa c il ita te d ’ 
(2001: 4 3 8 ) . It is th is  trend  o f  em o tio n a l d isa sso c ia t io n  that is m o st p e r v a s iv e  in  
fu n ction a list w ork ; th e p ortrayal o f  th e  G e n n a n  p o p u la ce  and p erpetrator as o n e  
m oved  b y  n o n - id e o lo g ic a l g o a ls  w h o  w o u ld  fit in to  M a n n ’s su g g e s te d  c a te g o r ie s  o f  
bureaucratic k ille r s , m a ter ia list  k illers  and careerist k illers  (2 0 0 5 : 2 8 , 2 9 ) .
Out o f  the w o rk  o ffe r e d  b y  th e se  sc h o la r s , M o m m se n ’s th eory  o f  cu m u la tiv e  
rad ica lisation  e m e r g e s  as p articu lar ly  in terestin g  in lig h t o f  the d isc u ss io n  in C h ap ter  
T w o on  path d e p e n d e n c y  an d  th e se q u en tia l p r o c e sse s  o f  e v o lu t io n . M o m m sen  
strongly  refu tes th e in te n tio n a lis t  c la im  that there w a s an o v era rch in g  in ten tio n  b a sed  
on H itler’s ear ly  w r it in g s  or h is  d ire c tiv es  w h ile  in  p o w er. In stead , th e g e n o c id e  w a s  
a d ev e lo p m en t o f  s o m e t im e s  sp o n ta n e o u s , so m e tim e s  erratic b ureau cratic  in it ia tiv e s  
(1983: 3 9 9 , 4 1 2  - 4 1 5 )  and  stip u la tes  that the b a sic  p rem ise  o f  cu m u la tiv e  
rad ica lisation  is  th e  H o lo c a u s t  as th e en d -p o in t o f  a lo n g -ter m  p ro ce ss  o f  s lo w ly  
ch an ging  in stitu tio n s and e v e n ts  w h ic h  en d ed  in g e n o c id e  (M o m m se n  1 9 7 6 ).
B loxh am  and K u sh n er  further re fin e  th e term , en co u ra g in g  th eir  readers to  ‘th in k  o f  
it as d escr ib in g  th e m o m e n tu m  b u ilt up in a partly s e lf - s e le c t in g , p artly  se lf-d r iv e n  
Jew ish  p o lic y  u n d erp in n ed  b y  a g en era l racist c o n s e n s u s . . . ’ (2 0 0 8 : 137 ). T h o u g h  
som e sch o lars  h a v e  a p p lied  th e th eory  o f  cu m u la tiv e  ra d ica lisa tio n  to their w o rk  
(B loxh am  2 0 0 3 ;  K a llis  2 0 0 0 ;  H a y  1999; L e v e n e  2 0 0 5 )  and th o u g h  K ersh a w  n o te s  
that id e o lo g y  is  b e in g  in c r e a s in g ly  s e e n  as a k e y  e lem en t in  th e p r o c e ss  o f  cu m u la t iv e  
rad ica lisation  (2 0 0 0 :  2 6 4 ) ,  th ere has y e t  b een  a co m p a ra tiv e  m o d e l ex p a n d in g  the  
idea o f  cu m u la tiv e  ra d ic a lisa tio n  to  id e o lo g y  in g e n o c id a l sta tes. B y  ev a lu a tin g  
M a h o n ey ’s th eory  o f  path  d e p e n d e n c y  through  three c a se s  o f  g e n o c id a l p ro g re ss io n , 
this a n a ly sis  w il l  b e  a b le  to  f ill that gap.
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Let m e b e clear: u n lik e  p ath  d e p e n d e n c y , I d o  n o t p e r c e iv e  M o m m s e n ’s id ea  o f  
cu m ulative ra d ic a lisa tio n  as a th eo ry  in n eed  o f  test in g . In fact, I p la ce  m y s e l f  w ith in  
the fu n ctio n a list  ca m p  b y  a c c e p tin g  th e id ea  o f  cu m u la tiv e  ra d ic a lisa tio n  as a m ore  
ap plicab le rep resen ta tion  o f  th e  c o m p le x it ie s  p resen t in  th e H o lo c a u s t  than  th o se  
su g g estio n s put forth  b y  m o st  in te n tio n a lis ts . T e st in g  path d e p e n d e n c y  th o u g h  an  
ep isod ic  ap p roach  as e x p r e sse d  in C hap ter T w o , a llo w s  u s to  lo o k  at th e re la tio n sh ip  
b etw een  id e o lo g y  and e v e n ts  and th u s to  a sse ss  n ot o n ly  h o w  th e cu m u la tiv e  
rad ica lisation  p r o c e ss  o cc u r s , but w h y  it o ccu rs in  su ch  a fa sh io n .
This is n ot to sa y  that th e fu n c tio n a lis t  argu m en t is a lw a y s  the correct o n e  in re sp ec ts  
outside cu m u la tiv e  ra d ic a lisa tio n . F u n ctio n a lis ts  d o  ten d  to  o v e r lo o k  th e  fa ct that 
p eop le d o  k ill for  v a r io u s  rea so n s; M an n  n o te s  that perpetrators o f  th e H o lo c a u s t  can  
be ca teg o r ised  as v io le n t  k ille r s , b ig o te d  k illers  and e v e n  id e o lo g ic a l k ille rs  (2 0 0 5 :  2 7  
- 28 ). F u n ctio n a lis ts  ten d  to  a llo w  fo r  th e in flu e n c e  o f  H it le r ’s ch a rism a  but n o t for  
his p o lic ie s  n or h is  d ire c tiv es;  e q u a lly , d esp ite  recen t sc h o la rsh ip  as n o ted  a b o v e , 
there has b een  a te n d e n c y  to  o v e r lo o k  th e in flu e n c e  id e o lo g y  h ad  on  th e N a z i re g im e. 
E ven  M o m m sen  h im s e lf  fe ll  in to  th is trap on  certa in  o c c a s io n s  (1 9 7 6 :  6 6  - 70; 1983:  
381 - 4 2 0 ) . L ik e  M a n n , th ere are o th er sch o la rs w h o  try and sy n th e s iz e  th e re la tion a l 
gaps le ft  b y  the stru c tu r a l-fu n c tio n a lis t/id e o lo g ic a l- in te n tio n a lis t  d eb ate . T h o u g h  
they do n o t a lw a y s  ag ree  w ith  h o w  th is sh o u ld  be d o n e , their w o rk  p r o v id e s  an oth er  
in teresting d y n a m ic  w ith in  H o lo c a u s t  literature. F irst a m o n g  th e se  is  K ersh a w  
h im self. T h o u g h  h e b oard ers m ore  c lo s e ly  w ith  the id e o lo g ic a l- in te n t io n a lis ts  than  
w ith stru ctu ra l-fu n ctio n a lists , h e  is  v er y  c lear, p articu lar ly  in h is  la ter w o rk , that 
H itler, b oth  as an  in d iv id u a l and as a k ey  m em b er  in th e  N a z i p o lit ic a l sy s te m , w a s  
h eav ily  in flu e n c ed  b y  g e o -p o lit ic a l  ev e n ts  (K ersh a w  2 0 0 1 b : ch . 9 , 10, 15). 
N o n e th e le ss , h e  a lso  rem in d s h is  readers that the a rtic les  o f  H it le r ’s p erson a l 
w o rld v iew  p la y ed  ‘a fu n c tio n a l ro le . T h ey  had so  little  to  d o  w ith  d iv is iv e  d a y -to -  
day so c ia l and p o lit ic a l is s u e s  that th e y  co u ld  b e resorted  to  as ‘d ire c tio n s  for  a c t io n ’
(Aktionsrichtungen) an d  a d v a n c ed  as u ltim a te , lo n g -r a n g e  g o a ls . . .H it le r ’s f ix a tio n s  
w ith a n ti-S em itism , a n ti-b o lsh e v ism , and w ith  Lebensraum m ig h t b e sa id  to  h a v e
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had, at least in  th e ear ly  y ea rs  o f  th e  T hird  R e ic h , a la r g e ly  s y m b o lic  fu n c t io n ’ 
(K ershaw  1989: 6 7 ).
K ershaw  is a s tron g  c o m p o n e n t in  H o lo c a u s t  h isto r io g ra p h y  b e c a u se , a m o n g st  o th er  
things, o f  h is  b io g ra p h ic  w o r k  o n  H itler  (2 0 0 1 b ; 1 9 9 9 ). In la y in g  th e g ro u n d w o rk  for  
these b o o k s, h e  s tr e sse s  that
the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  [H it le r ’s] ro le  can  o n ly  b e a s se s se d  b y  re la tin g  h is  
input to  th e c o n d it io n s  w h ic h  p ro d u ced  and sh ap ed  h im , and w h ic h  h e  
co u ld  n ot a u to n o m o u s ly  co n tro l e v e n  at the h e ig h t o f  h is  p o w e r . . .S o  
sin gu lar  w a s  H it le r ’s id e o lo g ic a l and p o lit ic a l co n tr ib u tio n  to  th e sh a p in g  
and d ire ctio n  o f  th e  N a z i m o v e m e n t and th en  the N a z i S tate that an y  
attem pt to  la b e l N a tio n a l S o c ia lism  as fa s c is m ’, th u s p la c in g  it in  
co m p a riso n  w ith  o th er ‘s im ila r ’ m o v e m e n ts , is  m e a n in g le ss  and im p lie s ,  
m o reo v er , th e ‘tr iv ia liz a t io n ’ o f  H itler  and N a z is m . R ather, so  
c o m p le te ly  in te r w o v e n  w ith  N a tio n a l S o c ia lism  w ith  th e r ise , fa ll,  
p o lit ic a l a im s, an d  d estru c tiv e  id e o lo g y  o f  th e is  u n iq u e  p erso n a lity , that 
it is  le g it im a te  to  sp ea k  o f  N a z is m  as ‘H it le r ism ’.
(K ersh a w  1989: 4 1 , 2 0 )
It is th is typ e  o f  co n tro l, id e o lo g ic a l,  sy m b o lic  and p o lit ic a l, that in c lin e s  K ersh a w  
towards a cc ep tin g  c la im s  o f  H o lo c a u s t  ‘u n iq u e n e ss ’. Y eh u d a  B a u er  (1 9 7 9 ;  1989;  
1994; 1990; 2 0 0 1 )  is  p erh ap s th e m o st p op u lar p rop on en t o f  H o lo c a u s t  ‘u n iq u e n e s s ’; 
for B auer, ‘H it le r ’ a lm o st  b e c o m e s  sy n o n y m o u s  for ‘N a z i G e rm a n y ’, p articu lar ly  in  
his d iscu ss io n s  on  w a r ( s e e  1990: 3 3 4  for  ex a m p les);  h o w e v e r , h is  a ssu m p tio n s  are 
founded  on  th e m a ch in a tio n s  o f  th e  in terw ork in gs o f  a m u lt i- le v e l sy s te m  o f  
govern an ce , a d m in istra tin g  w a rtim e  p o lic ie s , o n e  o f  w h ic h  w a s  an in te n s iv e  
relationship  w ith  th e J e w ish  p o p u la tio n  at the tim e (1 9 8 9 :  5 6  - 6 6 ).
This sits cou n ter to  th e stron g  argu m en t m ad e b y  B lo x h a m  (2 0 0 9 a : 1 - 14) and  
B loxh am  and K u sh n er (2 0 0 8 :  6 6 - 7 1 )  on  the co m p a ra b ility  o f  the H o lo c a u st. In  The 
Holocaust: Critical Historical Approaches ( 2 0 0 8 )  B lo x h a m  and K u sh n er  are 
particularly ad am an t ab ou t w h a t th e d ia lo g u e  o f  ‘u n iq u e n e ss ’ h as d o n e  fo r  s tu d ie s  o f  
the H o locau st: ‘T h e H o lo c a u s t  m etanarrative h as d e v e lo p e d  as part o f
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‘c o n sc io u s n e ss ’ o f  ‘th e H o lo c a u s t ’ and is  an o b sta c le  to  historical u n d erstan d in g  o f  
the d estru ction  o f  th e  J e w s  b e c a u se  o f  its ten d e n c y  to  v ie w  th o se  e v e n s  from  the  
latter-day p e r sp e c t iv e  o f  th e a c c o m p lish e d  fa c t ’ (B lo x h a m  and K u sh n er  2 0 0 8 : 6 6 ) .
A s A lic e  and R o y  E ckardt first p o in ted  ou t th irty yea rs a g o , d esc r ib in g  th e H o lo c a u s t  
as co m p le te ly  u n iq u e  is  to  c la s s ify  it as u n e x p la in a b le  and  m y stica l;  th is  d o e s  little  
for further d e v e lo p m e n t o f  h is to r ic a l a n a ly s is  and can  eq u a lly  tak e a w a y  from  the  
event itse lf. Id ea s o f  H o lo c a u s t  u n iq u e n e ss  are gen era ted  m ore  from  su r v iv o r s ’ 
exp erien ce and from  th e  ‘sp e c ia l re la t io n sh ip ’ that m a n y  p eers and d esc en d a n ts  h a v e  
with that e v e n t than  fro m  an y  h isto r ic a l ev e n t or sc h o la r ly  ra tion a le  (E ck ard t and  
Eckardt 1980: 166 , 178 ).
In truth, th e H o lo c a u s t  is  ‘u n iq u e ’ . H o w e v e r , so  is e v e ry  c a se  o f  m a ss  k ill in g  u n iq u e;  
there is  so m e th in g  sp e c ia l, u n se tt lin g , in d escr ib a b le  ab out th em  all. T h is  d o e s  n o t  
m ake all g e n o c id e s  eq u a l, b u t in stea d  m a k es th em  d y n a m ic . N e ith e r  sh o u ld  it lim it  
com parison; in d e ed , th e  H o lo c a u s t  and th e A rm en ian  g e n o c id e  are o fte n  co m p a red , 
though the d iffe r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  th e c a se s  are n otab le . Staub p o s its  that th e N a z is  
used  ‘b ureau cratic m a n a g e m e n t and a d v a n ced  te c h n o lo g y  in th e fra m ew o rk  o f  a 
totalitarian sy stem . T h e  g e n o c id e  o f  the A rm en ia n s w a s  le s s  p lan n ed , w ith  lim ited  
bureaucratic o rg a n iz a tio n  an d  v er y  little  a d v a n ced  te c h n o lo g y  in  its e x e c u t io n ’
(Staub 1989: 7 ) . M o re  o f  th e se  d is t in c tio n s  c o m e  to  lig h t as w e  m o v e  in to  the  
literature o f  th e A rm en ia n  g e n o c id e .
Turkey
To start w ith  T u rk ey , th e literature can  ro u g h ly  b e  c a te g o r ise d  in to  tw o  m ain  
approaches su p p orted  b y  an ev e r -in cr ea s in g  a m a lg a m  o f  o th er literature p articu lar ly  
w ork on g en d er  (D erd er ia n  2 0 0 5 ;  Sanasarian  1989; T ach jian  2 0 0 9 ) ,  m ed ia  
(K irakossian  2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 7 ;  T orch in  2 0 0 6 )  and w o rk s a d d ressin g  other in sta n c es  o f  
Turkish p ersec u tio n s  o f  A rm en ia n s , p rim arily  d uring  th e la te  18 0 0 s , an d  G reek s,
92
Chapter Three: Survey o f  approaches
prim arily after W W I (M e ls o n  19 8 2 ; N a im a rk  2 0 0 1 ) . T h e tw o  prim ary v e in s  o f  
literature on  th is ca se , h o w e v e r , are h isto r ica l n arratives and  co m p a ra tiv e  a cc o u n ts .
To borrow  from  th e H o lo c a u s t  d ia lo g u e , b oth  o f  th e se  ap p ro a ch es fa ll in to  the  
fu n ction a list-stru ctu ra list c a te g o ry . T h o u g h  sch o la rs in  th e f ie ld  w id e ly  a c k n o w le d g e  
the r e sp o n sib ility  h e ld  b y  th e  C U P  for th e a tro c ities  c o m m itte d  a g a in st  the  
A rm enians, a g g r e s s iv e  acts  c o m m itte d  ag a in st the A rm en ia n s  on  ord er o f  th e S u ltan  
and then later a g g r e ss io n  a g a in st  th e  G reek s u nd er A tatiirk , h a v e  en co u ra g e d  sc h o la r s  
to cast their b la m e  o n  a w id e r  se t  o f  c irc u m sta n c es , rather than  o n  th e Y o u n g  T urk  
trium virate.
B eg in n in g  w ith  th e h is to r ic a l n arratives, th e first p o in t o f  n o te  is that m u ch  o f  th is  
w ork is c o m p a ra tiv e ly  n ew ; th e  fou r k e y sto n e  h istorian s in  th e f ie ld , V ah ak n  
Dadrian, T an er A k p am , D o n a ld  B lo x h a m  and Jay W in ter, h a v e  o n ly  r e ce n tly  b eg u n  
p ub lish in g  w o rk  o n  th e su b ject. A  cr itica l p o in t o f  n o te  on  literature and the  
A rm enian  g e n o c id e , u n lik e  th e research  in  th e N a z i c a se , m o st o f  th e h isto r ica l 
assu m p tions m a d e  b y  th e se  h isto r ia n s are d o n e  so  from  a fu n ctio n a lis t  p e r sp e c t iv e  
and thus their ex p la n a tio n s  an d  a n a ly se s  are g en er a lly  ‘m ad e w ith o u t re fere n c e  to  the  
in tentions o f  in d iv id u a ls ’ (D u n le a v y  and O 'L eary 1987: 2 1 8 ) . T h e literature rarely  
focu ses on  b io g ra p h ies  o f  th e  k e y  id e o lo g u e s 11; eq u a lly , there is a te n d e n c y  to  
o verlook  the ro le  o f  id e o lo g y  in  th e c o n flic t , d ue p erh ap s to  th e la ck  o f  literature  
p rev iou sly  w ritten  o n  th e su b ject.
T hough W in ter’s first b o o k  w a s  p rin ted  in the m id -e ig h tie s  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  it is  n o t u n til the  
early tw e n ty -fir st cen tu ry  that h e b eg in s  to  fo c u s  on  su b stan tia l h isto r ic a l n arrative  
and th eoretica l ex p la n a tio n  (W in ter  2 0 0 3 a , 2 0 0 3 b ; C an n in g , L eh m an n , and W in ter  
2 00 4 ). L ik e  so m e  H o lo c a u s t  sc h o la r s , W in ter p o in ts  to  the p o ss ib ility  o f  m a ss  
m ob ilisa tion  in in d u stria l s o c ie t ie s  to  ex p la in  the O ttom an  E m p ir e ’s ro le  in  W W I, 
creating w h at h e term s a s itu a tio n  o f  ‘to ta l w a r ’ in  w h ic h  g e n o c id e  can  b e h id d en .
There are very few in English, the most important being The Socia l a n d  P o litica l Thought o f  Z iva  
Gdkalp (Parla 1985).
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‘G e n o c id e ,’ he c la im s , ‘ h e lp e d  form  to ta l w ar, and tota l w a r  h e lp ed  lau nch  
g e n o c id e ’ (W in ter  2 0 0 3 b : 2 1 3 ) .  U n fo rtu n a te ly , W in ter is n o t en tire ly  e x p lic it  in  
link ing the O ttom an  E m p ire  to  th e ‘m o b ilise d , in du stria l c o u n tr ie s ’ r e sp o n s ib le  for  
the co n tex t o f  to ta l w ar.
O zm ucur and P am u k , in  th e ir  d is c u ss io n  o f  the sh ifts  in  th e standard o f  liv in g  from  
the late n in e teen th  cen tu ry  u n til the b e g in n in g  o f  W W I m a k e  it q u ite  p la in  that 
though the O ttom an  E m p ire  w a s  ch a n g in g , it co u ld  h ard ly  be co u n te d  a m o n g  o n e  o f  
the great in d u str ia lised  E u rop ean  sta tes  (2 0 0 2 : 2 9 3 , 3 1 2  - 3 1 3 , 3 2 1 ) . W in ter  d o e s  try 
to address th is , but h is  s ta tem en t ‘that T u rk ey  w a s  n ot a m o n g  th e le a d in g  in du stria l 
nations is n e ith er  h ere n or there; th e w ar T u rk ey  jo in e d  o n  th e s id e  o f  th e C entral 
P ow ers so o n  b e c a m e  a n e w  k in d  o f  w ar, to  w h o se  rad ica l ch aracter T u rk ey  
contributed th rou gh  carry in g  to  th e A rm en ia n  g e n o c id e ’ (W in ter  2 0 0 3 b : 191 ) s e e m s  
to fall fla t w h e n  co m p a red  to  th e m ore su b sta n tiv e  argu m en ts o f  D adrian  and A k p am .
B ecau se o f  h is e x te n s iv e  k n o w le d g e  o f  la n g u a g e , V ah ak n  D adrian  has es ta b lish ed  
h im se lf  as o n e  o f  th e  p rem ier  sch o la rs  o f  g e n o c id e  in  th e m o d e m  era. H is  first b o o k  
on the su b ject, The History o f  the Armenian Genocide ( 2 0 0 4 ) , o r ig in a lly  p u b lish e d  in  
1995, o s te n s ib ly  c h a n g ed  sch o la rsh ip  on  the A rm en ian  g e n o c id e , m a k in g  th e to p ic  
m uch m ore a c c e s s ib le  to  a c a d e m ic s  h ere to fo re  stu m p ed  b y  la n g u a g e  and a la c k  o f  
primary m ateria ls. T h is  b o o k  is e x te n s iv e , ran g in g  from  a trea tise  o n  I s la m ic  L a w  in  
O ttom an s o c ie ty  and  its  im p a c t on  a n o n -Is la m ic  se n se  o f  o th er-n ess  to  th e e f fe c ts  o f  
the A rm en ian  g e n o c id e  and th e H o lo c a u s t  and the N u rem b erg  tria ls. D a d r ia n ’s 
primary co n cern  is  o n  in terven tion ; th e le s so n s  c o m in g  out o f  th e A rm en ia n  g e n o c id e  
as p resen ted  in th is  w o r k  are th ree-fo ld : 1) that sta tes are n ot ab le  to  ju s t ly  p o lic e  
th em se lv es or h o ld  th e m se lv e s  a cc o u n ta b le  in  a cou rt o f  la w , 2 ) in order for  
gen ocid a l cr im es to  c o m e  to  ju s t ic e , that in tern ational actors m u st b e in d e lib ly  
com m itted  to  th e ta sk  and  3 )  i f  in tern ation a l actors d o  in terven e  w ith o u t  w h o le ­
hearted co m m itm e n t, their  a c tio n s  can  and o ften  do aggravate  the situ a tio n  rather 
than a llev ia te  su ffe r in g  (D ad rian  2 0 0 4 : x x  - x x ii i ) ,  a ll ten ets  a d d ressed  in the  
R esp o n sib ility  to P ro tect (In tern ation a l C o m m iss io n  on  In terven tion  an d  S tate
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S overe ign ty  2 0 0 1 ) . W h at is  m o st  la u d a b le  ab ou t D a d r ia n ’s w o rk , h o w e v e r , is  the  
am ount o f  in fo rm a tio n  fro m  p rim ary  so u rc es  h e h as m ad e a v a ila b le  to  the greater  
com m un ity  o f  g e n o c id e  sc h o la r s . It is  h is  e x te n s iv e  n o ta tio n  as m u ch  as h is  cr itica l 
analysis that m a k e s  h im  a cr it ica l so u rc e  fo r  e v e ry  o ther sc h o la r  o f  th e A rm en ia n  
g en ocid e (M e lso n  1997 ; S u n y  1 9 9 6 ).
Taner A kp am  ce rta in ly  b u ild s  u p on  D a d r ia n ’s w o rk  in  b oth  h is  From Empire to 
Republic (2 0 0 4 )  and  Shameful Act ( 2 0 0 6 ) . H o w e v e r , in stea d  o f  fo c u s in g  as D ad rian  
does, on  a sp ec ts  o f  in terv en tio n , A k p a m ’s Empire a ttem p ts to  b r in g  to g eth e r  th e  
narrative o f  a c o lla p s in g  em p ire , p o rtio n ed  b e tw e e n  E u rop ean  p o w e rs , and that o f  th e  
terror and so rro w  o f  g e n o c id e , o f  a troc ity  p iled  u p on  atrocity . In ord er to  ta ck le  th is  
ch a llen ge , A k p am  a ssu m e s  th e v o ic e  o f  th e perpetrator -  n o t in  that h e d e fe n d s  or 
speaks p o s it iv e ly  ab ou t the C U P  and th e T u rk ish  r e g im e , but that h e  b e g in s  b y  a 
thorough d isc u ss io n  o f  T u rk ish  n a tio n a l id en tity  w h ic h  se ts  the to n e  for  further  
d iscu ssion s o n  r e lig io n , T u rk ifica tio n  and th e e c o n o m ic  an d  p o lit ic a l p la n s m a d e  b y  
the reg im e. T h is  ty p e  o f  ap p roach  h as b een  p ic k e d  up b y  o th er sc h o la r s , m o st  
notably B o r is  Isyar , w h o  d is c u s s e s  th e (re )co n stru ctio n  o f  O ttom an  id en tity  in to  
Turkish id en tity  th rou gh  th e le n s  o f  c h a n g in g  n o tio n s  o f  m o d ern ity  in  E u rop e at the  
tim e (2 0 0 5 ).
A Shameful Act h as s im ila r  th e m e s  to  Empire, and ex p a n d s the id ea s  o ffe r e d  b y  Isyar  
to great ex ten t. A k p a m ’s p u rp o se  h ere is  to  sh o w  that the c la im  o f  th e m o d e m  
Turkish state that n o  T u rk ish  so u rc es  can  b e  u sed  to  p ro v e  T u rk ish  r e sp o n s ib ility  for  
the A rm en ian  g e n o c id e  (A k p a m  2 0 0 6 : x ii)  -  w h ic h  A kp am  d o e s  to  great ex ten t; 
h ow ever, th e f in a l ch ap ters o f  th e  b o o k  fo c u s in g  on  th e w a r tria ls, and in stea d  o f  
focu sin g  on  th e o r ig in a l o u tc o m e  o f  d o cu m e n t a n a ly s is , le a v e s  th e reader w ith  a 
sim ilar o u tc o m e  to  that p o se d  b y  D ad rian , that in terven tion  o f  an y  k in d , m ilita ry , 
p olitica l or le g a l, is  ‘e x tr e m e ly  p ro b le m a tic ’ and h a v e  th e ca p a c ity  to  ‘p ro d u ce  resu lts  
that are m ore d etr im en ta l than a d v a n ta g e o u s’ (A k p am  2 0 0 6 : 4 2 3 ) .
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R ounding out th e  h isto r ic a l literature o f  th e f ie ld  is  th e w o rk  o f  D o n a ld  B lo x h a m  in  
his Great Game o f Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction o f the 
Ottoman Armenians ( 2 0 0 5 ) .  T h o u g h  p ro v id in g  a co n cr e te  h isto r ica l narrative, 
B lo x h a m ’s w o rk  sta n d s o u t d u e  to  h is su c c e s s fu l en d ea v o u r  to  rein terpret the  
A rm enian g e n o c id e  w ith in  th e  c o n te x t o f  ex tern a l in terv en tio n  in late O tto m a n /ea r ly  
Turkish m in or ity  re la tio n s . M u ch  o f  B lo x h a m ’s later w o rk  p resen ts  th e A rm en ia n  
g en ocid e in  the c o n te x t  o f  th e sh ifts  o cc u r in g  in  th e E u rop ean  p o w e r  d y n a m ic , 
link ing it stro n g ly  w ith  th e  H o lo c a u s t, but a lso  c iv il  u n rest and c le a n s in g  in  th e  
U S S R  and in th e B a lk a n s (B lo x h a m  2 0 0 9 a , 2 0 0 9 b , 2 0 0 8 , 2 0 0 1 ) . U n lik e  th e o th er  
authors a b o v e , B lo x h a m  is re ticen t to  em b race th e id ea  o f  w h o le s a le  
ack n o w led g em en t fo r  th e  A rm en ia n  g e n o c id e , a sk in g
w h at w o u ld  r e c o g n it io n  m ea n  for A rm en ia n s?  O n o n e  le v e l  the a n sw e r  is  
straightforw ard: a certa in  c lo su r e  on  an a g o n iz in g  past. B ut o ther  
a n sw ers rem ain  to  b e  p ro v id ed . H o w  w o u ld  A rm en ia n  h isto r ia n s and  
p o lit ic ia n s  e x p lo it  th e situ ation ; to w h a t u se s  w o u ld  th e h isto ry  o f  the  
g e n o c id e  b e put?
(B lo x h a m  2 0 0 5 :  2 2 9 )
C ertainly, th e se  are im p ortan t q u e stio n s , p articu lar ly  u n d erstan d in g  b oth  th e w a y  
historians, jo u r n a lis ts  an d  p o lit ic ia n s  u se  ‘g e n o c id a l h is to r y ’ in ord er to  attain  
individual a im s an d  g o a ls , as s e e n  in  th e  H o lo c a u st, and  u n d erstan d in g  th e le g a c y  o f  
enm ity that can  resu lt in  further a g g r e ss io n , as se e n  in  th e B a lk an  ca se .
The Balkans
O f all the literature w ith  w h ic h  th is  research  e n g a g e s , th e literature on  th e b reak -up  
o f  Y u g o s la v ia  and th e  a tro c ities  ea r n e d  out aga in st th e B o sn ia k s  is the m o st lim ited . 
T hough in th e u p c o m in g  se c t io n  I w ill  ta lk  a fe w  m ore  s p e c if ic  p ro b lem s in certa in  
exam p les o f  literature on  B o sn ia -H e r z e g o v in a , there is a g en era l th em e w orth  n o tin g  
before p ro ce ed in g  a n y  further: th e B a lk an  ca se , th ou gh  f ittin g  w ith in  th e b o u n d s o f
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m y d efin ition  o f  g e n o c id e  as p resen ted  a b o v e , d o e s  n ot fit in to  the g e n e r a lly  a c c e p te d  
category o f  to ta l g e n o c id e . T h u s, m a n y  g e n o c id e  sc h o la r s  a v o id  th is c a s e , o p tin g  
instead for a le s s  c o m p le x  co m p a r iso n . H o w e v e r , as d isc u sse d  a b o v e , I c o n s id e r  th is  
case to b e c la s s if ie d  as partia l g e n o c id e  or, m ore r igh tly , as a c a se  o f  e th n ic  c le a n s in g  
with g en o c id a l e p iso d e s .
O f the literature that h as b e e n  p ro d u ced , w e  can  d e tec t  tw o  m ain  ca te g o r ie s . O f  first  
note are th o se  au thors s o m e h o w  in v o lv e d  w ith  th e m ed ia  p r esen ce  in  th e B a lk a n s at 
the tim e o f  th e c o n f lic t ,  e ith er  in  B o sn ia -H e r z e g o v in a  or later in  K o so v o . T h o u g h  
there is n ot ro o m  in  th is  P h D  to  d isc u ss  the ro le  o f  th e m e d ia  in  the B a lk an  c o n f lic t , 
K eith D o u b t ap tly  d e sc r ib e s  th e jo u r n a lis t ’s ro le  as o n e  o f  great im port: ‘ It has  
b ecom e the r e sp o n s ib ility  o f  jo u r n a lis ts  to  articu la te th e m oral im p e ra tiv e s  th rou gh  
w hich  to v ie w  e v e n ts ’ (D o u b t 1 9 9 9 ) w h ic h  b u ild s  on  th e w o rk  o f  M itc h e ll and  
Richards w h o  p o s it  that jo u r n a lis ts  h a v e  b e c o m e  the m artyr o f  m o d e m  c o n f lic t  
(M itch ell and  R ich ard s 2 0 1 0 ) .  T h e literature I u se  in  m y  w o rk  in c lu d e s  p ro jects  
undertaken b y  au th ors w h o  w er e  th e m se lv e s  jo u r n a lis ts  d u rin g  th e co u rse  o f  the  
con flic t su ch  as M ish a  G le n n y , w h o s e  F a ll o f  Y u g o s la v ia  (1 9 9 9 )  is  a co r n ic e  p ie c e  o f  
Y u g o sla v ia n  g e n o c id a l literature, an d  E liza b eth  N e u ffe r  (2 0 0 1 ) . H o w e v e r , it e x te n d s  
to the e x te n s iv e  b o d y  o f  w o rk  d o n e  on  the ro le  o f  the m ed ia  in  th e Y u g o s la v  c o n f lic t  
(G ow  et al. 1996; C o h e n  2 0 0 1 ;  S o fo s  1999; S a d k o v ich  1998 ).
A  good  e x a m p le  o f  th e  literature c o m in g  from  th is ca te g o ry  o f  au th orsh ip  is th e w o rk  
o f  Laura S ilb er  an d  A lla n  L ittle  in  their b o o k , Y u g o s la v ia :  T h e  D ea th  o f  a N a tio n  
(1997 ). S ilb er  an d  L ittle  tak e  a fu n ctio n a lis t  ap proach  to  the crea tion  o f  m o d e m  
S erb ian /C roat/B osn iak  n a tio n a l id en tity , b eg in n in g  w ith  a b r ie f  d is c u ss io n  o f  
Y u g o sla v ia  d u rin g  W W II and  th rou gh  T ito ’s re ign . It w a s  h ere, th e y  c la im , that 
nationalist id e a lism  c a m e  in to  its o w n  as n a tio n a lis ts  w e r e  o ften  ja ile d  or fo rc ed  in to  
ex ile , resid in g  in  ex -p a t c o m m u n it ie s  w h ich  so  o ften  fo rm  th e b a s is  for  ex trem e  
nationalist a d h eren ce . T h u s, S ilb er  and L ittle  fo c u s  th e ir  a tten tion  to  th e r ise  an d  fa ll 
o f  M ilo se v ic  and o th er S erb ian  leaders; th e y  d o  n ot fa ll in to  th e trap o f  m a n y  o th er  
fu n ction a l-stm ctu ra lists  w h o  u n d erestim ate  the ro le  o f  n a tion a l lead ers in  the  
rad icalisation  p r o c e ss  (K er sh a w  2 0 0 8 :  2 4 5  - 2 4 7 ) . N a tu ra lly , for  an y  co m p a ra tiv e
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study on  n a tio n a lism , a d d r ess in g  the q u estio n  o f  n a tion a l lead ersh ip  is in ev ita b le .
The in sigh ts th e y  p ro v id e  in to  th e  c o m p le x  and sh iftin g  p o w e r  re la tio n s b e tw e e n  
Y u goslav  lead ers are k e e n  an d  p u rp o se fu l. W h en  co m p a rin g  their co n stru c tio n s  o f  
these p o w er  re la tio n s  w ith  th o se  in  G erm an y  and T u rk ey , m u ch  can  be b etter  
u nderstood  ab ou t th e ro le  o f  a n a tio n a l lead er in  g e n o c id a l co n flic ts .
S im ilarly to  th e G erm an  c a s e , m u ch  o f  the in itia l literature in  th e Y u g o s la v  ca se ,  
written in the w a k e  o f  th e c o n f lic t , is  p resen ted  from  b oth  a stru ctu ra l-fu n c tio n a list  
p erspective w h ere  M ilo s e v ic  is  p resen ted  as a figu re  w ith  little  fu n ctio n  e x c e p t  as a 
sym bol h a v in g  rather le s s  than  m o re  con tro l o v e r  the id e o lo g ic a l ch a n g e s  o c c u r in g  
under h is guard  (C o h e n  2 0 0 1 ) ,  an d  from  an in ten tio n a lis t  p e r sp e c tiv e  w h e re  h e  is  ca st  
as b ein g  a k ey  in flu e n c e  in  b o th  id e o lo g y  and th e p ro g re ss io n a l e v o lu t io n  o f  
rad icalisation  (H o lb r o o k e  1 9 9 9 ; P o w er  2 0 0 2 ) . T o o  o fte n , the c o n f lic t  is  
o v ersim p lified  b y  s e e k in g  to  es ta b lish  an a g e -o ld  hatred  d riven  to e x tr em es  b y  
religion  and th e rem n an ts o f  W W II id e o lo g y  (Judah 1997; F o x  2 0 0 4 b ). E q u a lly , 
though jo u r n a lis ts  a ttem p t to  b e  o b je c t iv e , at so m e  p o in t m o st ap p ly  m ore  n o rm a tiv e  
p erspectives an d  o p in io n s  o n  th e c o n flic t , in  p articu lar re la tin g  to the ro le  o f  ex tern a l 
actors in in terv en tio n  (D o u b t 1999: 9 1 ).
On the other s id e  o f  B o s n ia n  literature are w o rk s w h ich , lik e  th e au thors o f  the  
Turkish a tro c ities , a ttem p t a h isto r ic a l o v e r v ie w  o f  th e h istory  o f  th e B a lk a n s in  an  
attempt to  ex p la in  w h y  th e  b reak -u p  o f  Y u g o s la v ia  occu rred  in h isto r ica l co n tex t.
This ca teg o ry  c o n s is ts  o f  w o rk  b y  authors su ch  as S abrina R am et (2 0 0 1 ;  1 9 9 9 ),
V esn a D rapac (2 0 1 0 ) ,  John  F in e  (1 9 8 3 ;  1987; 2 0 0 6 ) ,  S tan ford  J. S h a w  (1 9 7 6 )  T im  
Judah (1 9 9 7 ; 2 0 0 0 ) ,  P eter  B a la k ia n  (1 9 9 7 ) , John L am p e (1 9 9 6 ) , L e s lie  B e n so n  
(2 0 0 1 ) and N o e l  M a lc o lm  (1 9 9 6 ;  1 9 9 8 ). O f  th ese  au th ors, it is Judah, L a m p e, F in e  
and M a lco lm  w h o s e  w o rk  h as b een  w e ll  r e c e iv e d  and in flu en tia l.
Both Judah and M a lc o lm  sp en d  s ig n if ic a n t  am ou n ts o f  t im e p resen tin g  the h isto r ic a l  
and g eo g ra p h ica l c la im s  o f  th e v a rio u s grou p s p resen t as ear ly  as th e first cen tu ry  in  
order to attem p t to  r e c tify  th e o v e r s im p lif ic a t io n  so m e tim e s  fou n d  in th o se  w o rk s  
produced b y  m e d ia -b a se d  au thors. B o th  p o in t to  th e ro le  o f  re lig io n  and its
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im portance in  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  b ou n d ar ies in  the ear ly  h isto ry  o f  th e g rou p s  
present in the r e g io n  (M a lc o lm  1996: C h  5; Judah 1997: C h s 2 , 3 ). J u d a h ’s sa rd o n ic  
tone, h o w e v er , rem in d s u s o f  th e m y th ic  statu s m u ch  o f  th is h isto ry  has tak en  o n  in  
m odem  n a tio n a lis t  id e o lo g y , as w e  w ill  s e e  in  th e u p c o m in g  ch ap ters ( s e e  a lso  
Drapac 2 0 1 0 : 2 3 , 3 7  - 3 8 ) . F in e  b u ild s  o n  th is, sta tin g  that p o lit ic is e d  eth n ic  
boundaries w er e  n o t a sc r ib ed  to  r e lig io u s  id en titie s  u n til th e n in e teen th  cen tu ry  w h e n  
Croat id en tity  b eg a n  b e in g  a sso c ia te d  str ic tly  w ith  th e C a th o lic  church  and Serb  
identity w ith  th e O rth o d o x  ch urch .
Fine g o e s  on  to  n o te  ‘M u s lim ’ rem ain ed  a n o n -eth n ic  id en tity  for  lo n g  after th e o th er  
two groups an d  w h e n  th e  id en tity  w a s  g iv e n  p o lit ica l w e ig h t , it w a s  n o  lo n g er  a 
relig ious a sso c ia t io n , b ut a cu ltural o n e  (s e e  a lso  B o u g a re l 2 0 0 3 : 104; P a v k o v ic  
2000: 157); h e  g o e s  on  to  sa y  o f  B o sn ia k s  ‘all that rem ain s o f  their  fa ith  is  their  
ethnonym  ‘M u s lim ” (F in e  2 0 0 2 :  11). L am p e (1 9 9 6 )  tak es a m ore  sp e c if ic  ap p roach , 
directing h is  en e r g ie s  at th e  ch a n g in g  nature o f  the B a lk an  reg io n  p rim arily  in  the  
tw entieth  cen tu ry  a g a in st  a b ack d rop  o f  g e o -p o lit ic a l sh ift. In stead  o f  lo o k in g  at the  
historical se g r e g a tio n  o f  p e o p le  g rou p s o v e r  the co u rse  o f  the r e g io n ’s h istory ,
Lam pe lim its  h is  p e r sp e c t iv e  to  th e rise  in  e th n o -p o litic s  after 1968 .
Spanning th is sc h is m  is  th e w o rk  o f  K e ith  D o u b t, w h o se  w o rk  is u n iq u e in the  
context o f  literature o n  th e B a lk a n  ca se . D o u b t’s w o rk  b rid ges the gap  b e tw e e n  
m edia and h isto r ia n s b y  p r o v id in g  a cr itica l a n a ly s is  o f  e v e n ts , actors and literature  
through the le n s  o f  s o c io lo g y . H a iled  as a s o c io lo g ic a l  ‘p io n e e r ’, D o u b t u se s  
C hom sky, W eb er , M arx , L ord e and v a rio u s others to  relate th e B a lk a n  c a se  to  so c ia l 
scien tists and th u s r e lie v e  h isto r ia n s and jo u r n a lis ts  b oth  from  their h ere to fo re  
necessary  burden o f  r e sp o n s ib il ity  for  a n a ly sis .
D ou b t’s w o rk  in tro d u ces u s  to  a m ore u p -to -d a te  v e in  o f  sch o la rs  w h o s e  a n a ly se s  
attempts a m ore  m a cro -a p p ro a ch . T h e se  sch o lars attem pt to  sh o w  the u p h ea v a l 
Y u g o sla v ia  e x p e r ie n c e s  d u rin g  th is tim e p eriod  as o cc u r in g  a g a in st th e b ack d rop  o f  
socia l, h isto r ica l, cu ltu ra l, e c o n o m ic  and id e o lo g ic a l ch a n g e  rather than, as w e  se e  
above, others w h o  attem p t to  attribute the c o lla p se  o f  Y u g o s la v ia  to  a g e -o ld  h atred s
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or ‘m e r e ly ’ th e b reak -u p  o f  th e S o v ie t  U n io n . A s  a co m p a ra tiv e  h isto r ic a l 
so c io lo g ist , I am  p a rticu la r ly  sy m p a th e tic  to  th is approach; in  order to  a c c o m p lish  th e  
goals se t forth  in  C h ap ter O n e, I n atu ra lly  fo c u s  on  w o rk s fo c u s in g  s ig n if ic a n t ly  on  
the id e o lo g ic a l im p a ct o f  and o n  ch a n g e . T h e m o st su c c e ss fu l sch o la rs o f  n o te  in  th is  
field  are D eja n  J o v ic  an d  S in isa  M a le se v ic .
M a le se v ic ’s re ce n t w o rk , Id en tity  as Id eo lo g y : U n d ersta n d in g  E th n ic ity  and  
N ation a lism  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  is  an  H S  ap p roach  to  re -ev a lu a tin g  id en tity  as an id e o lo g ic a l  
exp ression  o f  race, n a tio n a l ch aracter and  so c ia l c o n sc io u s n e s s  in  the c o n te x t o f  a 
changing Y u g o s la v ia  and R w an d a . In  d o in g  so , he argu es that id ea s  o f  e th n ic ity  and  
n ationhood  are m o re  p ro p erly  u n d ersto o d  as e lem en ts  o f  id e o lo g y  rather than o f  
identity as th e y  se rv e  as ‘p o lit ic a l ly  m o tiv a te d  form s o f  so c ia l a c t io n ’ (2 0 0 6 :  157 ). 
U nlike m y  o w n  w o r k  in  th is th e s is , M a le s e v ic ’s b o o k  d o es  n o t trace the  
rad icalisation  o f  id e o lo g ic a l  e v o lu t io n , but d o es  in stea d  a p p ly  th e se  th e o r ie s  to  the  
changes o cc u r in g  in  b o th  c a s e s  in  order to id en tify  sh iftin g  m e c h a n ism s  o f  e th n ic  
group m o b ilisa tio n  th rou gh  th e p r o c e ss  and id e o lo g y  o f  d ém o cra tisa tio n  (2 0 0 6 :  2 0 4  - 
205).
S im ilarly, J o v ic ’s Y u g o s la v ia :  A  S tate that W ith ered  A w a y  (2 0 0 9 )  a s s e s s e s  id e o lo g y  
as one cr itica l a sp ec t  a m o n g  m a n y  in  the p ro ce ss  o f  state d is in teg ra tio n  in the  
Balkans. Id e o lo g y  fo r  J o v ic  se rv e s  as ‘p o lit ic a l c o n c e p ts  and id ea s  that in flu e n c e d  
p articipants’ su rrou n d in g  th e d eb a tes  and ev e n ts  p rec ed in g  th e c o lla p s e  (2 0 0 9 : 3 3 ) . 
His an a lysis  a sserts  that e lite  p ercep tio n s  o f  rea lity  and their d esire  fo r  a b e n e f ic ia l  
future a ffe c ted  th e p o lit ic a l c o m p r o m ise s  m ad e prior to M ilo s e v ic ’s r ise  to  p o w e r  and  
helps exp la in  th e ra tio n a le  b eh in d  th e sc h ism  in  th e id e o lo g ic a l and p o lit ic a l  
con sen su s in  the la te  1 9 8 0 s . F or J o v ic , n a tio n a lism  and c o m m u n ism  are n ot tw o  
different id e o lo g ie s  w h ic h , in  Y u g o s la v ia , m erg e  from  o n e  (co m m u n ism ) in to  the  
other (n a tio n a lism ); in stea d , b oth  d o ctr in es con ta in  e lem en ts  o f  the other, a l lo w in g  
the transition  from  T ito ’s re g im e  to  M ilo s e v ic ’s re g im e  to  o ccu r  w ith in  a s p e c if ic  
context (2 0 0 9 : 1, 5 ). T h o u g h  h is  a n a ly s is  en d s in  199 0 , J o v ic ’s a n a ly s is  p r o v id e s  k e y  
insight into the ro le  id e o lo g y  p la y s  in  th is ca se , p articu lar ly  in  the ear ly  s ta g es  o f  
id eo lo g ica l ra d ica lisa tio n .
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There is an oth er d iv id e  in  th e literature w h ic h  sp an s b o th  h istor ian s an d  th e m ed ia  
alike: that is , th e h is to r ic a l nature o f  a g g r e ss io n  b e tw e e n  grou p s. A  n u m b er o f  
authors h a v e  e s ta b lish e d  a h isto r ic a l en m ity  b e tw e e n  S erb s, C roats, M u slim s  and  
other m in or ities  w h ic h  th en  cu lm in a ted  in th e trag ic  e v e n ts  at th e c lo s e  o f  th e  
tw entieth  cen tu ry  (fo r  e x a m p le s , s e e  C o u se n s  and C ater 2 0 0 1 ;  B a la k ia n  1997;  
Gunther 193 7 ). O n  th e  o th er  h and  are th o se  w h o  se e  th e t im es o f  c o n f lic t  as o u tlier s  
w ithin  a re la t iv e ly  c o n ten t m u lti-e th n ic  co m m u n ity . T ak e F in e , for ex a m p le , w h o  
posits that B o s n ia -H e r z e g o v in a  has always b een  p e a c e fu lly  m u lti-e th n ic  ‘e x c e p t  
w hen fo re ig n ers or lo c a ls  stirred  up b y  fo re ig n  g o v er n m e n ts  or fo re ig n  m o v e m e n ts  
have in c ited  B o s n ia n s  to  o th er  p a th s’ (F in e  2 0 0 2 : 4; s e e  a lso  F in e 2 0 0 6 ;  
M ah m utcehajic 2 0 0 3 ) .
There is  a m id d le  w a y , to  w h ic h  I am  sy m p a th etic . F o llo w in g  the w o rk s o f  B r in ga  
(1995; 2 0 0 2 )  an d  A itc h in s o n  ( 2 0 0 8 ) ,  I f in d  that th ou gh  there is a s e n se  o f  h isto r ic a l  
otherness e s ta b lish e d  b e tw e e n  g rou p s and  that th ou gh  there has b een  c o n f lic t  
b etw een  th e se  g ro u p s, it w a s  th e rea lig n m en t o f  th e se  g rou p s a lo n g  e th n ic  lin es  in  the  
late n in eteen th  cen tu ry  and, in  th e M u slim  co n tex t, in  th e 1 9 6 0 s  w h ic h  a llo w e d  for  
con flict to  o ccu r  in q u ite  th e w a y  it h as d o n e  o v e r  the co u rse  o f  th e tw e n tie th  cen tu ry . 
C ertainly, a g g r e ss io n  in W W II c a u se d  a m ajor sh ift in  the p ercep tio n  o f  id en tity , ju s t  
as has c o n flic t  in  th e  1 9 9 0 s . A s  B r in g a  su g g e sts , ‘w ar ch a n g es  p e o p le . . .a s  a rea ctio n  
to and part o f  th e p r o c e ss  o f  w ar and the p o lit ic s  b eh in d  it, B o sn ia n  M u slim s  are 
redefin ing  b oth  th e  c o n ten t an d  fu n ctio n  o f  their c o l le c t iv e  id en titie s  and id e n tify in g  
with a w id er  c o m m u n ity  o f  M u s lim s ’ (B rin g a  1995: 197  - 198 ).
Conclusion
This chapter h as so u g h t  to  p ro v id e  an an a ly tica l o v e r v ie w  p ertin en t to  th e research  
questions p o se d  in  C h ap ter O n e. B e g in n in g  w ith  su b stan tia l con tr ib u tion s b y  
scholars o f  n a tio n a lism , I h a v e  sh o w n  the ro le  that n a tio n a lis t  m o v e m e n ts  h a v e  
played  in co n stru ctin g  th e  foru m  for g e n o c id e . T h is first se c t io n  a lso  sh o w e d  the
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gaps in n a tio n a lis t  literature in  re la tin g  p articu lar ly  to  g e n o c id a l c a s e s , that there is  a 
disjoin b e tw e e n  g r o w in g  n a tio n a lism  and g e n o c id a l p o lic y . In an a ttem p t to  e x p la in  
this re la tion sh ip , I turned  to  g e n o c id e  sch o la rsh ip . H ere , I r e v ie w e d  th e g r o w in g  
literature re la tin g  to  th e  c o n tro v e rsy  su rrou n d in g  th e d e f in it io n  o f  g e n o c id e  and  
clarified  h o w  it w a s  to  b e  u se d  in th e c o n te x t o f  th is  d isserta tio n . T h e w e a k n e s s e s  o f  
this ca tegory  o f  literature, h o w e v e r , w a s  ro le  o f  m a c r o -le v e l in stitu tio n s o f  p o w e r ,  
such as id e o lo g y , in  th e v a r io u s  c a s e s , s tem m in g , as e x p la in e d  a b o v e , from  a la c k  o f  
com parative w o rk  and an fo c u s  o n  s in g le -c a s e  stu d y  h isto r ic a l a n a ly s is . T h e  
strengths w er e  fo u n d  p articu lar ly  w ith in  th e fu n c tio n a lis t  p e r sp e c t iv e  o f  c u m u la tiv e  
rad icalisation , but o n ly  w h e n  o p e n e d  up to  in c lu d e  th e e f fe c ts  o f  id e o lo g y  w ith in  the  
rad icalisation  p r o c e ss . I th en  w e n t  o n  to  d isc u ss  th e ty p e s  o f  se co n d a r y  literature  
availab le in  ea ch  o f  m y  th ree  c a se s .
It is n o w  p o ss ib le  to  situ a te  m y  o w n  w o rk  w ith in  th e greater c o n te x t  o f  literature. In  
brief, th is d isse r ta tio n  s e e k s  to  ad d ress the gap s in  n a tio n a lis t  literature regard in g  the  
process o f  ra d ic a lisa tio n  an d  in  g e n o c id a l literature regard in g  th e ro le  o f  id e o lo g y  
through co m p a ra tiv e  a n a ly s is . I w o u ld  co n ten d  that th o u g h  I se e  a cr o ss  the  
id eo lo g ica l- in te n tio n a lis t /fu n c tio n a l-str u c tu ra lis t  d eb ate  and fin d  m y s e l f  m o r e -o r -le s s  
w ithin the fu n c tio n a lis t  ca m p , I am  le ss  co n ce rn ed  w ith  th e ‘m o m e n t’ that p o l ic ie s  o f  
p ersecution  and e x te n n in a t io n  b e c a m e  g e n o c id a l and m ore  fo c u se d  on  th e p r o c e ss  o f  
change. A s  d isc u sse d  in  th e u p c o m in g  ch ap ters, th e literature su g g e s ts  that the road  
to g en o c id e  is  n o t o n e  f ix e d  th in g , b ut in stead  is a g r o w in g , e v o lv in g  p ro ce ss .
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Historical context and the episodic approach
Introduction
In order to  u n d erstan d  an d  a n a ly se  th e stren gth  o f  a sh iftin g  id e o lo g y , w e  m u st first 
v iew  that id e o lo g y  in h is to r ic a l co n tex t. T h e p u rp o se  o f  th is  ch ap ter is to  p ro v id e  an  
historical narrative fo r  m y  T u rk ish , G erm an  and B a lk a n  c a se s  th rou gh  a d isc u ss io n  o f  
the even ts  u sed  to  fo rm  th e e p iso d ic  ap p roach  to m y  research  and a n a ly s is . A s  
su ggested  in  C h ap ter T w o , th is  ap p roach  a llo w s  u s to  a scerta in  w h eth er  or n ot path  
d ep en dency  is  a p p lic a b le  w h e n  stu d y in g  the e v o lu t io n  o f  r a d ic a lis in g  id e o lo g ie s .
N aturally, as C h ap ter T h ree  p o in te d  ou t, th is sort o f  research  m irrors th e  w o rk  o f  
M om m sen  (1 9 7 6 ;  1983; 2 0 0 1 ;  2 0 0 3 a ) , K ersh a w  (1 9 8 9 ;  2 0 0 0 ;  2 0 0 2 )  and B lo x h a m  
(2003; 2 0 0 9 b )  a ll o f  w h o m  n o te  th e  im p ortan ce  o f  c u m u la tiv e  ra d ica lisa tio n  in  
gen ocid a l sta tes. H o w e v e r , th e  d iffe r e n c e  here is  that the fo c u s  o f  th e se  s c h o la r s ’ 
w ork is the cu m u la t iv e  ra d ic a lisa tio n  o f  ev e n ts . M y  q u e stio n s  h a v e  to  d o  w ith  
w hether or n o t there e x is ts  a c u m u la tiv e  ra d ica lisa tio n  o f  id e o lo g y ;  I u se  e v e n ts  to  
provide a b ack d rop  a g a in st  w h ic h  to  m ap  ou t id e o lo g ic a l sh ifts , but w e  m u st k eep  the  
d ifferen ce b e tw e e n  e v e n ts  and id e o lo g y  c lear in  order to  e f f ic ie n tly  a n sw e r  the  
research q u e stio n s  se t  forth  in  th e  ear lier  chapters.
Therefore, th is  ch ap ter  se r v e s  to  in trod u ce n ot o n ly  th e g e o -p o lit ic a l b a ck g ro u n d  o f  
each case , but a lso  th e  e v e n ts  around  w h ic h  m y  research  is structured . E ach  se c t io n  
b egins b y  p ro v id in g  a sh ort b a ck g ro u n d  narrative o f  ea ch  ca se . I then  g o  on  to  an in  
depth d isc u ss io n  o f  ea c h  o f  m y  k e y  e v e n ts  p ro v id in g  the story -b oard  for  ea c h  ca se . 
Like C hapters F iv e , S ix , S e v e n  and  E ig h t, th is  ch ap ter b e g in s  w ith  T u rk ey  and  
m oves c h r o n o lo g ic a lly  th rou gh  ea c h  o f  m y  three c a ses . T h e m ain  e v e n ts  I d isc u ss  in  
the Turkish c a se  are: 1) th e  C U P ’s a ssu m p tio n  o f  p o w er, 2 )  the b e g in n in g  o f  the  
Balkan W ars, 3 )  R u s s ia ’s d ec la ra tio n  o f  w ar on  th e O ttom an  E m p ire and 4 )  the  
m assacre and arrests at V an . T h e G erm an  c a se  fo c u se s  on: 1) the b o o k  b u rn in g  at 
O p em platz, 2 )  the in stitu tio n  o f  th e N u rem b erg  L a w s, 3 )  K rista lln ach t and 4 )
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Auschwitz-Birkenau’s transition from a work camp to an extermination camp.
Lastly, the B a lk a n  c a se  fo c u s e s  o n  th e fo llo w in g  fou r  even ts: 1) M i lo s e v ic ’s sp e e c h  
to K osovar S erb s, 2 )  S lo v e n ia  an d  C ro a tia ’s d ec lara tion  o f  in d e p e n d en ce  from  
Y u goslav ia , 3 )  th e b e g in n in g  o f  th e s ie g e  o f  S ara jevo  and 4 )  the m a ssa cre  at 
Srebrenica.
In ch o o s in g  w h ic h  e v e n ts  I w a s  g o in g  to  u se , I lo o k e d  for  ev e n ts  that w e r e  g e n e r a lly  
characterised b y  fo u r  d iffer en t criteria . F irstly , as w e  h a v e  se en  in  C hap ter T w o ,  
M ah on ey’s th eo ry  o f  p ath  d e p e n d e n c y  is  h e a v ily  b o u n d ed  b y  th e cr itica l jun cture, or  
the even t d uring  w h ic h  tra d itio n a l in stitu tion a l con stra in ts are in  flu x . In order to  
seek  to  id en tify  th is  cr itica l ju n ctu re  and to  ev a lu a te  its id e o lo g ic a l im p act, it w a s  
im perative that th e  e v e n ts  I a n a ly se  b e  so m e h o w  u n iq u e , a k ey  e v e n t  ear ly  on  in the  
rad icalisation  p r o c e ss . T h u s, I b eg a n  lo o k in g  for  e v e n ts  that m ark ed  structural, 
institutional c h a n g e s , w e r e  u n iq u e  at th e p o in t at w h ic h  th ey  occu rred  and  
particularly e v e n ts  w h ic h  se t  a p rec ed en t for  other ty p e s  o f  s im ila r  e v e n ts  to  o cc u r  in  
the future.
S econ d ly , as m y  resea rch  q u e stio n s  in h eren tly  ad dress a p ro ce ss  w h ic h  o cc u r s  o v e r  
tim e, I lim ited  m y  e v e n ts  to  th o se  occu rrin g  r e la tiv e ly  eq u id istan t apart in  the  
rad icalisation  p r o c e ss . W h ile  I d id  n o t w a n t to co n ta in  m y  ev e n ts  to  an ex tr em e  
extent by sa y in g  that ea c h  h ad  to  b e a certain  len g th  o f  t im e  apart, I w a s  c o g n isa n t  o f  
how  c lo se  ea ch  e v e n t  w a s  to  th e  in stitu tio n a lisa tio n  o f  g e n o c id a l p o lic y . M o m m s e n ’s 
theory id en tifie s  th e se  e v e n ts  as b e c o m in g  s ig n if ic a n tly  m ore  ra d ica lised ; b y  
ensuring m y  e v e n ts  o c c u r  at v a r io u s  s ta g es  o f  ra d ica lisa tio n , w e  are a b le  to  a scerta in  
w hether or n ot id e o lo g ie s  are a lso  p ro g re ss in g  in th is w a y .
This leads in to  m y  third  criteria  for  c h o o s in g  the ev e n ts  in  m y  e p iso d ic  ap p roach , that 
being I w a s  lo o k in g  to  a n a ly se  e v e n ts  o f  id e o lo g ic a l im port. In  o ther w o rd s , I w a n ted  
to incorporate e v e n ts  a c k n o w le d g e d  b y  that id e o lo g y  to  b e im portant. U su a lly , th is  
happened in  re trosp ect, th o u g h  n o t a lw a y s , as th e u p c o m in g  ch ap ters sh o w . L a s tly , I 
lim ited m y  c h o ic e s  to  e v e n ts  w h ic h  w er e  s ig n if ic a n tly  a p p lica b le  to  the g e n o c id e
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itself. A s  I m en tio n  th ro u g h o u t th is  d isserta tion , g e n o c id e  in  ea ch  c a se  w a s  o c c u r in g  
w ithin  the c o n te x t o f  grea ter  c o n f lic t  o f  so m e  k ind  ( s e e  T a b le  2 .1 );  I w a s  k een  to  
ensure that th e e v e n ts  I c h o s e  e f fe c te d  th e c o n f lic t  b e tw e e n  the p ersecu to rs and th e  
inner, rather than  th e  ou ter, e n e m ie s . B y  lim itin g  the ev e n ts  in th is m ann er, I w a s  le ft  
with the ev e n ts  a b o v e .
Let m e b e c lear , th ro u g h o u t th e  co u rse  o f  the en tire P h D , I re fere n c e  m a n y  o ther  
historical e v e n ts , su ch  as th e  A n sc h lu ss , th e ten sio n  b e tw e e n  G r ee ce  and T u rk ey , th e  
death o f  T ito  an d  th e  d is so lu t io n  o f  th e O ttom an  p arliam ent, and p o in t to  their  
im portance w ith in  th e  p r o c e ss  o f  ra d ica lisa tio n . T hat th ey  d id  n o t fit  th e criteria  
outlined  a b o v e  an d  th u s are n o t u se d  to  p ro v id e  structure for  m y  p ro ject is m ea n t in 
no w a y  to  d etract fro m  th e ir  im p o rta n ce  in  the p ro ce ss  o f  id e o lo g ic a l sh ift. In stea d , it 
is a re flec tio n  on  m y  o w n  in a b ility  as a research er to in corp orate e v e ry  im portan t  
event into a research  p ro ject o f  th is  nature. T hat b e in g  sa id , th e e v e n ts  that I h a v e  
chosen  p ro v id e  an  in v a lu a b le  p e r sp e c t iv e  on  the id e o lo g ie s  th e y  represen t.
An ep iso d ic  ap p roach  to  h isto r ic a l a n a ly s is  p ro v id es  a ‘sn a p sh o t’ o f  h isto ry  at 
various p o in ts  o f  id e o lo g ic a l  p ro g ress io n . R ather than se e in g  th e h isto ry  o f  th e se  
cases through  the le n s  o f  g e n o c id e , it is  v ita l to v ie w  th em , as m u ch  as is  p o s s ib le , as 
they w ere at th e tim e . T h is  e p iso d ic  ap proach  to  research  and to  w ritin g  a llo w s  u s to  
com pare n ot o n ly  c a s e  w ith  c a s e , but sn a p sh o t w ith  sn a p sh o t -  the w a y  id e o lo g y  is  
shaped around o n e  e v e n t  v er su s  th e w a y  id e o lo g y  is sh ap ed  around  an oth er even t. 
Thus, w e  are ab le  to  trace the ra d ica lisa tio n  p ro ce ss  o f  id e o lo g y  in ea ch  c a se , but a lso  
on a m a cr o -sc a le , e s ta b lish in g  seq u en tia l patterns and p a tte m -p r o c e sse s  m ore  
generally  in  g e n o c id a l sta tes.
Turkey
At the turn o f  th e tw e n tie th  cen tu ry , the O ttom an  E m p ire w a s  in  cr is is . A  b lo o d le s s  
coup occu rrin g  on  th e 2 4  o f  Ju ly , fo rced  th e Su ltan , A b d u l H am id  II, to  a c q u ie sc e  to  
Y oung Turk d em a n d s in c lu d in g  th e re in stitu tion  o f  the C o n stitu tio n  o f  1 8 7 6  and  the
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recall o f  the P arliam en t, o r ig in a lly  d isb a n d ed  in 1 8 7 8 . A s  is u su a lly  th e c a s e , the  
Ottom an em p ire , e v e n  u n d er th is  p articu lar ly  w ea k  su ltan , d id  n o t cru m b le  o v e r  
night.
E stab lish ed  in a p p r o x im a te ly  1 3 0 1 , the O ttom an  E m p ire  o f  the m id -n in e te en th  
century stre tch ed  fro m  S ou th  E astern  E u rop e to N o rth  A fr ic a . Its g eo g r a p h ic a l 
context m ea n s that it c o n ta in e d  v a r io u s  d ifferen t p e o p le  g ro u p s from  v a rio u s  
different r e lig io n s  and p ra c tic e s , from  B e d o u in  trib es to  urban A rm en ia n  c ity  
cou n cils . T h o u g h  o n ly  a n o m in a lly  th eo cra tic  s ta te 12, O ttom an  la w  w a s  b a sed  in  a 
com b ination  o f  S haria  la w  and ‘cu sto m a ry  la w ’, w ith  n o  c o d if ie d  d o cu m e n t to  d eta il 
w hich  w a s to  b e u se d  in  w h a t situ a tio n  (T o le d a n o  1993; S h a w  and S h a w  1 9 7 6 ). 
G enerally , as I w ill  d is c u ss  in C h ap ter F iv e  in  greater d eta il, S haria  la w  w a s  a p p lied  
to m inority  r e lig io u s  g ro u p s in  order to d icta te  th e w a y  in w h ic h  th e y  w o u ld  e x is t  in  
the E m pire. T h e r e su ltin g  structure w a s  c a lle d  th e millet sy stem . T h o u g h  co n s id e r e d  
rather fo rw a rd -th in k in g  in  th e tim e  o f  m e d ie v a l E u rop e, th e A m erica n  and F rench  
R evolu tion s h ad  c h a n g ed  th e w a y  E u rop ean  sta tes v ie w e d  their c it iz e n s . In a b id  to  
m odern ize in  a s im ila r  w a y , n o n -M u slim  grou p s b egan  to  v ie  for  p o lit ic a l and  
cultural eq u a lity . A  ty p ic a l s itu a tio n , su ch  as th e S erb  re b e llio n  o f  1 8 0 4 , b e g in s  w ith  
a sm all arm ed  in su rrectio n , re su ltin g  in  at first in  su p p ress io n  and terror, fo l lo w e d  b y  
Treaties and p r o m ise s  o f  reform , fo llo w e d  b y  a n eg a tio n  o f  reform , fo llo w e d  b y  
further re b e llio n  (M a lc o lm  1996: 88; A k p am  2 0 0 6 :  11 - 12). N o te  that th e fo c u s  
here, th ou gh  r e su ltin g  in  th e d ea th s o f  m illio n s , w a s  n ot g e n o c id a l;  its p u rp o se  w a s  to  
encourage its  c it iz e n s  to  b e  o b e d ie n t  to th e state. A s  M ic h a e l M an n  rem in d s u s, ‘the  
O ttom an E m p ire -  lik e  o th er h is to r ic  em p ires -  w a n ted  co m p lia n t, n o t d ead , 
su b jects’ (M an n  2 0 0 5 :  114  se e  a lso  113 , 115). N o n e th e le s s , th is  p erp etu a l p o s it io n  
o f  in -fig h tin g  w e a k e n e d  th e sta te , p articu lar ly  in  th e e y e s  o f  the R u ss ia n  and o th er  
European E m p ires w h o  c o v e te d  O ttom an  lan ds. A k p am  d esc r ib es  it v er y  w e ll:
12
‘ The theocratic nature o f  the Ottoman state is under heavy debate. For an interesting discussion, see 
Akfam (2006: 431).
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T h e n o n -M u s lim  c o m m u n it ie s  w er e  in v o lv e d  in a tire less  s tru g g le  
for b a sic  r ig h ts  an d  fr e ed o m s, and the G reat P o w er s  rep ea ted ly  
u se d  th is  as a p re te x t fo r  in terfer in g  in  d o m e stic  O ttom an  affa irs.
C o n sid e re d  th e  ‘S ic k  M an  o f  E u ro p e’ s in c e  th e 1 8 3 0 s , th e sta te w a s  
on  th e v e r g e  o f  c o lla p se ;  the G reat P o w er s  w er e  c o n v e n ie n tly  a b le  
to  p resen t th e ir  a m b itio n s  to p artition  th e em p ire as ‘h um an itar ian  
in te r v e n tio n s”
(A k 9 a m 2 0 0 6 :  13)
Thus, in  the T u rk ish  c a s e , th e d es ir e  for m in or ity  righ ts is d irectly  lin k ed  to  th e lack  
o f  a strong, secu re  sta te , p articu lar ly  in  th e bord er areas o f  the C a u ca su s and the  
Balkans (M an n  2 0 0 5 :  112; B lo x h a m  2 0 1 0 ) . T h e in tegration  o f  th e 18 7 6  C o n stitu tio n  
in the 1 8 8 0 s w a s  an a ttem p t at true reform , w ith  the term  ‘O tto m a n ’ u sed  for  th e first  
tim e in re fere n c e  to  a ll im p er ia l su b jec ts  reg a rd less  o f  m in or ity  status. In stead  o f  
d eflating th e s itu a tio n , h o w e v e r , it en h a n ced  it b y  c o n tin u in g  to  a c k n o w le d g e  certa in  
rights and structures b a sed  in th e o ld  millet sy stem ; w h a t em e rg ed  then  w a s  tw o  
separate le g a l sy s te m s , o n e  b a se d  o n  in d iv id u a l rights and o n e  b a sed  on  grou p  righ ts, 
m aking c o m p le te  im p lem en ta tio n  o f  th e C on stitu tio n  a ll but im p o ss ib le  (A k g a m  
2006: 17 - 18).
By the en d  o f  th e n in e te en th  cen tu ry , su b stan tia l m ilitary  m u tin ies  had  b een  
occurring a cro ss  th e E m p ire; c iv ilia n s  w er e  b eg in n in g  to  r ise  up a g a in st d isco rd a n t  
governm ent o f f ic ia ls  (B a la k ia n  2 0 0 3 :  143 ). W h ilst th e se  ev e n ts  w er e  o ccu rrin g  from  
Syria, S m yrna, C o n sta n tin o p le , E rzerum  and B it lis , th e heart o f  the u p r is in g s  w a s  to  
be foun d  in M a c e d o n ia . B lo x h a m  id en tifie s  the p rim ary in stig a to r  o f  th e co u p  as 
being co n cern s h e ld  b y  S a lo n ik a -b a se d  rev o lu tio n a r ies  that fo re ig n  p o w e rs  w o u ld  
intervene in the u n rest in  M a c e d o n ia , th ereb y  g iv in g  W estern  E u rop e and R u ss ia  a 
desired fo o th o ld  in  th e O ttom an  sta te (2 0 0 5 :  59; s e e  a lso  D an n reu th er 2 0 0 1 : 14).
This w ea k en in g  o f  p o w e r  p r o v id e d  the op p ortu n ity  for  o th er p o lit ic a l g rou p s to  
establish  th e m se lv e s  in  th e O ttom an  p o lit ic a l arena, m o st n o ta b ly  C U P  u nd er the
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Y oung T urks. A t th e  tim e  o f  its e s ta b lish m en t, the C U P  w a s  n eith er  rad ica l n or  
ethnocentric. In stea d , it w a s  a m o d e m , secu la r  p o lit ic a l m o v e m e n t w h o s e  p o lit ic a l  
foundations w e r e  b a se d  f irm ly  on  E u rop ean  id ea ls  o f  the m o d ern  n a tio n a lis t  state. 
Their k ey  fo c u s  w a s  on  th e  fu ll in tegra tion  o f  th e 1 8 7 6  C o n stitu tio n  in to  O ttom an  
soc iety  and a se v e r e  re str ic tio n  o f  S u ltan  H a m id  II’s p o w e r s  (S h a w  and S h a w  1976:  
262 - 2 6 7 ) . T h o u g h  o n ly  o n e  o f  se v er a l su ch  grou p s, th e ir  fo c u s  on  p ro -O ttom an  
liberalism , co m m itm e n t to  m o d e m  E u ro p ea n ism  and d eterm in a tio n  to  s e e  the  
Ottom an E m p ire  su sta in  its p o w e r  th rough  reform  en a b led  their m o v e m e n t  to  a c h ie v e  
enough p o lit ic a l c lo u t  to  m a n o e u v r e  in to  the sc h ism s o p en ed  b y  a w e a k e n e d  O ttom an  
state.
24 July 1908 - The CUP takeover of power
The S u ltan ’s v a s t  e s p io n a g e  sy s te m  a llo w e d  h im , fo r  th e m o st  part, to  rem ain  aw are  
o f  the situ a tion  an d  q u e ll m u ch  a n ti-S u lta n ic  m o v e m e n ts  d uring  th e ea r ly  y ea rs  o f  the  
tw entieth  cen tu ry  th rou gh  th e  ju d ic io u s  u se  o f  p o lic e , lo c a l fo r c e s  and the ju d ic ia l  
system  (A h m a d  1969: 4 ) . H o w e v e r , as d isco rd  spread , the cou rts w er e  n o t a lw a y s  
able to co n d em n  e v e r y  rev o lu tio n a ry ; su ch  a s itu a tion  occu rred  w ith  A d ju tan t-M ajor  
N iyazi. N iy a z i  w a s  a stro n g  co n stitu tio n a l su pp orter w h o , after b e in g  a cq u itted  on  
account o f  la ck  o f  e v id e n c e , c a lle d  for  a secret m e e tin g  o f  th e C U P  on  2 8  June 1908  
and in stiga ted  th e first o f  m a n y  m in o r  in su rrection s tak in g  p la ce  o v e r  th e f o llo w in g  
m onth. T h e k e y  e le m e n t  o f  N iy a z i ’s m o v e m e n t is that it m o v e d  th e a n ti-S u lta n ic ,  
pro-C on stitu tion  Y o u n g  T urk  m o v e m e n t  o u ts id e  the rea lm  o f  co n sp ira c y  and  in to  th e  
realm o f  in su rrection . O u tr igh t re b e llio n  n ece ss ita ted  a ctio n  b y  th e Su ltan . H o w e v e r ,  
as the situ a tion  b eg a n  to  sp ira l ou t o f  the S u lta n ’s co n tro l, m ilita ry  tro o p s b eg a n  to  
refuse to o b e y  ord ers to  e n g a g e  in o p en  b attle  ag a in st their co u n try m en  (A h m a d  
1 9 6 9 :8  - 11).
B y 20  Ju ly , M u s lim  p o p u la tio n s  a cro ss  the O ttom an  E m p ire had  r isen  up a g a in st  th e  
Sultan, sw ea r in g  to  resto re  th e  co n stitu tio n . T w o  d ays later, after the Ittih ad ist C U P  
had a n n ou n ced  th e  restora tion  o f  the con stitu tion  in  M a c ed o n ia , the S u ltan  b o w e d  to  
CUP d em an d s for  p o w e r , re p la c in g  k e y  p o lit ic ia n s  w ith  m em b ers o f  the C U P .
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Further to discussions over the next day, the Sultan acquiesced to the reformers’ 
demands, enabling him to keep his title as Sultan and his role as caliph. However, 
under the new constitutional monarchy, he would be little more than a figurehead, 
being stripped of political power and role as head of state (Chalk and Jonassohn 
1990: 257; Balakian 2003: 143 - 144; Ahmad 1969: 12 - 13).
Scholars of the Armenian genocide traditionally make much of this event as it 
occurred through support of many ethnic groups, including Armenians and Greeks. 
Going back as early as 1902 at the first Ottoman conference in Paris, these groups 
affirmed their support of the Constitution and the rights provided to minority groups 
under its basic tenets. The relationship between the Armenian Dashnak 
Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was further reinforced in 1907 during the Second 
Unionist Congress, again in Paris, when both the ARF and the CUP formalised their 
agreement to participate in alliance with each other against the Sultan. These events 
are cited by some scholars as being a moment when the Armenian Dashnak 
community and the CUP formalised their budding relationship, deep-seated in the 
foundational Young Turk ideals of liberalism focused on new, Europeanised political 
reforms, noting that ‘many Armenians cheered the revolution’ (Valentino 2004: 160; 
see also Waller 2002). However, most scholars give a strong argument that this 
alliance was a reticent one, made by the CUP for political gain and by the ARE in 
hopes of securing the reforms promised under the original Constitution. Even when 
policy and action, such as this, was agreed upon by the two parties, ‘the façade of 
unity concealed the assumption that accounts would some day be settled with the 
Armenians’ (Akçam 2006: 51, 58 - 64; Hanioglu 2006; Dadrian 2004).
Indeed, it was only months after the 1908 takeover that the Ittihadists began 
preparing for the institution of bloodier policies, primarily through the creation of the 
secret organisation called the fedâiin; this was a precursor of the Special 
Organisation, described by Akçam as a group of ‘brave, self-sacrificing, obedient 
young men, who would undertake ‘special operations’ -  usually the murder of 
political opponents — on orders, membership was entirely voluntary, but once one
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entered, there was no going back’ (2006: 59). Two things are worthy of note here: 
The first is noted by Akçam who points out that thefedâiin was directed by the 
Central Committee; thus we can assume that the unionist murders that were carried 
out against Turks of differing political orientations -  primarily supporters of the 
Sultan -  were directed kills by those in control of state power. Before their political 
ascendancy, such directives were much harder to order. Secondly, one seemingly 
overlooked by Akçam and most other scholars is that these first victims of the CUP 
regime were ethnically Turkish and killed by those claiming to uphold nationality as 
sacrosanct. This leads one to remember that while ideology is often shaped by 
events, the reality of gaining and retaining political legitimacy sometimes requires 
political leaders to both move outside of the ideological platform they themselves 
create and also to bend and change that ideology to fit their immediate need.
Whilst the Ittihadist regime was swift in eliminating political enemies, they were 
seemingly at a lack to know what to do with the rest of their power once the Sultan 
had been forced to fulfil their primary requirement. This provided a power vacuum 
the European powers were eager to fill. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, Bulgaria 
gained independence and Crete left the Empire and united instead with Greece. 
Fearing a Christian Armenian/Christian European alliance, and following rumours 
the Turkish Ittihadists had been overthrown, Turkish nationalists massacred over
20,000 Armenians13 at Adana in April of 1909 (Mann 2005: 129; Akçam 2006: 54 - 
55, 59 - 62; Balakian 2003: ch. 12).
8 October 1912 - Balkan Wars begin
Perhaps, then, it is easy to see why Turkish nationalists were so distressed by the 
outbreak and subsequent loss of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Indeed, in 
ideological terms, loosing this conflict struck a blow to the Turkish ideal of national 
superiority guaranteed by restoration of the Constitution. In practical terms, defeat in
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the Balkan Wars saw the loss of sixty per cent of Turkish territory, reducing the 
Empire to the approximate size of modern-day Turkey (Isyar 2005: 345). Poor 
results in the conflict were blamed further on the Sultan and resulted in his complete 
overthrow on the 23 January 1913, followed by an immediate shift in policy, 
institutionalising the nationalism that had been thematically present for some time. 
This formalised the triumvirate of power shared between Enver Pasha, the Minister 
of War, Cemal Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, and Talat Pasha, the Minister of the 
Interior and the man now largely credited with instituting the policies necessary for 
genocide. They oversaw the establishment of such societies as the Society for 
National Defence whose aim was to establish unity and social mobilisation, thus 
‘curing’ the ills of the nation, and the National Independence Society which aimed to 
create a thriving Turkish middle and upper class, replacing all Christians in 
traditional economic roles. Christians were not allowed to join any of the established 
societies sponsored by the ‘new’ Turkish state as propaganda at the time allied the 
Armenians with the Christian Europeans of the Balkan region (Akpam 2006: 87 - 90; 
Derderian 2005: 2).
Institution of these and similar policies coincided with the mass migration of 
Muslims from the Balkan states to Turkey who feared for their own safety. Many of 
these had faced terror and pain at the hands of Christians during the Balkan Wars and 
were adamant that the state provide them protection from the Christian Armenian 
enemy (Judah 1997: 79); this movement of peoples will have long-lasting effects, 
resurfacing again in my Bosnian case. For now, suffice it to say that the loss of the 
Balkan War, minority unrest, not only from Armenians but from Kurds as well 
(R14079/Ab. 12669 25.06.1913), and the tie between Christian Armenia siding with 
Christian Europe laid the ground work for the next event critical to Turkey’s 
procession to genocide. The Balkan wars ended with established peace in February
This massacre also resulted in the death o f  approximately 1000 Muslims who would not join with 
the attackers.
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1914, terms of which were decided by the European powers and were viewed as 
degrading to the Turks (Mann 2005: 131).
2 November 1914 - Russia declares war on the Ottoman Empire
As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the territorial losses of the Balkan Wars were 
detrimental to the Ottoman Ittihadist state, not in the least because of the loss of 
Rumelia which was the birthplace of a majority of CUP leaders and, at the time, 
considered the heart of Turan. Amongst other shifts discussed throughout the 
empirical chapters, the key outcome of this loss was a shift in the importance of 
Eastern Anatolia to the Turks, not only ideologically, but geo-politically as well.
Described by Mann as ‘backward’ (2005: 112), Eastern Anatolia was composed of 
the majority of Armenians in the Ittihadist state. Erzerum and Van, two key 
provinces in the region, were of particular concern as they shared a border with 
Russia. Russian influence in the region was recognised as a key area of concern for 
the Turks; the primary fear was that Russia would attempt to seize the region based 
on a shared sense of ethnicity between Armenians living in the Ottoman state and 
Armenians living in the Russian state. This also served as a concern that if this 
conflict were to take place, Armenians would side with the Russians in any conflict 
(R14078/Ab.2888 8.02.1913).
Regardless of the fact that the Armenians emphatically denied any alliance other than 
that to their own Ottoman state (R14077/Ab.l987 29.01.1913), the Russian 
declaration of war against the Ottomans seemed to justify fears of foreign 
intervention by an enemy Christian state supported by Armenians. Once war was 
declared, the Turks presented the conflict as a ‘holy war’ of supremacy against the 
heathen ‘infidels’ in order to ‘include and unite all branches of our [Turkish] race’ 
(Enver Pasha in Astourian 1990: 136; see also Dadrian 2004: 203). Unsurprisingly, 
however, the ‘Christian infidel’ was not to include the CUP’s greatest ally, Germany.
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The alliance was established in August of 1914 in secret with hopes to wage off the 
military and political threat provided by the European powers. In doing so, the Turks 
secured German agreement for economic assistance to rebuild its military and 
infrastructure; this was shortly followed by a similar agreement with the Austrian- 
Hungary Empire (Dadrian 2004: 203 - 205). These agreements, however, remained 
secret and informal until the Russian Empire declared war in November. It was at 
this time when German influence in the regime moved from a casual relationship 
established by party leaders Enver Pasha and Dr. Nazim to a formal military alliance.
The outbreak of war caused significant ideological changes discussed in detail in 
coming chapters; these shifts were reflected by policy shifts which were, at first, not 
necessarily overly detrimental for the Armenians. Though they were required to 
submit themselves to conscription, something not granted to Armenians under the 
millet system of the Sultan, the first month of the war reflected no immediate anti- 
Armenian policy changes. A startling defeat at the Russian boarder close to Kars, 
where many Turkish Armenians fought Russian Armenians, caused Enver Pasha to 
suggest to Hiiseyin Cahit Yalcin, editor of Tanin, the main CUP newspaper, and the 
Vice-President of the Parliament, that it was Armenian sedition that brought down 
the Turks so low. He suggested then that it was the time to be certain that the 
Armenians were ‘settling in locations that could do no harm’ (Astourian 1990: 137).
17 April 1915 - Persecutions in Van
The Triumvirs acted quickly in response to Yalqin’s idea, closing Armenian schools, 
shutting down the Armenian press and prohibiting Armenian international 
correspondence through all but the consulates. Whilst aware that there would be 
some political ramifications for these actions, the Porte, as the diplomatic state was 
addressed, relied on the critical emergency of war and the necessity to continue 
formal alliances for military gain to override the humanitarian claims these policies 
would normally cause (R14086/Ab. 17493 1915).
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The massacres at Van, however, were a new level of persecution organised by the 
CUP. Anonymous ministers at the Russian consul sent a telegram to the German 
embassy in Copenhagen, describing it thus:
.. .Entire Kylikien Armenian massacres were carried out in 
hundreds of towns around Van where total populations have faced 
utter destruction. In Van itself, Kurdish bands besieged the 
Armenian city quarter; these new crimes of the Turks against 
humanity and civilisation were undertaken in a coordinated 
[manner] under orders by the Turkish regime in Constantinople,.
The alliance of the Russian, French and English regimes must 
herewith explain to the Porte that the personal responsibility for 
this crime rests entirely on the shoulders of the Turkish regime, just 
as the representatives of the regime who participated in the 
massacres will [be personally] held to account...
(R14086/Ab. 17667 1915)
Unlike the mass killing in Adana, this was clearly not the work of an incensed mob, 
but a coordinated attack set out to ensure the entire destruction of a people living in a 
certain area. Akpam recounts the experience of American missionary Stanley E.
Kerr who collected eye-witness accounts of the Van massacres. Kerr claims that 
‘more than fifty-five thousand Armenians had been killed.. .before the uprising had 
even started’ in Van (2006: 201). While Bloxham estimates the number of killings 
from mid-December to mid-April at a more conservative figure of 10,000 (2005: 76), 
we can assume that there were Special Organisation attacks on the ethnic Armenian 
minority paving the way for this large anti-Armenian push.
The massacres at Van were swiftly followed by the systematic arrest, torture and 
killing of approximately 600 Armenian cultural leaders, political leaders and 
intellectuals on 24 April 1915, a date that stands as the generally accepted date for 
the ‘beginning’ of the Armenian genocide (Staub 1989: 10; Ak9 am 2006: 129;
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Astourian 1990: 137). This was followed throughout Eastern Anatolia as the war 
progressed through 1915. Though the Armenians attempted some resistance to the 
aggression, including raids on Muslim towns and interference with CUP 
communications (R14086/Ab.23244 31.07.1915), they had little defence against the 
combined strength of the Ittihadist state and the complacency of a world otherwise 
engaged in war.
By 1916 attacks and sustained policies of destruction were being implemented 
against the Armenians. In the year following the massacres at Van, eleven of the 
fifteen Armenian diocese had been wiped out with no longer enough members 
remaining alive to continue ministry; the diocese of Adana and Marasch had been 
completely destroyed (R14090/Ab.5914 3.03.1916). Just over two years later when 
the Turks began their evacuations from the battlements of WWI, approximately half 
of the pre-WWl Ottoman Armenians had been killed outright, sent into where they 
died of persecution, disease or other malady or had been forced out into the Syrian 
desert where hundreds of thousands perished of exposure, thirst and starvation14.
Germany
When did the path toward the Holocaust begin? Where did it branch off from the 
shared roots of European history to devolve into some of the worst atrocities history 
has known? Historians tend to answer this question with great variance; Evans 
begins The Coming o f  the Third Reich (2004) with Bismarck; the entire basis of 
Abel’s Roots o f Anti-Semitism (1975) is that Jewish persecution begins in Biblical 
times under Ptolemaic Egypt; Dawidowicz, in her Holocaust Reader(\916), and 
Niewyk and Nicosia, in The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust (2000), claim the split 
to have come with the rise of Adolf Hitler.
The actual number o f  deaths remains uncertain, though most scholars estimate between 800,000 and 
1.5 million deaths o f  a pre-war population o f just 2 million (Mann 2005: 140; Levene 2005: 70 - 7j ; 
Valentino 2004: 157; Winter 2003b: 193). These numbers, o f  course, do not cover such atrocities as 
the rape o f women and children or those sold into slavery — again, a crime occuring mostly to women 
and children.
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Whilst I agree that Hitler’s ascension to power and Nazi control of state 
organisations and institutions was a key point on the ‘road to Auschwitz’, I fervently 
acknowledge that without the anti-Semitism rife in the Western world at the time and 
without the extraordinary economic, historical and geo-political situation Germany 
found itself in during the late 1920s, this rise to power and the fundamental 
ideologies and policies of the party would have been radically different, if indeed the 
Nazis had been able to take power at all. In order to maintain balance in each of my 
cases and to allow this case study to fit into the scope of my PhD, I have chosen to 
limit myself to tracing German ideology under the NSDAP, thus restricting my 
research to events occurring after the Nazis came to power. Nonetheless, 
understanding Germany in the greater context of political shift is vital to 
understanding how they were able to come to power in the first place.
Mann reminds us that, when discussing Germany in the early 20th century, we must 
rely on both geopolitical relations and transnational relations because, prior to WWI, 
there were two main ‘German’ states, Prussia and Hapsburg Austria, and millions of 
people who considered themselves German who lived outside of those boundaries 
(Mann 2005: 181). He goes on to claim that German nationalism at the turn of the 
century already focused around mistrust of Jews and of Soviets, a tendency only 
heightened by the devastation of WWI where both Empires lost not only political 
power, but also substantial amounts of land where Germans were discriminated 
against by new political systems (Mann 2005: 183).
The Weimar Republic, another consequence of WWI, was almost immediately 
fraught with institutional problems. Social Democratic functionary, Friedrich Ebert, 
stepped into the breach to become the Republic’s first Reich’s President. His abuse 
of the ability to rule by decree did nothing to endear him to a fledgling legislative 
branch and little to uphold the Weimar Constitution of 1919. Also problematic was 
the Social Democratic party itself; founded on Marxist principles, they could not 
move away from these ideals without loosing significant numbers of their working- 
class adherents. However, attempting to employ more radical policies would see
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them alienated entirely as they were far from attaining an electoral majority at any 
time after 1920 (Evans 2004: 80, 88 - 89). Neither the executive nor the legislative 
branch could control the military who, during the 1920s, attempted to circumvent the 
restrictions of the Versailles treaty as often as possible (Crozier 1997: 100 - 105; 
Gatzke 1954); rearmament and military training began again, often in the Soviet 
Union.
The last straw, however, aside from political discontent, ideological disappointment 
and shame and lack of military support resulting from the Treaty of Versailles, was 
the effect of the Great Depression on Germany. Most scholars (Aly 2007; Barnett 
1998; Benz 1995; Broszat 1987; Broszat, Schwabe, and Herbst 1989; Evans 2004; 
Fischer 1986; Gatzke 1954; Mommsen 2001) recognise the importance this event 
had on the destabilisation of the Weimar Republic. Burleigh reminds his readers that 
the number of unemployed in 1932 had risen to as many as 7.6 million individuals, 
almost 34% of the workforce. These numbers are even more startling when 
compared to the only 1.6 million unemployed in October 1929 (Burleigh 2001: 122). 
Indeed, many people voted for the NSDAP not because of an ideological tendency 
towards ethnocentrism or because of a sense of Hitler worship, but instead because 
the NSDAP campaigned on an open commitment to ease the unemployment burden 
and offered positive answers to the dire economic and financial questions raised by 
the extremity of the time (Mann 2005: 183 - 184). Thus, here again, we see a weak 
state institution leads to geopolitical shift, creating power gaps into which growing, 
radicalising actors can manoeuvre.
10 May 1933 - Book burning at Opernplatz
Evans selects the resignation of the Social Democrat government from power on the 
27 of March 1930 as marking ‘the beginning of the end of Weimar democracy’
(2004: 247); without a parliamentary majority, power began to shift towards the 
army which had been illegally rebuilding its stockpiles and holdings since the end of 
the First World War. Though some members of the army were acknowledged Nazis
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at the time, the army generally kept its distance and pressured Hitler and his 
comrades to quell their extremism, thus becoming ‘strictly legal’ (Goebbels in Evans 
2005: 249). The government was reshuffled with Heinrich Brüning as Chancellor 
who began the practice of restricting democratic processes of government. However, 
government support continued to wane as seen in the September 1930 elections. As 
a reflection of the popular demands for political change, the Nazis gained an 
astounding total of 95 seats in the Reichstag. With Hitler gaining more personal 
popularity in the 1932 election run-offs against Thälmann, leader of the Communist 
party, and the current Chancellor, Hindenburg, the Nazis were indeed gaining 
popular support very quickly. However, most of their political campaigning during 
this time was focused, unsurprisingly, on the weaknesses of the other parties, the 
mistakes made by the Weimar Republic, the beauty and unity that would occur if 
Germany was once more united and Hindenburg himself, who was portrayed as an 
elderly, if honourable, politician who needed to step aside to make room for newer, 
younger blood (Evans 2004: 277 - 283).
Though the early 1930s showed massive gains in political support for the Nazis. 
Goering sums up the rationale for this quite well in one of his statements before the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, saying:
One must not forget that at this moment Germany had arrived at 
the lowest point of her downward trend. There were 8 million 
unemployed; all programs had failed; confidence in the parties 
existed no more; there was a very strong rise on the part of the 
revolutionary Leftist side; and political insecurity.
(Tribunals 13.03.1946)
Mann (2005) reflects this by reminding his readers that the people voting in support 
of the NSDAP were not voting for genocidal aggression; they were instead voting for 
a strong economic policy in an economic crisis and for renewed national pride in the 
wake of Versailles. Though the Nazis downplayed their anti-Semitic notions around
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election times, some type of ‘pressure’ on the Jews was approved of by many (Mann 
2005: 183). What that pressure would be and what form it would take, however, 
remained a mystery to the greater populace of voters and -  as I will argue in later 
chapters -  in many ways to the regime itself.
The book burning at Opemplatz is an early answer to how the regime viewed types 
of radicalised action in its earliest form. The event itself was a few days in the 
making. Staged on 6 May 1933 outside the Institute for Sexual Science in Berlin, 
home to an approximate 18,000 books and more manuscripts and photographs, 
students vandalized the Institute’s vast library whilst listening to their colleagues 
play patriotic songs. On 10 May 1933, the SA joined the students, pulling thousands 
of literary and photographic subjects out into the square, covering them with gasoline 
and setting them alight. Two days later, the Völkischer Beobachter published an 
article acclaiming the ‘symbolic act’ in which ‘un-German writings were set alight 
on piles of logs’. In the same article is reported Goebbels’ speech on the night in 
which the Reichsminister pronounced ‘Revolutions that are authentic do not stop 
anywhere. No area can stay untouched. As men are revolutionised, so too are things 
revolutionised;’ the fact that the ‘trash and dirt’ of Jewish literature was exuberantly 
praised, a reflection of the joyous feeling of the night (NSDAP 1933e).
Hill argues as a key point of note that the actions at Opemplatz were instigated, not 
through the state, but through civil action by the National Socialist German Students 
League (NSDStB). He points to the ambiguous ‘world reaction’ of indignation and 
excuse of student pranks as making the new Nazi regime ‘temporarily cautious’ 
about supporting the book burning (2001: 8 - 10). Unfortunately, Hill overlooks two 
aspects of the inner workings of the Nazi Party at the time. Firstly, much of NSDAP 
support and popularity was gained via grass roots approaches. That the book 
burnings were not decreed by the party before hand is unsurprising when one looks 
at the way they unfolded, beginning as what could be termed patriotic vandalism and 
only days later, supported by leading members of the Party. Secondly, Hill ignores 
the fact that, at the time, the NSDStB was already playing a role in the Hitler Youth
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(HJ) under von Schirach as Obemfuhrer. Though still in its infancy, the inner 
workings of the HJ were both overseen and supported by the greater Party and was 
already the largest youth organisation in the Reich (Tribunals 23.05.1946). Rather 
than being an embarrassing mistake for the Nazis, the book burning at Opemplatz 
gives us an early insight into how the NSDAP worked, and serves as an early picture 
of radicalised aggression against ideas and attitudes outside the state-led platform.
15 September 1935 - passing of the Nuremberg Laws
Actions such as book burnings were not long remaining informal. The passing of the 
Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935 was not only the legalisation of persecution 
already present in the Party in events like the book burning, but was also a formal 
statement of acknowledgement of the radicalising anti-Semitic feelings in the party. 
Between the book burnings and the institution of the Nuremberg Laws, however, 
there was a general hiatus of specifically anti-Jewish policies; instead the Nazis had 
picked up on another theme of purification suggested in Mein K am pf- anti- 
Bolshevik policy. In truth, many Jews of the time were indeed members of the 
Communist Party (KPD) and also of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), coming 
second and third in party power after the Nazis in the 1933 elections. However, the 
Germans were not prepared at the time to attempt outright politicide when political 
power could be gained by more familiar routs. The Enabling Act, passed in late 
March 1933, effectively legalised Hitler’s dictatorship and allowed him, in July, to 
disband and make all political parties other than the NSDAP illegal. The power of 
the communists, then, was tightly monitored after this point and was, by 1935, seen 
as a conquered threat (Mann 2005: 193; Tribunals 08.01.1946, 10.01.1946b).
This introduces a trend, expounded upon in Chapter Six, in which the Nazis used the 
legal system to legitimise radical shifts in policy, thus giving further legitimacy to 
their own institutions of power. Thus, precedent was set to deal with the problem of 
‘un-German’ political ideals. This stands as a perfect example of cumulative 
radicalisation in which aggressive radicalise through a graduated process step at a
120
Chapter Four: Context and approach
time. In this way, precedent was set to deal with the problem of ‘un-German’ 
political ideals. Years later, following a wave of vandalism assaults and boycotts 
organised by the NSDAP against the Jews, the Nazis once again signalled a political 
and ideological shift with the passing of the Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935; 
this time, however, the ‘problem’ was not a political group, but a racial group.
The Nuremberg Laws, introduced as a last-minute addition to a September Nazi 
Party Rally (Burleigh 2001: 543), are broken down into two articles of legislation.
The first, Laws for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour (Gesetzzum 
Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre)15, set out to ensure the purity 
of German blood in order to establish a pure folk for the future of Germany. In 
doing so, this law made marriages and sexual relationships between Jews and Aryans 
illegal, both within and out with the Reich; it also prohibited Aryans from employing 
Jews to work in their homes as house or garden staff in order to further restrict the 
effects Jews might have on Aryans if they remained in close proximity. It restricts 
Jews from flying German flags, but allows them to show Jewish colours, promising 
that in so doing they will be protected by the state.
The second law, the Reich Citizenship Law (Verordnungzum Reichsbuergergesetz), 
relieved non-Aryans of their citizenship, drawing a distinction between ‘citizen’ and 
‘national’; it also clearly delineates what constitutes a Jew and lays out provisions for 
Mischlinge, or those who are part-Jew. It also stipulates that those who are citizens 
of the Nazi state were specifically obligated to support it. For the Jew, the immediate 
outcome of that they had to provide their local government branch with the birth or 
baptismal statements of themselves, their parents and all four grandparents in order 
to prove their blood-status.
Bearing this in mind, let us return to the comparison of the Nuremberg Laws with the 
Law prohibiting the continuance of other political parties. The key difference
For full text o f  the Nuremberg Laws, see (Nuremberg Laws 1935).
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between the Jewish problem and the Bolshevik problem is that because of the ethnic 
affiliation of the Jews as a group, they could not simply change their allegiance. A 
communist could conceivably change their political orientation; a Jew would never 
be able to change their blood. While I go into greater detail on this in the next 
chapter, it is worth noting here; otherwise, one could argue that the passing of the 
Nuremberg Laws, would have effectively made being Jewish illegal, thus many 
people would have changed their religious orientation and Jews would have no 
longer been problematic. Taking Judaism out of the realm of religious orientation, 
placing it firmly in the realm of race and pairing this notion with ideals of Social 
Darwinism16 so integral to the Nazis and other parts of the West at the time, proved 
to be part of the rationale behind more radical events, such as the Night of Broken 
Glass.
9 - 1 0  November 1938 - Kristallnacht
One cannot, however, simply jump from 1935 to 1938 without a brief look at events 
occurring in and because of Germany during this critical time. Whilst not technically 
at war until the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, two key military 
and political victories were ‘won’ by the Reich in early 1938; the first was the 
Austrian Anschluss on 12 March 1938, the second was the signing of the Munich 
Agreement signed on 30 September 1938 when Germany assumed control of the 
Sudetenland. The expansion of German borders and the beginning the attainment of 
greater Lebensraum did more than fulfil promises made in the early campaigns of the 
Nazi party in the late 1920s and 1930s. The assumption of more land meant that 
there were also a much greater number of Jews living under the auspices of the 
Reich.
u The tenets o f Social Darwinism were influential in both the Armenian and Jewish genocides, they 
involve the application o f  Darwinist premises o f eugenics not to individual species, but to individual 
people groups who were considered to be in a life-or-death struggle for supremacy. Foi works 
addressing the application o f Social Darwinist principles to the Holocaust see Evans (2004) . Though 
there are fewer works addressing the application o f Social Darwinist principles to the Armenian
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This being the case, it is hardly surprising, but nonetheless noteworthy that following 
on from the Nuremberg Laws there were further restrictions placed on Jews, all 
coming from the legal, statutory policies of the Reich. Two weeks after the 
Anschluss, the NSDAP published a decree under the auspices of the Four Year 
Plan17 that all acts of disposal of Jewish enterprise necessitated permission of the 
local Nazi government branch. Twelve days after the signing of the Munich 
Agreement and only two days after Kristallnacht, there was another decree published 
fining all Jews a billion Reichmarks in order to ‘atone’ for the economic crisis; also 
published this day was a second decree citing that Jews were no longer allowed to 
legitimately own retail stores, offer their goods at market, act as economic leaders or 
be members of any co-operative (Tribunals 20.03.1946). The way in which these 
events mirror each other is not merely a point of interest, but also a case-in-point 
example that Nazi policy regarding the Jews grew out of geo-political events as 
much as out of an ideological compulsion.
Nonetheless, as I argue throughout the empirical chapters of the PhD, ideology also 
pivots around events; in the case of Kristallnacht, or Reichskristallnacht, the weeks 
preceding the event showed a dramatic upturn in the frequency and ferocity of anti- 
Semitic articles and inferences in propaganda sources throughout the Reich, 
primarily because Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish Jew, had shot Ernst vom Rath in the 
German Embassy (Tribunals 10.01.1946c; NSDAP 1938a, 1938b, 1938c). As usual, 
a NSDAP meeting had already been scheduled in Munich on 9 November in order to 
commemorate those who died during the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. However, once 
Hitler and Goebbels had been alerted to the young diplomat’s death, Hitler ordered a 
‘massive, co-ordinated, physical assault’ on Jews (Evans 2005: 581; Tribunals
24.05.1946). Goebbels responded by deploying some of the most radical elements of 
the Nazi party including the Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo) and the Sturmabteilung (SA).
genocide, some good examples can be found in Bloxham (2003; 2005), Al-Azmeh (1991) and Koch 
(1984).
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Their actions developed into what Rubenstein and Roth quantify as a ‘multiple 
disaster (1987. 117), firstly, it resulted in the destruction and looting of thousands of 
Jewish shops, the arson of hundreds of synagogues, the abuse of unknown numbers 
of Jews, the death of ninety-one Jews and the arrest and consequent incarceration of 
over 30,000 Jews in concentration camps. The second ‘disaster’ was done to the 
Nazi leadership. Generally, the population did not react supportively of the riots and 
vandalism. Himmler and Heydrich were caught unawares by the action and, in an 
attempt to win further favour from the Führer, argued strongly that the event was 
mishandled by Goebbels (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 352 - 353; Coppa 2006: 174 - 
175; Kallis 2008: 45).
Eventually, their arguments succeeded and it because quickly obvious that in order to 
reign in any further ‘mistakes’ a new way of answering the ‘Jewish Question’ was 
necessary. For instance, a look at the 1946 Military Tribunals reveals that Walther 
Funk, the NSDAP Minister for Economic Affairs, testified to shock and outrage at 
the events of Kristallnacht; five days later, once a new approach to these and other 
anti-Semitic events was formulated, he made a speech characterising them as a 
“ violent explosion of the disgust of the German people, because of a criminal Jewish 
attack against the German people,’ and saying that the elimination of the Jews from 
economic life followed logically their elimination from political life’ (Tribunals 
01.10.1946h).
Nonetheless, there was still a certain progression of other events necessary for policy 
to change from this dynamic persecution to genocide -  though the end point was 
considerably closer than five years previously. The idea that Jews would be deported 
and forced to migrate elsewhere was still strongly popular within the regime and 
understood to be Hitler’s wish for the remainder of Jews in Germany (Tribunals
29.04.1946). Bloxham and Kushner remind their readers that even up to 1940, the
17 The Four Year Plan was published in November 1936; drafted by Hitler himself in a memorandum 
in August o f that year, it outlined certain economic policies to be put in place in hopes to bring 
Germany out o f  economic crisis. For more information see Kershaw (2001b) and Evans (2005).
124
Chapter Four: Context and approach
ghettos constructed were to be temporary collections points for Jews leaving the 
Fatherland rather than the extermination camps we so frequently equate them with 
today (2008: 135).
3 September 1941 - Auschwitz receives first import of Jews for extermination
It took less than three years after Kristallnacht for the Nazi regime to shift into 
genocidal action, made possible by many things, though most scholars agree that the 
crisis o f ‘global war’ found in WWII was the key instigator of the genocide 
(Gellately 2003: 245 - 246; Winter 2003b). After the outbreak of war in Europe, the 
key historical events of the time unsurprisingly centre around military events. After 
the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, Germany invaded (amongst 
others) Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxemburg on 10 May 1940 and Greece on 6 April 1941. The military coup in 
Belgrade during the night of the 2 6 -2 7  March 1941 saw the overthrow of a 
government ‘less than forty-eight hours after they had succumbed to Hitler’s threats 
and signed up to the Axis Tripartite Pact’ (Judah 1997: 113).
During the course of these events circumstances for the Jews had continued to 
deteriorate; the first ghetto was established in December 1939 in Lodz, Poland 
(Litzmannstadt), after the invasion; though Lodz was the first, the Warsaw ghetto 
was the largest and arguably most famous (Adelson, Lapides, and Web 1989; Roland 
1992). However, there were numerous ghettos established, mostly along the Eastern 
Front after the Nazis had established a military victory in an area; these ghettos were 
varied and had different purposes and roles within the Nazi state (Trunk 1972).
Chalk and Jonassohn note that there was ambiguity in the formation of these ghettos 
in that there was no distinct outcome recognised for the Jews living inside (Chalk 
and Jonassohn 1990: 362). Nonetheless, as a critical development in the ratchet- 
effect of radicalisation, the establishment of these ghettos continued the 
legitimisation of the ideological necessity of the physical separation of Jews from 
‘real’ Germans. It was from these ghettos that most of the workers in the
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concentration camps were chosen (Mostowicz 2005), resulting in some of the most 
foul living conditions known to the twentieth century.
However, an argument can be made that this move from limiting rights and freedoms 
to ‘ghettoisation’ to concentration was not genocide but extreme persecution, that 
there was as yet, no deliberate attempt to completely exterminate any nation, only to 
enslave them. While the argument would be weak and the distinction slight, the 
argument would be silenced entirely after the events of 3 September 1941 in which 
Auschwitz received the first intake of Jews for the sole purpose of extermination. 
Prior to the arrival of this train into the station, Auschwitz had still been one of the 
most extreme concentration camps. The largest camp established by the Germans, it 
was housed near Krakow, Poland and dates back to May 1940. Initially, the 
Auschwitz compound was formed of three camps, Auschwitz I, Auschwitz 11 
(Auschwitz-Birkenau) and Auschwitz III (Auschwitz-Monowitz), led by Rudolf 
Hoss until 1943. Though terrible human rights violations occurred at all three 
camps, including the spine-chilling medical experiments carried out by the infamous 
Dr. Mengele at Auschwitz I (Nyiszli 1993: 17 - 18, 63 - 65; Bloxham 2009a: 181) 
and workings at I. G. Farben by the workers in Auschwitz III (Rubenstein and Roth 
1987: 153 - 154, 241 - 243), arguably the worst conditions and largest number of 
killings were found at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Initially provisioned with two gas 
chambers, four complete crematorium chambers were erected in 1943 including
| g
changing rooms, gas chambers and crematorium ovens (USHMM 2010)
After the establishment of Auschwitz as an extermination camp, the progression 
towards genocide was complete. While overlooked by many scholars, it is important 
to remember that the next four years of war were not as straight-forward as is 
sometimes thought, either on the military or the genocidal fronts. Other policy 
initiatives, such as the Nacht und Nebel Erlass of December 1941 and Seyss-
18 Unfortunately, there is not room within the bounds of the PhD to expound on the injustices and 
terrors taking place at Auschwitz or at any other camp, either in the Holocaust or in either ot the other 
two case studies. For more information about the camps see Dawidowicz (1975, 1976).
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Inquart s decree institutionalising compulsory labour service which resulted in over
500,000 people being sent from the Netherlands to the Reich as interned labourers, 
attempted to ensure that the anti-Semitic policies were at once legal and, to a great 
extent, clandestine (Tribunals 30.09.1946j, 01.10.1946m; see also Kallis 2008). This 
is not to uphold claims made by much of the German populace and Nazi leaders that 
they were not aware of the tragedy of the Holocaust (Goldhagen 1996; Tribunals 
23.01.1946a, 07.02.1946, 10.01.1946a, 10.01.1946c), but to say that the state often 
did hide the inner workings and directives about the answer to the Jewish Question 
behind legalities and bureaucratic speak, particularly in their propaganda and within 
the social spheres of the state.
Nor was the German propaganda machine impervious to attack; until the military 
losses of late 1942 and particularly the loss of the battle of Stalingrad 2 February 
1943, the Nazis were able to claim unilaterally to be ‘the’ authority on truth, giving 
them a necessary standard of power through legitimacy of the press and media. 
However, the long duration of war coupled with military losses and repeated attacks 
by anti-Nazi propaganda from within Germany (Kallis 2008: ch. 6) meant that the 
strength of state-led propaganda was less reliable and thus, state inspired ideology 
was, to an extent beginning to wane. Hitler’s withdrawal from the public sphere did 
little to restore the faith of a weary people. Nonetheless, the Nazi regime was still far 
from collapse: as Kershaw notes, as the war in the eastern front became more intense 
with greater losses for Germany, the ‘level of brutality towards its own population 
was about to rise sharply’ (2001b: 552). The way to recover from these losses then 
was to ‘eliminate Jewry not only from Reich territory but from the whole of Europe’ 
(Goebbels in Kershaw 1989: 555); the threat of the Jews, as I will show in Chapter 
Five were becoming increasingly tied to the ‘menace’ of the Soviet east.
By the time of German surrender in May 1945, approximately six million Jews had 
been killed in the gas chambers, starved to death, died in medical experiments, 
executed, died camp-induced illnesses, drowned, beaten to death and their bodies fed 
to the fires. On top of this number are the millions who were enslaved and suffered
127
Chapter Four: Context and approach
many of the same maladies, including rape, slavery and abject debasement and 
survived. It is thanks to the work of many other scholars that we are unable to forget 
the other groups of ethnically and racially ‘lesser’ humans -  many of them German -  
the other approximate seven million who were killed in the Nazi reign of terror, 
reminding us that it is rarely only the anti-nation who suffer at the hands of their 
national persecutors. It is theme reflected, as already shown in my Turkish case, in 
many cases of genocide. Yugoslavia is no exception to this abhorrent rule.
The Balkans
My third case is an outlier in comparison to my other two cases of ‘total’ genocide 
(Melson 1992: 26 - 29, 1996: 28). The critical difference separating the crisis in 
Yugoslavia from those in Germany and Turkey is, as discussed previously in Chapter 
Three, that here we have a case of what is frequently referred to as ‘ethnic cleansing 
followed by genocidal episodes in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995’(Malesevic 2006: 
209). It is important to remember, however, that the distinction between these two 
events are often blurry, particularly in the academic, rather than the legal, realm; 
using the definitions I suggest in the previous chapter and keeping in mind the 
relationship between genocide and ethnic conflict help clarify certain complexities.
As the upcoming chapters will show, total genocide -  the attempted complete and 
absolute destruction of one people group from the entire earth -  was only ever 
discussed in my German case in the very latest stages of the conflict on policy and 
ideological levels and even then only seen as a last resort. More similarly to the 
Armenian case (Melson 1996), the conflict in the Balkans radicalises to an ideology 
focused on the destruction of one (and occasionally two) people group(s) from the 
homeland. Unlike my two other cases, a more complex system of aggression exists 
wherein each of the three primary groups (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) committed 
crimes against humanity (Dijilas 2003: 318; Ron 2003: Ch. 3; Weitz 2005: 214 - 
219). However, the Serbs tended to act first and most aggressively, seeking out 
avenues for political gain through nationalist rhetoric and following through with 
extreme military tactics unused by Croats or Bosniaks to the same degree mostly due
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to their military prowess. Nonetheless, the persecutions were less controlled than in 
my other two cases, less centralised and less systematic; this is indicative of the way 
in which the Yugoslav state dissolved. As Malesevic suggests, we find an 
‘unprecedented institutionalisation of cultural difference had a decisive role to play 
in the eventual disintegration of the federal state...the roots of the collapse [of the 
Yugoslav state] are to be found in the very ideas, structures and processes that were 
created by the state and its political system’ (2006: 162) Mann describes these 
massacres and desecrations by mostly Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims 
(herein termed ‘Bosniaks’) as ‘wild’ in a way unfound in the other two cases (2005: 
358). Nonetheless, it is the ideology that is so fascinating as it is still an ideology 
radicalising towards genocide policy and towards genocidal aggression. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the process of the radicalisation of ideology in this case 
completes the spectrum of genocidal ideology in Europe in the 20lh century.
The Serbs consider themselves to be one of the ‘true’ modern nations, with kinship 
and cultural claims going back well into the l sl century AD (Judah 1997: ch 1). 
However, the conflict in the Balkans is not a history of the Serbs; it is instead a 
Yugoslav history with roots in a Yugoslav problem. Thus, when recounting the 
history of the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, we must go back to just before the dawn 
of Yugoslavia. In 1918, the region’s population was broken down into 
approximately 39% Serbs (including Slavs), 23.8% Croat (including Montenegrins) 
and 36% ‘Other’ which included Muslims, Macedonians and Albanians (Judah 1997: 
106). This ‘Greater Serbia’ restricted minority rights, causing suffering in particular 
to the Macedonians and Albanians, though Croats were more vocal about their 
position as second class citizens. This partially explains Croatian alliance with the 
Nazis (Fine 2002: 11).
As we have seen in the section above, the Second World War brought sorrow and 
suffering to many. However, as certain scholars have emphasised (Bloxham 2010), 
that suffering was in no way limited to the Jews -  though my own work focuses on 
that aspect of Nazism. Nazi support of the Croatian Ustasha government established
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in a military coup on 26 -  27 March 1941 sanctioned mass killings of Serbs and 
sparked a civil war amounting to all but 10 to 15% of deaths from 1941 -  1954, 
resulting in the deaths of over 500,000 Serbs (Burleigh 2001: 410; Valentino 2004: 
77). Before this tragedy occurred, Serbs and Croats had been living under a policy 
o f‘national unity’ established in 1905 with the Croatian-Serbian Coalition; Nazi 
support of the Croat surge for power under the Ustasha state destroyed the fragile 
trust this agreement founded (Judah 1997: 93). At the end of the war, after 
implementing a certain level of strong-arm tactics against opponents, Yugoslavia was 
established, formally dissolving the monarchy and vesting power into the hands of 
the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito (Lampe 1996:
226 - 233).
The establishment of a Yugoslav state did not mean immediate establishment of a 
Yugoslav identity; it took rather a significant amount of Stalinesque-type rule to 
quell ethnically-driven political dissent (Lampe 1996: 252 - 253). Nonetheless, with 
the reminders of WWII and Nazi rule still present in memory, fear of Soviet invasion 
arguably did more to create the ‘us vs. them’ mentality necessary in constructing a 
new identity, where ‘us’ meant Yugoslavia and ‘them’ meant the USSR. Yugoslavia 
was never intended to be a fluid entity, more of a salad-bowl approach to government 
in which each group was represented to create a whole entity. Indeed, Judah remarks 
that this post-1945 Yugoslavia was strong, ‘not because its peoples were one, but 
because they were many, and that strength was bom of unity.. .While it sought to 
accommodate the national interests of most of Yugoslavia’s peoples in a federal 
system, it also assumed an unchanging unity of interests’ (Judah 1997: 136; see also 
Neuffer 2001: 5). By the time the 1981 census was taken, 20 -  25% of the 
population in Bosnia’s largest cities identified themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ rather than 
as ‘Muslim’, ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’ (Weitz 2005: 203)19. Yugoslavia at this time was
’ This is not to say that there were not strong nationalists emerging at this time with pointedly 
nationalist ideas such as streamlining the alphabet or arguing that one language was distinct from 
another (Rusinow 2003: 19); however, most of these leaders were exiled or thrown into prison, many
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constructed of six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Slovenia, and two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was given its status to keep it from being a region of contention 
between Serbia and Cioatia, indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered to have 
been the most severe, least democratic of all the republics (Malesevic 2006: 217). 
Macedonia was given its status to keep it from being a region of contention between 
Serbia and Bulgaria. Kosovo’s autonomy was granted as a nod to its Albanian 
population; Vojvodina’s autonomy was granted on the more historical claim that it 
had never been a part of Serbia, regardless of its 50% Serb post-war population 
(Judah 1997: 137 - 138).
By the 1970s, some scholars posit that much of Yugoslavia’s initial growing pains 
had been worked through; decentralisation had picked up momentum, establishing 
what Ramet terms ‘a network of quasi-feudal national oligarchies’ whose power was 
entrenched in each republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
(2001: 5). This balancing act was only made possible by attempting to limit Serbian 
bureaucracy to a certain extent; in an attempt to fulfil this need, the 1974 
Constitution provided structure through ethnic quotas in multiethnic areas such as 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the right of the republics to veto; the Yugoslav economy 
was booming. As Ramet notes, many Yugoslavs considered the last years of Tito’s 
reign as a ‘golden age’ in the region’s history (2001: 5).
However, with Tito’s death came confusion. Yugoslavia was largely held together 
by Tito’s approach to multicultural governance. There was little guidance for what 
was to be done after the event of his death and, as will be discussed further in 
upcoming chapters, there was much power mongering as the institutional threads of 
governance began to unravel. This was paired with rising rates of unemployment 
and a faltering economic system (Lampe 2003). Here again we see the same sort of 
power gap emerging as is found in the previous two cases; Tito s death, economic
without trial or cause. This led to an extreme sense of national sentiment when the exiles were able to
131
Chapter Four: Context and approach
decline and the lack of institutional power independent of his person provided the 
opportunity for a more radical approach to politics in the Balkans. Though Tito’s 
death is only one of many early occurrences, institutional and otherwise (Jovic 2009: 
Ch. 5), adding to the foundations of radicalisation, ideologically it plays a 
particularly important role.
By the mid-1980s, the nationalism underlying the regional system instituted by the 
past and present Yugoslav Constitutions began to reassert itself, often, as seen in 
Chapters Six and Seven, recalling the nationalist sentiment and fervour of WW1I. 
Thus, we see introduced what Oberschall terms ‘the crisis frame’ wherein ‘ordinary 
people were held collectively responsible for their nationality.. .[elite] ethno- 
nationalists did not invent the crisis frame. They activated and amplified it with ‘our 
nation is threatened discourse’ (Oberschall 2007: 101 - 102). As with the other two 
cases, this growing radicalisation revolved around certain events, the first of which is 
Milosevic’s infamous speech to Serbian Kosovars in 1987.
24 April 1987 - Milosevic's speech at Kosovo Polje
The period of Yugoslavian history between 1987 and 1991 is dominated by political 
stmggles between rising Serbian nationalism promoted by Milosevic and the Serb 
elite and levels of rising nationalisms in other republics (Malesevic 2006: 177).
Rising nationalism coupled with the delegitimisation of Communism ‘set the stage’ 
for what Pavkovic terms ‘the generation of fears of domination’, fears felt by each 
nation against other, if not every other, nation (Pavkovic 2000: 98). This was the 
stage against which Milosevic was to solidify his leadership as a nationalistic figure. 
With a background in banking and leader of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY), Milosevic’s rise to leadership is peppered with back-stabbing and 
favour-mongering, including the orchestration of his friend and mentor, Ivan 
Stambolic, the then leader of Yugoslavia (Silber and Little 1997: 40, Ramet 2001.
return (Judah 1997: 145; Silber and Little 1997: 29).
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25). Before Stambolic was forced out, however, Milosevic had already made a name 
for himself as a nationalistic leader, keen on appealing to Serbian masses— though he 
found little support outside Serbia itself (Lampe 1996: 346 - 349). He did so almost 
by accident, in an impromptu series of speeches and meetings held over a twelve 
hour period after a crowd of Serbs attempted to break through police lines and into 
the building where Milosevic and local communist leaders were meeting.
After the resulting beatings, clubbings and arrests, mostly by Albanian (and a few 
Serb) police forces in an attempt to stop the mob, led to Milosevic being informed. 
Cohen describes what occurred next:
When a dialogue ensured between the demonstrators and 
Milosevic, they implored him to protect them from the police 
violence. Acting on a journalist’s suggestion, Milosevic re-entered 
the hall, and proceeded to a second-floor window. From that 
vantage point he nervously addressed the frenzied demonstrators, 
and uttered his soon-to-be legendary remarks: ‘No one will be 
allowed to beat you! No one will be allowed to beat you!’
Milosevic also invited the demonstrators to send a delegation into 
the hall to discuss their grievances.
(Cohen 2001: 107)
Cohen goes on to suggest that it was these series of meetings that established in 
Milosevic’s mind the seriousness of the Serbian ‘plight’ -  though, in truth, they had 
considerably more power and influence than any other national group at the time 
(Judah 2000: 50 - 55). Certainly, before this series of discussions, he had only 
refrained from discussing Serb dominance or from using nationalist rhetoric to any 
great effect (Cohen 2001: 107). Afterwards, however, such language became more 
frequent, as we will see in forthcoming chapters. Again, perhaps because of the role 
of Kosovo and the context of this encounter, Milosevic focused on the relationship 
between Kosovo and Serbia and particularly on Serbians living in Kosovo.
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Stambolic’s defeat in December 1987, making room for Milosevic, like many 
Communist leaders of the time, to enhance the power of his position and party 
(Weitz 2005: 209). Unlike other Communist leaders, however, Milosevic’s rationale 
for many of his policy initiatives had an obviously pro-Serb intent. Soon after his 
takeover of power, Milosevic’s government began allowing media outlets to 
publicise stories on the corruption of Tito’s regime, thus separating himself from the 
former regime (Pavkovic 2000: 105). His visit and discussions at Kosovo Polje 
cleverly revived the Kosovo myth, the idea that Serbs were significantly at risk 
outside of Serbia proper and had established himself as the leader of a movement 
bringing them back into the greater Serbian republic; this was followed in 1989 by 
the passing of Constitutional Amendments allowing Serbia to reintegrate Kosovo and 
Vojvodina and new legislation enabling Serb deputies in the federal parliament to 
outvote their Croatian and Slovenian counterparts (Pavkovic 2000: 107-108). Thus, 
Serbian leadership began to be institutionalised and the idea o f ‘Greater Serbia’ 
began quickly to spread to Serbs in other republics; Borisav Jovic, key aide to 
Milosevic through the late 1980s and President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia from 
May 1990, showed in his diaries that by late June 1990, Milosevic was already 
considering ways in which the areas of Croatia with majority-Serb populations could 
be subsumed by Serb-led Yugoslavia (Cohen 2001: 147; Jovic 2009: Ch. 7).
June 1991 - Slovenia and Croatia declare independence
In the early years of his presidency, Milosevic remained a strongly centralised leader 
with a firm grip on the power his position allowed him to maintain. Though much of 
Milosevic’s support was ostensibly based on his representation of Serbian needs, 
Serbia resisted democracy within their own republic. However, as post-Communist 
states began being successftilly established across Eastern Europe, Serbia s non-party 
pluralism was replaced by a more multi-party approach. Thus, ‘authoritarianism was 
given democratic legitimation, but in a plebiscitarían manner, in which citizens were 
presented with a ‘take it or leave it’ choice, designed by a leader.. .who had emerged 
during the pre-pluralist one-party system’ (Cohen 2001: 165). With the creation of
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the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) in 1990, Milosevic was able to distance himself 
from the ‘old’ Yugoslavia and claim the establishment of a modem political party. 
However, with Milosevic at the helm and with his increasing influence over the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), the economy, the increasingly pro-Serb education 
system, the police and the media, there was little to differentiate the SPS from the 
former League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) or from the Socialist Alliance of 
Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ), its two father organisations (Lampe 1996: 
262 - 263; Cohen 2001: 165, 166). Indeed, as Malesevic reminds us, the only 
functioning federal institutions were the office of the Prime Minister and the army, 
neither of which were strong enough to support a faltering state (2006: 178).
The nationalist ideals and policies espoused by the Serbian republic were beginning 
to chafe other non-Serb ethnic groups. By 1990, most of the six republic presidents 
were in favour of Yugoslavia’s governance system moving towards a loose 
federation of sovereign regional states; this would necessarily significantly reduce 
the amount of power and influence held by both Serbian-led Yugoslavia and the 
JNA, and it would mean giving up the idea of all Serbs in one state, the foremost 
component of ‘Greater Serbia’ (Glenny 1996: 37). As we will see in Chapter Seven, 
Serb leadership incensed nationalist sentiment by staging pro-Serb rallies, 
aggrandising the dangers faced by Serbs living outside Serbia and using the Serb-led 
JNA to threaten military intervention if independence were attempted or if Serbian 
authority was limited within the federation (Weitz 2005: 209).
Unsurprisingly then, institutional changes did little to endear Slovenia and Croatia, 
the leaders of the independence movement for the six Yugoslav republics, to a Serb- 
led Yugoslavia. The two republics had been vying for increased powers within the 
state system since the mid-1980s; thus, after attaining a positive result for 
independence in the December 1990 elections in both Croatia and Slovenia, a bieak 
up of Yugoslavia proper loomed. After increased violence in Croatia s Krajina 
region throughout the spring of 1991 and after Germany declared their support, 
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence after an almost unanimous vote in
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their respective parliaments (Weitz 2005: 211; Ron 2003: eh 2). Though upcoming 
chapters discuss the ideological shifts this event highlights, let it suffice that the ease 
with which the Serb leadership let Slovenia break off from Yugoslavia and the 
conflict with Croatia, not over independence but over the right of some areas rather 
than others to belong to Croatia or Serbia, signalled a shifting commitment away 
from Serb-led Yugoslavia, to ‘Greater Serbia’.
The immediate outcome of Slovenia’s declaration of independence was a ten day 
sham invasion by the JNA. The immediate outcome of Croatia’s declaration of 
independence was outright war, with Bosnia caught in the middle. Bosnia, with its 
ethnically mixed population, could exist as a state within Yugoslavia; however, with 
Serb -  and to a slightly lesser extent, Croat -  policies of ‘all Serbs in one state’, 
Bosnia was merely a chew toy between the dogs of Serbia and Croatia. Croatian 
paramilitary forces in Bosnia were arming their supporters, Serb media propagated 
the idea that Serbs could not exist within an independent Bosnia and the JNA was 
transferring significant amounts of arms and supplies to Bosnian Serbs to the tune of 
almost $1 billion (Weitz 2005: 213; Ramet 2001: 158). Ethnic conflict had begun, 
though the outcome and Bosnia’s role within it, were still uncertain.
1 March 1992 - Bosnian referendum for independence
Bosnia’s road to independence was more of a forced march: either remain a truncated 
version of itself as a puppet state of Greater Serbia (Bougarel 2003: 113)or declare 
independence and hope the international community would protect it, as they had 
promised to do with Croatia -  who was receiving arms from the European 
Community (EC) -  and Slovenia (Holbrooke 1999: 31 -41; Ron 2003: 40 -41). If 
independence was declared, Karadzic had already threatened that it would not 
survive even one day of freedom from Yugoslavia and would lead the Muslim 
people into annihilation’ (Weitz 2005: 214). In the event that a referendum take 
place, Karadzic had encouraged Bosnian Serbs to abstain from voting, the Serb-led 
Yugoslav air force helped spread the word by dropping leaflets encouraging Bosnian
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Serbs to boycott the referendum. Nonetheless, on 1 March 1992, over 63% of 
Bosnian voted, and of those who participated 99% voted pro-independence (Ramet 
2001: 205). Almost immediately upon this announcement, and irregardless of EC 
recognition on 6 April, Serbian troops barricaded Sarajevo and commenced one of 
the twentieth century’s most infamous sieges.
Boasting one of the richest cultural histories of all cities in the Balkans, Sarajevo has 
hosted the Winter Olympics in 1984, is home to numerous university students and 
serves as a base for art, poetry and music. Cosmopolitanism in Sarajevo was a 
matter of course until the Bosnian declaration of independence. Though Sarajevo 
had a Muslim majority, the Serbs were better organised (Mann 2005: 385; see also 
Ramet 2001: 264). Karadzic then announced a plan to separate the city into three 
main sectors, the largest for Serbs and the smallest for Bosniaks, though the Croats 
would also have a sector. The Bosniaks’ sector was essentially a ghetto; though the 
Serbs never did manage to hold onto control over the entire city, a quasi-partition did 
hold, defined by a line Serb forces had reached while commanding the hills around 
the city (Oberschall 2007: 106 - 107; Weitz 2005: 215 -216).
By the time Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic declared independence on 3 March 
1992, Karadzic was openly discussing plans of war in order to keep Bosnian regions 
of Greater Serbia attached to SFRY (Ramet 2001: 205). Thus, concurrent to the 
siege of Sarajevo, Milosevic ordered attacks on Prijedor, Omarska, Bijeljina, Zvomik 
and Kozarac, all cities and towns along the so-called ‘Corridor of Life across the 
northern boarder of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Krajina, a Serb-dominated area of 
Croatia where fighting had been taking place since the Croatian declaration of 
independence. In contrast to the Croatian conflict, the JNA was not immediately 
directly engaged on behalf of the Bosnian Serb forces, though Bosnian Seib 
paramilitaries had been receiving weaponry and tactical officers since early 1991 
(Pavkovic 2000: 163); eventually, as we will see later in the PhD, the JNA did 
openly side with Bosnian Serb militia groups (Malesevic 2006. 182 - 183). Battles 
for control of the Corridor, or the Posavina valley, were sometimes costly for the
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Serbs, but vital in the fulfilment of the idea of Greater Serbia, as it provided the link 
between SFRY, Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs (Judah 1997: 207 - 209). It was 
along this corridor where some of the worst camps were established and where some 
of the greatest crimes against humanity occurred, including the Prijedor massacres 
and the Omarska, Bosanski Novi and Tmopolje camps, many of which were 
established, in a macabre turn of events, on the sites of primary and secondary 
schools (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-99-36-1 2004).
11 - 1 3  July 1995 - Massacre at Srebrenica
At its height, Serbian forces came to control close to 70 per cent of territory claimed 
by Bosnia-Herzegovina; most of this territory was secured and stabilised in 1992 and 
held until the NATO offensive in autumn 1995 (Pavkovic 2000: 164). However, this 
is not to say that the relations between Serbia and Bosnian Serbs were equally stable. 
Significant disagreements between Karadzic and Milosevic had driven a wedge 
between the two leaders personally; politically, Serbia succumbed to (largely 
economic) pressure through the UN and the international community and imposed an 
internationally monitored blockade on Republika Srpska, restricting the flow of 
military supplies to the Bosnian Serb military (Pavkovic 2000: 166). Nonetheless, 
this did not stop the humanitarian crisis in the region. It did, however, change and 
modify the projection of ideology in the region. Thus, the last key event my research 
focuses on is the massacre at Srebrenica which will give us the opportunity to see 
how these political changes effect the way ideology shifts around this genocidal 
episode.
Code-name ‘Krivaja 95’, the massacre at Srebrenica began being planned months in 
advance after an increase in military aggression against the Bosnian Serbs by the 
UN and NATO (IT-98-33 2008; Silber and Little 1997: 360). The killing of 
Muslims had already begun, particularly the killing of those in camps, by Bosnian 
Serb military personnel. Bodies would be scattered around fields and buildings 
where the killings had taken place, frequently within sight of other prisoners and
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Bosniak civilians. Often these killings inspired such terror among remaining 
Bosniaks that suicides were rife and many fled en masse in an attempt to escape 
further persecution (IT-95-18 1995). Nonetheless, the massacre at Srebrenica was 
different; not only was Srebrenica a UN-declared safe area, but the massacres 
themselves also established a new, heightened level of killing.
Once the Bosnian Serbs began to attack the town in early July 1995, the majority of 
the population sought one of two courses: thousands of elderly men, women, 
children and some able bodied men sought shelter at the UN compound in Potocari, 
seeking aid from the Dutch UN troops (DutchBat) stationed there. They remained at 
the compound until 11 - 13  July when they were forcibly removed by busses and 
tmcks operated by Bosnian Serb militia, a decision made by Ratko Mladic at the time 
of the attack, the evening of the 11th after famously announcing that the Bosniaks 
could either ‘survive or disappear’ at a meeting with the DutchBat and Bosniak 
representatives (IT-04-80-1 2005). The majority of the men who had sought refuge 
here were then identified and summarily executed (Weitz 2005: 217; Pavkovic 
2000: 166; IT-95-18 1995; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006).
A second group of Bosniak men and some women and children numbering around
15,000 sought refuge in the woods towards Tuzla; the majority of this group went 
unarmed and were civilians or unarmed military personnel. The same night the 
forced transfer of group A began, the decision was made to destroy those attempting 
to flee through the woods. Thus, as many as 7,000 to 8,000 men were executed in 
the immediate days following the massacre within Srebrenica itself. (IT-95-18 
1995; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006; IT-98-33 2008).
Thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were executed. Some 
were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers who 
captured them and some were killed in the places where they were 
temporarily detained. Most, however, were slaughtered in carefully 
orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July 1995, in the
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region just north of Srebrenica. Prisoners not killed on 13 July 
1995 were subsequently bussed to execution sites further north of 
Bratunac, within the zone of responsibility of the VRS Zvomik 
Brigade. The large-scale executions in the north took place between 
14 and 17 July 1995.
(IT-98-33 2008)
These few days of intensive killing sparked mass killings of a similar nature 
throughout other places in Serb-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, near 
the village of Meces, Bosniaks successfully fleeing Srebrenica were encouraged to 
surrender and guaranteed their safety by Bosnian Serb military personnel. 
Approximately 350 Bosniak men summarily surrendered. The soldiers then took 
over one third of them, forced them to dig their own graves and executed them (IT- 
95-18 1995). Bosniaks in Zepa were given the choice to either be ‘evacuated’ as the 
Bosniaks in Srebrenica were evacuated or to be overrun by the Bosnian Serb forces 
(IT-04-80-1 2005; IT-95-5/18-1 2002). As Doubt explains, the latent function of 
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to significantly change the
nonnative orientation to which Bosnian Serbs were both dependent 
and subject as members of the Bosnian community, the objective 
consequence was to maim the collective sentiments that integrated 
Bosnian Serbs into their society...the result was to detach Bosnian 
Serbs from the value elements that they use to make judgement not 
only about other but also about themselves.
(Doubt 1999: 21)
Conclusion
In many ways, the above Doubt quote can be extended to each case when applied to 
the disassociation of the persecutor from their moral obligation. Throughout the
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differences discussed in each case, this is one of the truths shared between them.
This chapter, however, has attempted to show not only the similarities, but also the 
complexities and the differences in all three cases. Thus, we see that indeed, each of 
these three cases are unique. As Dannreuther suggests, ‘each of these wars 
developed their own dynamic and had their specific causes and origins’ (2001: 17). 
There are distinct differences, not only in the events themselves, but also in the way 
these events effected the radicalisation of both state and ideological institutions, 
something that will be discussed at length in the upcoming chapters.
Nonetheless, there is one significant way in which all three of these cases are similar: 
in each case, weak government systems led to a power gap into which three ‘new’ 
regimes were able to insert themselves. In the Balkans, the death of Tito and the lack 
of continuing multi-ethnic power balance provided the opportunity for leaders to 
assert the Serbs’ right of dominance throughout the region and the need for the 
protection of Serb rights above those of other minorities (Judah 1997: 309). This led 
to a quasi-seesaw aggression, during which the Bosniaks drew the shortest straw.
The Weimar Republic crumbled under the weight of the Great Depression and the 
strictures of the Treaty of Versailles. By the late 1920’s, the party was essentially 
picked away by the Communists and the National Socialists, with the Nazis finally 
winning the bones. As we will see, much of their anti-Semitic sentiment present in 
the early days of the party was founded on policies established by the Weimar state 
and earlier institutions. The Ottoman state had been struck by the misfortunes of 
empire -  a weak sultan, a failing economy and a loss of geo-political territory. As 
we will explore more fully in the upcoming chapters, the movement to ‘modernise’ 
in this case included a more centralised approach to government whose focus on 
establishing a Turkish identity led to more ethnocentric policy implementation and 
ideological radicalisation where Christian minorities, and Annenians in particular, 
were associated with the ‘old’ Empire.
T hese r e g im e s  w e r e  th en  ab le  to acquire a strong footh old , asserting in flu en ce and 
even tu a lly  g a in in g  su b stan tia l con tro l o f  po litica l, m ilitary, econ om ic  and id eo lo g ica l
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power through the institutions of the state. Though the focus of the rest of this PhD 
is on the path of radicalisation of only one of these four ‘sources of social power’ 
(Mann 1986), it is critical to remember that within the greater picture of social 
conflict, each of these four areas are vulnerable to corruption and to chauvinistic 
radicalisation. ‘As each side has gained the upper hand, it has exacted revenge for 
past wrongs, forgetting that, in choosing innocent members of the ‘enemy nation’ for 




The anti-nation: re-evaluating otherness in the 
process of radicalisation
Introduction
A basic premise of genocidal ideology is that if national decline is not due to any 
inherent quality bom of the nation, then the current state of affairs must be due to an 
outside source causing extreme detriment to the national consciousness. The 
progressive steps toward genocidal action, then, is viewed as ‘preventative murder,’ 
(Koch and Kershaw in Kershaw 1989: 172) bom out of geopolitical instability and 
shifts in power dynamics. But the question of who is at fault for this national decline 
must first be answered and certain in the national eye before steps toward national 
salvation can be taken. While multiple non-national groups exist in radicalising 
states, one group is most often identified as the ultimate enemy, the absolute 
antithesis of the national self.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a new and more targeted way of approaching 
ideas of otherness in genocidal states. I argue that in these states it is necessary to 
identify an extreme other-group that goes beyond the bounds of ordinary ‘otherness’. 
In contrast to the idea that, in genocidal states, the nation is supreme, I call this 
extreme other the ‘anti-nation’. This chapter goes on to suggest that the process of 
distinguishing the anti-nation from various other-groups"0 is a critical step in the 
cumulative radicalisation process of ideology, but does not always occur in the same 
way. There is a particular difference between my first two cases of Turkey and
~° As ideas o f otherness are not limited to national groups, 1 have opted to use the term other-groups 
rather than ‘other nations’, ‘non-anti-nation others’ or merely ‘nations or others to represent them 
on a macro group level. This then includes not only national groups, such as Kurds and Bulgarians, 
but also groups classified and persecuted by non-ethnical or racial standards such as the German 
categorisation o f  ‘useless eaters’ including homosexuals, mentally unwell and the aged, as well as 
those classified as political and national enemies. However, the ideological rationale tor these killings 
are, for the most part, outside the scope o f this analysis (for further information see. Tribunals
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Germany and my third case of Yugoslavia that suggests that there may be a 
difference between how different genocides identify the anti-nation.
I begin this chapter by defining the anti-nation, a critical step in furthering the 
dialogue of genocide studies. I then address the role of other-groups in genocidal 
states, not merely identifying the anti-nation, but more generally. I do this by 
looking at otherness as a whole in each of my three cases, identifying key other- 
groups and only then going on to distinguish the anti-nation from these other-groups 
historically, culturally and politically.
Defining the Anti-Nation
One of the basic tenants of nationalism and genocide studies is that a sense of 
nationhood establishes an awareness of other-groups outside the nation. Many 
genocide scholars use this sense of otherness to explain why certain groups are 
selected to play the scapegoat victim role: because they are unlike the nation, a 
particular group instils a sense of fear and uncertainty in the nation (for more on 
otherness and fear see Gagnon 1995; Melson 1996; Young 2001). In this respect, 
however, I contest the simplicity of the explanation; though the idea that otherness 
leads to fear and uncertainty is not incorrect, it simply does not go far enough for 
proper analysis, particularly on an ideological level.
Instead, I propose to begin with a clearer discussion on other-groups in radicalising 
states. In order to do this properly, however, a brief discussion on victim groups is 
helpful. As I will discuss at greater length below, victimhood in genocidal states is 
not linked to only one group; multiple victim-groups occur in almost any state at war 
and most particularly in cases of states in total war. Mere otherness does not explain 
the necessity for genocidal levels of action, nor does it help identify, ideologically or 
otherwise, groups that may be selected in the future for this particular kind of
01.10.1946f, 30.09.1946j, 30.09.19461; Kershaw 2001b: ch. 6, 260 - 261; Mann 2004: 143; Carlson
144
Chapter Five: Re-evaluating otherness
destruction. In fact, there are varying levels of other-groups, some being allies of the 
nation, some being enemies of the nation. However, ideologically, the groups that I 
am particularly concerned with are not merely enemies of the nation, but are instead 
portrayed as extreme perpetrators themselves, set out to completely undermine the 
nation. They are shown to be the absolute antithesis of the nation in almost every 
way; they are represented as the perverse mirror image to the nation’s sanctification. 
They are what I call the anti-nation.
In their expression of the anti-nation, radicalising ideologies generally associate the 
anti-nation with the regimes of previous political leadership. They become, in the 
first instance, stereotypes of negative political and cultural practise. By ideologically 
rejecting the anti-nation, national elites are rejecting the ‘old’ state and are thereby 
increasing the legitimacy of their own rule. How this rejection is expressed, 
however, varies from case to case. Whether or not there are any patterns in how this 
comes about is a critical aspect of this chapter.
Other-groups in Genocidal States
Each of my three cases have strong ethnic divisions between other-groups on an 
ideological level; ideas of election imply that the nation is above all other-groups, 
particularly those within the boundaries of the homeland. Not all of these other- 
groups, however, experience the same level of ideological animosity during the 
escalation to genocide. From an analytical perspective understanding the differences 
between other-groups is vital. Most cases of genocide occur within the greater 
context of mass death and include multiple victim-groups. However, as we shall see 
further in Chapters Six and Nine, the identification of the anti-nation in radicalising 
ideology is critical to legitimising the policy and practice of the genocidal state in 
such a way as to place the anti-nation outside the bounds of mere otherness. This 
section seeks to identify the varying levels of other-groups in my three cases of
2001: Partili).
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radicalising states and briefly assess the role otherness plays in the ideology of those 
states.
Turkey
In Turkey, as the shift from Ottomanism to Turkism occurred under the CUP, the 
identification of other-groups breaks down roughly into Kurds, Nomads, Arabs, 
Christians, Greeks and Armenians. The relationship Turkey’s leaders cultivate with 
each group is unique and tends to shift in order to accord political gain to these elites. 
For the most part, however, Kurds, nomad tribes and Arabs were ideologically 
considered different to Turks, but were cast as the ‘closest’ other-groups due to their 
Islamic heritage and their military alliances under the Ottoman Empire, during the 
Balkan wars, an alliance that continued in the First World War. Kurdish bands in 
particular were charged with some of the greatest Armenian massacres recorded by 
the Germans during WWI (R14078/Ab.9798 10.05.1913; R14079/Ab. 12669 
25.06.1913; R14086/Ab.23244 31.07.1915; R14090/Ab.5914 3.03.1916).
For the CUP, the term ‘Christian’ is a sort of middle category, though in earlier times 
this micro-type categorisation was not present. When the millet system was fully 
implemented, non-Muslim monotheistic believers were categorised as ‘Peoples of 
the Book’ under Islamic law, and granted dhimmi status. While this was ‘tolerant by 
the standards of the late Middle Ages and the early modem era, it was nonetheless 
defined by many discriminatory measures that indicated the inferior position of the 
non-Muslim monotheistic subjects of the empire’(Astourian 1990: 117; see also Fine 
2002: 7). Under the millet system, dhimmi were divided into groups under Patriarchs 
based around religious affiliation, such as the Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, 
Jew or Armenian. By the late nineteenth century, however, though the structure of 
these groups remained, there were varying levels of acceptance per gioup. The term 
‘Christian’ had come to delineate non-Armenian Christians from Armenians. It 
could include Greeks, which will be discussed momentarily, but was mostly 
restricted to other Europeans or those of European descent. This distinction is very
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important tor the CUP, the disciplinary and political measures taken against 
Armenians should absolutely not be extended to the Christians. Any measures 
threatening the lives of local [non-Armenian] Christians are to end immediately and 
should be reported’ (Talat Pasha in Akçam 2006: 187; see also R14078/Ab.4311 
1913).
This leads inherently to the role of Armenians and Greeks in Turkish ‘otherness’. 
Neither enjoyed the same level of ambivalence as the others. Policy dialogue often 
used similar, derogatory terms in reference to both groups (Toynbee in Staub 1989: 
175 - 176). Young Turk animosity toward Greeks living under the crumbling 
Ottoman empire began before WWI and continued to grow to its zenith after its 
conclusion. Of most interesting note is the economic policy established 1913-1914, 
redistributing wealth and jobs from the Greek and Armenian communities to 
Muslims in order to attempt the establishment of what Bloxham describes as ‘a 
centrally controlled and independent economic system [where] the key positions in 
the economy [would] be occupied by ‘reliable’ citizens whose interests coincided 
with those of the state’ (Bloxham 2005: 64). These years proved to be critical for 
anti-Greek policy, particularly for those living in the Aegean, as they suffered 
harassment, displacement and expulsion under the CUP. However, the succession of 
the Balkan Wars saw a postponement of anti-Greek ideology until after the 
establishment of a Turkish state under Atatiirk after WWI21. There was also a 
certain rationale behind Turkish policy here where, after the Balkan Wars 
particularly, there was significant reticence at killing any group of European 
Christians for fear it would incite European animosity against the CUP. National 
elites were keen to avoid this type of friction, as they were already under significant 
pressure by the European powers to put an end to Armenian suffering by the 
implementation of certain reforms (R14078/Ab.9798 10.05.1913; R14078/Ab.4311 
1913).
J For more information on the Greek/Turkish conflict see (Carlson 2001. Part III, Volkan and 
Itzkowitz 1994; Yildirim 2006)
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As we have seen in previous chapters, the Armenian—Turkish conflict had no relapse 
after the end of the Balkan Wars. In fact, there were significant consequences borne 
by the Armenians as outcomes of this war, as will be discussed in the upcoming 
sections. These policies were backed by a radicalising ideology built on a history of 
Armenian discrimination accepted under the Ottoman Empire, as discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four. At the heart of these problems is, once again, the shifting 
nature of Europe at the time and a growing mistrust of the Russian empire, an 
ideological remnant from the influx of Muslim refugees after the Ghazawat uprisings 
in the northern Caucasus region22. After the loss of territory suffered by the Ottoman 
Empire in the Balkan wars, fears that Russia would seek to enlarge their own empire 
at Turkish expense began to take hold; this was largely due to the extreme conditions 
suffered by Muslims meted out by Russians during the Ghazawat uprisings and the 
Crimean War (King 2008: 95, 97).
At the same time, there was a strong association of the Armenian population with 
Russians, both because of their religious affiliation and because of the trans-border 
nature of the Armenian population. There were, in fact, a substantial number of 
Armenians living in Russia, approximately 1,783,000 in the border region of the 
Caucasus alone and these Armenians had made certain bids for sovereignty over the 
region since the early 1830’s (Suny 2004: 121; Staub 1989: 178). Certainly, there 
were movements during the nineteenth century for greater devolved powers to 
regions in which Armenians held a majority, both in Russia and in the Ottoman 
Empire; however, my research suggests that after the CUP took power, there was 
little desire for Ottoman Armenians to ally themselves with these Russian Armenians 
in order to found their own state, as Turkish propaganda averred (R14077/Ab.l987 
29.01.1913; R14078/Ab.2888 8.02.1913; R14080/Ab. 13152 30.06.1913;
R1480/Ab. 14922 14.07.1913). Though there are events of Turkish Armenian attacks 
on Turks, the Armenians gave only limited help to Russia and that only occurred
22 For more information on the Caucasus wars and their consequences, see Hunter (2004: 10-20) and 
King (2008: Ch. 2)
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after some of the most severe action began against them (Staub 1989: 180). In fact, 
many Armenians openly denied any affiliation with their Russian compatriots, 
vowing loyalty only to the Turkish state under CUP control. Nonetheless, these 
realities did little to lessen the perception ot threat and the engenderment of fear 
spawned by elites and ideologues of the time, as we shall see in the upcoming 
sections.
Certain political outcomes of the Ottoman millet system also did little to help the 
Armenians during this critical stage. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the millet 
system was founded under Sharia law. Sharia was not only focused on religious 
dictates, but also on individual and institutional duties and, in particular, political and 
judicial dictates, whose regulation was to be earned out by the Ottoman state. ‘The 
Ottoman system was not merely a theocracy, but a subjugative political organisation 
based on the principle of fixed superordination and subordination governing the legal 
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and entailing social and political 
disabilities for the latter’ (Dadrian 2004: 4). One of the key ‘disabilities’ was an 
non-Muslim’s inability to become part of the warrior class; instead, they were 
required to pay a substantial tax to help fund the military. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, however, this came to be viewed as a positive outcome of their ‘infidel’ 
status: pay a tax and become exempt from the five years of military service usually 
expected of Muslim youths. This was a right Armenians were loath to give up, even 
under the Constitution, as it kept them from having to fight in Ottoman conflicts 
(Akqam 2006: 33). In short, the Turks ‘were witnessing, on the one hand, the 
political decline and dismemberment of their empire, and, on the other hand, the 
theoretical loss of their centuries-old superior status within it, they viewed the 
Armenians as the allies of the much-hated West and, in the cities, as a cipher for 
modernity’ (Astourian 1990: 125).
Thus, we see that the Armenians developed the key traits of the anti-nation through 
the radicalisation o f  ideological structure: there was a history o f  homeland claims 
being made in Anatolia and the Caucasus. This was compounded by the trans state
149
Chapter Five: Re-evaluating otherness
nature oi the Armenian people as Russia was perceived as a key threat, particularly 
after the Balkan Wars, and had a similar religious affiliation as the Armenians. The 
millet system provided a sense of long-standing friction between Muslim and 
Armenian, aggregated by a loss of national pride due to the loss of wars and territory.
Germany
German ideas of ethnic otherness were deeper and more intransigent than those in the 
Armenian case as the Germans had a clear sense of racial hierarchy distinctive of the 
Nazi state at this time. While there were certain ideological provisions made toward 
the rest of the world and their ethnic standing as compared to Germans, the majority 
of Nazi ideological focus was geared toward Europe and has something of an East- 
West divide. Those from Northem/Westem Europe, countries such as Denmark and 
Great Britain were of similar blood to the Germans and were considered to be of 
heightened ‘racial value’ to the Reich; thus, they would stand at the zenith of the 
racial pecking order. In order to establish this premise as ‘true’, German elites 
reached back as far as the Holy Roman Empire, or the First German Reich (Heiliges 
Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation) and carried on through the glorified mythic 
histories of the Teutonic Knights to Bismark (Cecil 1972: 65 - 70; Mann 2005: 181- 
182; Hitler 1969 [1925]).
This stands in contrast against German policies regarding Southern and Eastern 
Europe. Southern Europe, such as Italy and Greece, was to be pitied as they had 
fallen from their former glory due to racial ‘contamination (Hitler 1969 [1925].
512). The Czechs and Russians were of some racial ‘value’; that value tended to 
shift, however, depending on what stage of WWII Germany was in. Whilst regarded 
with general ambivalence in the thirties, by the later stages of the war, particularly 
after German occupation of Bulgaria, it was generally asserted that ‘in so far as we 
do not need them, they may die’ and ‘what these nations can offei in the way ot good 
blood of our type, we will take, if necessary, by kidnapping their children and iaisinG 
them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me
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only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur, otherwise it is of no interest’ 
(Bormann 1942 and Himmler 1943 in Tribunals 30.09.1946j; see also Tribunals 
23.01.1946a; Goebbels 1982 [1939 - 1941]: 122, 255; Kershaw 2001b: 276). 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these ideals were occasionally neglected in light 
of furthering the interests of the Vaterland; principles were constantly changed as 
strategy changed, particularly in light of WWII, where Italians and Japanese were 
welcomed as allies regardless of their ‘lesser’ status as non-Aryans (Jick 1998: 158).
This leaves us, amongst a barrage of other-groups suffering at Nazi hands, with 
predominantly Roma, Sinti, Ukrainians, Poles and Jews. The Roma and Sinti people 
lost somewhere between 200,000 -  500,000 during the Nazi purge; a number mainly 
lost to most academic scholarship, making it what Bloxham and Kushner call the 
‘least abhorred of all Germany’s genocidal operations’ (2008: 85). Perhaps the 
reason for this oversight and the rationale for the lack of space given them in this 
analysis is the lack of ideological space given to this particular group in NSDAP 
rhetoric -  in direct contrast to the remaining other-groups. Though, as Milton points 
out, the so-called gypsies, blacks and handicapped were often discussed in the press, 
they were not often referred to on a racial, biological or scientific level, but instead 
on a criminal level; when they were discussed as having the same ‘alien blood’ as 
Jews, it was generally done in the context of Jewish derogation (Milton 1990: 269 - 
271). Ukrainians, while suffering terrible losses at the hands of Germans, never 
faced the same virulent spite shown to Poles, whose ethnic standing gave them the 
hope of offering only one thing to the Reich -  their work. ‘The standard of living in 
the country is to remain low; we want only to draw labour forces from there and 
later ‘the Pole must feel.. .there is only one duty, namely, to work and to behave 
himself (Frank 1940 and 1939 in Tribunals 10.01.1946b). However, though the 
Nazis did eliminate a vast portion of educated, non-Jewish Poles, German ideology 
was explicit in that they were to remain alive under the NSDAP after the war and 
might be able to govern themselves at a local administrative level after some time 
(Tribunals 10.01.1946b; Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 86; Mann 2005. 186). 
Nonetheless, to ignore the policies of violence against these groups is to ignoie the
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greater context of violence present in the Third Reich which suggests that it was 
more than ‘mere’ antisemitism that provided the primary motivation for Nazi 
aggression against their own peoples (Milton 1990; Nolzen 2002).23
Rubenstein and Roth pick up on this same phenomenon, pointing to a distinction 
made here between subhuman and ‘nonhuman’ other-groups, stating that this 
distinction was made to advance Nazism’s ideological and political aims (1987: 5). 
This approach, however, overlooks a deep-seated anti-Semitism prevalent throughout 
Europe for, in some areas, thousands of years. Events of Jewish hatred are rife 
throughout the ancient world. Even such thinkers as Horace, Caesar Augustus,
Cicero and St. Augustus openly decry the Jews for their various ‘crimes’ through the 
centuries (Feldman 1986: 17, 18 - 19; Abel 1975: Ch. 9; Littell 2000). Europe in the 
Middle Ages is pock-marked with instances of anti-Semitic myth, from blaming the 
Jews for the maliciousness of the Black Death to the popular belief that Jews killed 
and ate children, particularly at Passover, by mixing their blood into the unleavened 
bread (Coppa 2006: 17,20).
By the 19th century, politicised antisemitism stemmed primarily from the economic 
privation of the 1870s and 1880s and, later, an increase in Jewish population due to 
immigration after the Russian pogroms of the 1880s and 1890s (Rubenstein and Roth 
1987: 97). German antisemitism was led in part by extremists Ernst Herici and 
author Hermann Ahlwardt, who suggested that Jews had an all-powerful hold over 
German society and thus was to blame for the economic failures of the times.
Richard Evans credits Wilhelm Marr’s pamphlet, The Victory o f Jewdom over 
Germandom Viewedfrom a Non-confessional Standpoint, 1873, with the 
disassociation of Jewishness from religion; Marr insisted on separating the Jews as a 
racial minority, rather than as a religious minority. Using this mentality, some 
enclaves of German society, mostly lower-middle-class writers, began promoting 
total Jewish exclusion from German society and culture. Though visible, however,
More on this topic will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
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this viewpoint was hardly popular ideology. The SDP stood in resolute opposition to 
any such movements, regarding them as ‘backward and undemocratic’ (Evans 2004: 
29; see also 24 - 30).
Nonetheless, the nineteenth century set a terrible model for state sanctioned 
treatment of lesser peoples . Colonisation provided ample opportunities for the 
trampling of indigenous societies for the betterment of the colonising state (Moses 
2004: 49 - 50; Bloxham 2009a: 37). This phenomenon is hardly limited to Germany 
-  indeed, some of the greatest atrocities were committed by Belgium in the Congo, 
the United States in the Philippines and the United Kingdom in India. However, a 
precedent is set here for the treatment of ‘subhuman’ groups in order to produce a 
certain outcome for the betterment of the state; Germany, particularly after the Berlin 
Conference of 1884, was a vital part of those shifts in state policy, where 
nationalism, and the provisions it provides regarding the elements of racial hierarchy, 
became an invaluable metre against which to measure the worth of other-groups.
Moving into the twentieth century, the First World War, not only served as the cover 
for the Armenian genocide, but also provided a theatre of change regarding German 
policy and the Jews24. Throughout the nineteenth century, Germany refrained from 
initiating extreme anti-Jewish policies, such as pogroms, unlike many of their 
neighbours. However, the pro-German nationalism inspired by WWI led to a 
heightened level of antisemitic propaganda in which Jews were labelled as draft 
dodgers’ (Bajohr 2006: 185). After the implementation of the Weimar constitution 
in which Jews were granted full and equal citizenship rights, this restraint began to 
change and Jews began to face significant societal violence and discrimination, 
including exclusionary policies and sporadic burning of synagogues (Burleigh 2001. 
329; Bajohr 2006: 185; Borut 2000).
' For an interesting perspective on German policy towards Jews during WWI, see Fischer s 
Triff nach d er W eltm acht which credits many Nazi antisemitic decisions to.policies imP'e“ ™ 
uring the Weimar Republic. His claims that there is a direct continuance e ween e P 
re carried through his later works, particularly Bündnis der Elieten translated as From Katserretch to
h ird R e ic h  (1986) and H itler w ar kein Betriebsunjall (1992).
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Massive economic shifts, a result of both the Great Depression and the loss of WWI, 
are one of the key reasons behind this change in society’s acceptance of a trend 
toward an antisemitic political culture (Aly 1999, 2007; Benz and Dunlap 2006; 
Browning and Matthäus 2004; Burleigh 2001; Dawidowicz 1975; Evans 2004; 
Stachura 1978). This served to fuel belief in the Jewish conspiracy to bankrupt the 
German state. This sort of conspiracy-theorist thinking harks back to the mdieval 
stereotype of the Jewish money lender, gleaning money off the poor, and the 
association of Jews with Judas, the betrayer of Jesus, popularised during the Dreyfus 
scandal (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: Ch. 4; Chapman 1972). It was in this Zeitgeist 
that Hitler and the NSDAP began their ascent to power and allowed the antisemitism 
of the Nazi elite to flourish.
Now is perhaps the moment to discuss another key aspect of the Holocaust and 
Germany's relationship to the Jewish anti-nation. More than in either of my other 
two cases, the biological connotations of race are vital to understanding Nazi 
ideology. In fact, the biological language of NSDAP propaganda went a long way in 
making a case for the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust, popularized in the 1960’s and 
1970’s by scholars such as Nolte (1969) and Winkler (1978). Similar to the Turkish 
case, ideas of Social Darwinism provided the foundation for much of Nazi ideology 
and policy. However, the manifestation of the biological aspect of Social Darwinism 
had grown and radicalised since the First World War and the fall of the Weimar 
Republic. As mentioned above, racism was a predominant feature of colonialism 
from most Western states; however, the manifestation of the biological language of 
racism to such a great extent is unusual, both for the time and also in comparison to 
other cases of genocide. For instance, examples exist in the Turkish and Serbian 
cases in which ideological leaders have intimated that members of the anti-nation 
were less than human (Glenny 1996: 57). However, this type of biological language, 
while present, was rarely used in popular dialogue; instead the focus tends to be on 
the ‘infidel’ or ‘traitor’ rather than on the ‘cancerous microbe or the pungent 
mucus’ found in the German case; it is important to bear in mind that this is both a 
reflection of and reflected by the Germans’ dedication to the growing interest in
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science and scientific breakthroughs occuring throughout the West during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. As we will see more specifically in the next 
chapter, for the Nazis, the biological focus on the detriment of the Jewish other group 
on the German nation is clear and present throughout their rise to power and the 
course of their regime.
Thus, we see the prime ideological elements of the anti-nation projected onto the 
Jews. Though there were no homeland claims made by the Jews on German 
territory, there was a distinct religious separation at the heart of a history of European 
antisemitism. The Jews were indeed a transnational group, with a history of 
persecution without political retribution in many European states, including Germany 
itself under the Weimar Republic and beyond. This resulted in the lethal 
combination of the collapse of empire with an increased Jewish population due 
predominantly to Russian pogroms of the late 1800s, a sense of national shame and a 
perceived financial imbalance between Jew and German.
The Balkans
When looking at this as an example of ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes, we 
see that of all the three cases, the Balkan case seems to have the least variance 
between non-Serb other-groups, particularly as the conflict progresses through the 
1990s into the twenty-first century. Jacques Semelin notes that ‘new [Serb] power 
fed itself on aggressiveness: the destruction ofwhatever was not Serb’ (2003: 361) 
and points to the utopian notion of ‘Greater Serbia’ predominant in Serbian ideology 
until the mid-nineties. Nonetheless, analysing the shifting relationship between 
Serbs and non-Serb other-groups, and particularly the complex links between 
Kosovar and Bosniak, is enlightening when considering the way in which a particular 
other-group is singled out in a more radical way that all others. This also diiectly 
relates to the variation of the path of ideological radicalisation within the case and 
particularly how the agency of ideology is restricted and constrained by structuie 
ideology establishes.
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It is helpful to remember that though Yugoslavia is dealing with internal collapse, as 
are the other two cases, the geographical boundaries and homeland claims are 
smaller than in either Germany or Turkey, a trait typical of cases of ethnic cleansing
25and paitial genocide . Instead of homeland claims leading to or justifying external 
wars of aggression, Yugoslavia in the early 1990s is a case of disputed borders and 
mixed nationalities within these contested areas; though this creates a number of 
complexities and differences when compared to the other two cases, a limited 
geographical space inherently limits the number of other-groups present. The 
primary groups of the region during the conflict are Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Serbs, 
Bosnian Croats, Kosovars, Croatian Serbs, Kosovar Serbs and Bosniaks.
Both Serbs and Croats make nationalist claims that go back as far as the seventh and 
sixth centuries, when Slavonic speakers moved into the Balkan region. Croatian 
tribes moved south, down the coast and soon found themselves subject to the Roman 
Catholic Church, while Serbs and Slavs remained in the north and were under 
pressure from the Orthodox communities popular in that region. This provides the 
basis for the popular understanding that these two communities are of the same 
blood, but are of different religions, thus opening up the possibility of becoming, 
through changes in language and religion, Croat or Serb.
Perhaps surprisingly, the same claim was sometimes made about Muslims in the 
region as well. The Ottoman Empire invaded the Balkan peninsula in 1459, 
conquered Bosnia in 1463 and Herzegovina in 1483; Turkish invasion signaled the 
end of independent rule in the entire region until the early nineteenth century (Judah 
1997: 17) and was a time where the Christian heritage of Yugoslavians came under 
threat. Nonetheless, until the time of the Balkan wars only two main people gioups 
converted en mass, the Albanians and the Bosnians. Malcolm is quick to emphasise 
that this was hardly the first encounter Yugoslavia would have had with Islam, due to 
its key geography on the Dalmatian coast (1996: 51). However, it is frivolous to
"5 This will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Eight.
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overlook the importance of this early ‘colonisation’ and conversion. It is perhaps the 
‘most distinctive and important feature of modem Bosnian history’ (ibid). Turkish 
rule saw the implementation of the millet system explained earlier, harvest and 
livestock taxation, all of which became gradually more exploitative as the Ottoman 
Empire declined in power through the early twentieth century (Lampe 1996: 19- 21; 
Fine 2002: 7).
As in Turkey and Germany, the mid-nineteenth century was a critical time for the 
Balkan region and the establishment of national identities beyond allegiance to a 
state or religious leader. It was during this time that Ilija Garasanin (1812-1874) first 
articulated a Serb national identity and began circulating in secret his Nacertanije, or 
draft plan, for South Slav unity under Serb leadership (Judah 1997: 56; Drapac 2010: 
Ch. 1). By 1905 and the founding of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition it seemed that 
the fulfilment of this dream was within reach, particularly after winning the Croatia- 
Slovenian elections of 1906. Central to its platform is the idea of national unity, a 
precursor to Yugoslavism (Judah 1997: 93).
These national alliances, however, were for the most part utterly destroyed during 
WWII. Malcolm describes the state of Yugoslavia in the Second World War aptly as 
‘the story of many wars piled one on top of another’ (Malcolm 1996: 174). The 
initial conflict was the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy; then was the 
resulting annexation of Yugoslavia followed by its resulting action in the war against 
the Allied forces and the continued aggression of Axis power holders against 
Yugoslav resistance fighters. Most pertinent to this analysis, and this chapter on the 
anti-nation in particular is the aggression of the Croatian Ustasha against the Serbian 
population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, in which over 1 million deaths 
occurred (Carmichael 2010: 7)26. This aggression and the tragedies occuring during 
this time period were, as we shall see in Chapters Six and Seven, crucial in stirring
26 For more information on the role o f Yugoslavia in WWII, see Chapter Two, Four Schopflin (1993), 
Mann (2005: 294 - 298), Malcolm (1996: Ch. 13; 1998: Ch. 15), Glenny (1999: Ch. 7) and Lampe 
(1996: Ch. 7).
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up mistrust and animosity within Serbian propaganda. During this time period we 
see a reinforced system of ethnic aggression, primarily between the Ustasha and the 
Serbs, though there were substantial killings of Jews and Gypsies as well, through 
mistreatment, executions and internment (Drapac 2010: Ch 4).
Tito attempted to recreate Yugoslavia by removing the animosity left in the wake of 
WWII; ideology at the time attempted to smooth over national differences by 
focusing instead on a multinational Yugoslavism governed by socialist democracy 
based on ‘the cornerstone’ of self-management (Tito 1978 in Jovic 2009: 73). The 
expressed hope was that nationalist tendencies would eventually fade from memory; 
however, as happens so often, these restrained national freedoms led to heightened 
tensions because Communist Yugoslavia instituted policies of regional and national 
decentralisation which reified national identities in a different peace-time frame, 
resulting in an early but key contradiction present in Tito’s government (Malesevic 
2006: 211; Oberschall 2007: 100) A result of these tensions is the acknowledgement 
of ‘Muslim’ as a national identity in 1971 with hopes that doing so would lessen 
tensions between Croat and Serb identities. Less a religious movement, leaders such 
as Izetbegovic were keen to see a more secular involvement of Muslims into the 
political scope of the Yugoslav government. Nonetheless, there was also a revival of 
Islamic dedication to the faith which no doubt bolstered the secular political 
movement by legitimising the augmentation of power (Malcolm 1996: 200 - 201; 
Carmichael 2010: 1); official ideology of the time asserted that Muslims expressed 
their identity through ‘the creation of a synthesis of spiritual traditions and new 
spiritual, literary, political and cultural features’ (in Pavkovic 2000: 94 - 95). Tito s 
government had the tricky job of holding together various national groups, some with 
ever radicalising individuals at their heads. Many nationalist movements were dealt 
with by exiling nationalist radicals, or, as with Tudjman, they were sentenced to 
prison (Silber and Little 1997: 29). Part of this radicalisation came as a consequence 
of the exertion of political power by Muslims under Tito, both Bosnian and Kosovar, 
and the rewriting of the Yugoslav Constitution in 1974, though the primary national 
identity at the time was still that of pan-Yugoslavism.
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Nonetheless, throughout the sixties and seventies, the differences in national 
orientation begin to become more entrenched. Not only was a Muslim identity given 
national political status, but rifts between Serbs and Croats began to deepen as well. 
The first strong blow to strike against pan-Yugoslavism occurred in 1967 when Croat 
intellectuals declared that the Croatian language and alphabet were entirely separate 
from Serbian. This in turn, led to Serbian insistence that schools in Croatia teach 
Serbian children in Serbian and that they use the Cyrillic alphabet rather than the 
Latin alphabet used in Croatian (Lampe 1996: 305; Judah 1997: 145). This is a 
critical shift in a community where language, rather than race, is a key element to 
national identity (Banac 1994: 144; Pavkovic 1994: 444). Many Serbs professed fear 
over any growth in power for non-Serbs due to the Croatian Ustasha violence in 
WWII. This fear and the legacy of ethnic conflict established during WWI1 was to 
become a key element of ideology in the break-up of Yugoslavia as will be discussed 
further in Chapter Seven. In short, we see that Malesevic is right; the fear of 
humiliation and status degradation plays a significant role in accounting for popular 
support of rising Serb nationalism (Malesevic 2006: 182)
Changes implemented in the 1974 Constitution helped further this sort of fear for 
Serbs, particularly as Serb dominion over the region was distinctly lessened (Banac 
1994: 148 - 149). Previous federal constitutions had not granted Kosovo or 
Vojvodina, the two autonomous provinces in the region, legal status. They were 
instead granted legal status only by the republic in which they resided -  Serbia; this 
changed under the 1974 Constitution. Similarly, the other five regions of Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted equal 
rights to Serbia under federal Yugoslav law. At the time, this sort of political 
balance provided stability amidst political change and economic boom (Ramet 2001. 
5). Indeed, the late seventies did see a lessening of nationalist discourse, however, 
Tito’s death in 1980 provided a political vacuum which once again reignited 
nationalist claims and ideological themes of entrenched otherness.
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Here is where we begin to see a disassociation of the ‘Muslim’ identity. Again, 
based in the 1974 Constitution, any of the six republics could legally withdraw from 
the Yugoslav confederation, the two provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo could not 
do so. Thus, the idea of the enemy within’ expressed so obviously in both of my 
other cases shifts in Yugoslavia depending on the immediate threat to Serbs in the 
greater Yugoslav arena and on the changing political aims of those in power; we will 
see this in more detail in Chapters Six and Seven. The first enemy of the nation 
expressed in national Serbian ideology is not merely Muslims, but Kosovars.
Through the eighties we see heightened anti-Kosovar rhetoric and propaganda 
specifically focused on the cultural and ethnic differences established in a Muslim 
community.
Also of interest during this time period is the shift away from the idea of 
‘brotherhood and unity’ towards an ideology o f‘togetherness’; where ‘brotherhood 
and unity’ represented a Yugoslav identity, ‘togetherness’ implied a state of ‘separate 
but equal’ existing among the different national groups. As Pavkovic remarks, 
during this time of ‘togetherness,’ ‘ all citizens were assumed to belong to a 
recognised nation or nationality of their birth (or were of mixed nationality) but no 
one could legally be a Yugoslav, as this was not a recognised national group’ (2003: 
253).
However, fears of loss of political control through the independence movement 
changed this ideological focus from Kosovo, an autonomous region intrinsically tied 
to Serbia through the 1974 Constitution and strong historical claims, to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, a province with supposedly equal rights and the ability to legally opt 
out of the confederation. Bosnia at the time held a Bosniak majority, but a very 
strong Serbian minority of 42% (Carmichael 2010: 7). This independence movement 
changed not only geographic homeland claims, but also refocused the idea of the 
national enemy from Kosovar to Muslim, and, at the time, specifically to Bosniak. In 
short, the build-up to Croatian secession and Germany’s acceptance and support ot 
Croatian independence provided Milosevic and other Serbian ideologues a rationale
160
Chapter Five: Re-evaluating otherness
to use Kosovo as justification to legitimise attacks on the Bosniak anti-nation 
(Malcolm 1998: 349 - 351; Glenny 1996: Ch 3), linking the two groups together 
through religion while separating them ethnically27. Thus, again we see an 
ideologically constructed structure constraining the way ideology acts as agency 
through this shifting relationship. In order to fulfill the pre-established structure, 
ideologically shifts had to be legitimised in manner connecting one enemy to 
another.
From both a policy and an ideological standpoint, the Serbian elite’s initiative for a 
pure homeland under the auspices of Greater Serbia sets them apart from the other- 
groups, not only as aggressors, but as a radicalising body focused on ethnically-led 
atrocities regardless of actual national threat. As Malesevic suggests,
because the communist regime had not allowed subtle discussion on the 
Second World War massacres and genocide committed by the Ustasha 
regime against the Serbian population in the Nazi-sponsored Independent 
State of Croatia, nor the crimes committed by the Serbian Chetnik para­
militaries against Bosnian Muslim and Croatian civilians, this space was 
also open for the new elites.. .With the help of ethnosymbolism, new 
enemies replaced old ones. Instead of the ‘capitalists’, ‘fascists’ and 
‘Western imperialists’, the new sources of fear because the revamped 
Ustashas/Croats, Chetniks/Serbs and Islamic Fundamentalists/Bosnian 
Muslims
(Malesevic 2006: 181)
By the early nineties, Serb ideologues began to insist that the only way to achieve 
complete Serb autonomy in conclaves where Serbs were in a majority was to 
implement policies of deportation, banishment and liquidation ot the non-Serbs 
present; no more than 2% of the population could be non-Serb (Radoslav Brdjanin in 
IT-99-36-1 1999). Thus, as we will visit further in the next chapter, the ideological 
focus is divided: firstly, there is the impetus to cleanse all of greater Serbia from non-
This ideological equation o f Bosniak to Kosovar also completely overlooks the fact that Islam 
ryed a relatively minor role in the politicalisation of Kosovo, even if it did produce a more unifying 
:tor in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Malcolm 1998: 351)
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Serbs; secondly, there is the drive to eliminate all Muslims from particular 
geographical conclaves.
It is important to take note that in this case in particular, atrocities were committed 
by each group, including the Bosniaks, to some level. There are cases of Croats 
acting without remorse, killing both Serbs and Bosniaks just as there are cases of 
Serbs massacring both Croats and Bosniaks. There is also the most unusual and oft 
overlooked Muslim uprising in the Bihac pocket from 1993 to early 1995, provoking 
the exodus of approximately 20,000 Muslim refugees fleeing from members of their 
own ethnic group sent from Sarajevo to quell a threat to their own power (Glenny 
1996: 288; Judah 1997: 244 - 245). In fact, most UNPROFOR (United Nations 
Protection Force [in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina]) troops killed between 1991 
and 1995 were killed by Muslims, a fact often overlooked in Yugoslav scholarship 
(Bethlehem and Weller 1997: 598 - 599). Another illuminating point is that the 
charges of genocide against Karadzic, Mladic, Tolimir, Persic, Milosevic and others 
are only fo r  crimes against Muslims', different charges, namely those of persecution, 
murder, and extermination, are used to legally prosecute the persecutors of the 
remaining other-groups. It is, in short, a matter of an organised force whose 
command structure is statist (IT-02-04-19 2002). It is the Serbs within Bosnia- 
Herzegovina who are charged with committing the worst crimes against Bosniaks 
(IT-95-5/18 2008a; IT-95-18 1995; IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-95-5/18 2008b). Serb and 
Bosnian-Serb ideology itself also provides substantial support for the identification 
of the Bosniaks as the anti-nation as will be discussed in the following chapter.
Thus, as the Bosniaks are a substantially large ethnic group, identified by the nation, 
they are then comparable to Jews and Armenians — victims of total genocide — 
though the identification of their ‘otherness’ has come about in a more complex and 
perhaps more modem way; these differences might help us understand why total 
genocide did not occur in the Yugoslav case. As Bringa reminds her readers, the 
religious aspect of the Bosniak identity was, though greatly emphasised by the press 
and the greater Muslim community, largely created by Serb and Croat propaganda
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(Bringa 1995. 25). In truth, regional and national party leaderships were forced, over 
the years, to institutionalise cultural and ethnic difference in order to secure 
legitimation for state control. On a national level, ‘once this political door was 
prised open there was no turning back’ (Malesevic 2006: 180). Critically, it is the 
Bosniak’s homeland claims that lead them to this position; the breakup of 
Yugoslavia is not a war fought over national existence, but over the mismatch of 
claims to historical homelands and modem national borders.
Analysis
Broadly, there are five characteristics of the anti-nation found in the cases I use in the 
course of this project; the level and extent to which these characteristics are present 
do vary from case to case, something that I would equally expect in other cases of 
genocide, particularly in cases of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial genocides, 
regional genocides or partial genocides. For instance, as regards 1) homeland claims, 
some scholars suggest that in Turkey and in Yugoslavia, it was claims of land that 
separated the anti-nation from the nation and put these particular other-groups at 
maximum risk as they were claiming Anatolia and Bosnia, respectively, for their 
own when these lands were also being claimed by the nation as critical to national 
progression (Melson 1996: 166). However, as analysis of the Holocaust shows us, 
this is not a necessity for a victim group; the Jews were not generally portrayed as 
seeking to annex parts of the Vaterland for their own particular national goals in the 
same way that the Armenians were believed to do and the Bosniaks actually did do. 
Thus, it is important to remember that, while contestable homeland claims can be 
points of contention between nation and anti-nation, fear of a loss of homeland need 
not be at the forefront of ideology in radicalising states.
Similarly, the use of 2) religion in genocidal states, both on an institutional and 
symbolic level, has been addressed at great length and with good reason (Dietrich
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1994; Fox 2004a, 2004b; Frisch and Sandler 2004; Kershaw 2002; Gagnon 1995:
141; Peterson J. B. 2002: 455; Banac 1994: 161; Streng 1974: 57). Nation formation 
is the way in which ethnic elites ‘select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new 
value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to 
defend its interests, and to compete with other groups’ (Brass in Robinson 1994:
218). Religion inherently helps elites accomplish this by being a primary provider of 
myths and symbols for genocidal states. Religion streamlines customs, provides the 
structure for a belief in common descent and unifies historical perceptions, thereby 
becoming one of the primary culture bearers -  even in seemingly secular states. 
Perceived religious marginalisation offers elites a foundation to build upon the fear 
of the nation against the anti-nation. Accordingly, radicalising states use religion not 
only to gather support for their political agenda, but also as a way to set in opposition 
nation and anti-nation.
Nonetheless, the way in which this is accomplished varies in each of my three cases. 
Religion for the Southern Slavs was always a force of identification and, as we will 
see in Chapter Six, became even more important in the establishment of both the 
Serbian nation and  the Muslim anti-nation. The role of the Roman Catholic and 
Orthodox church was vital on an institutional level and also for the symbolic, historic 
ties they offered to their respective audience, thus legitimising relations between 
other-groups (Levine 1986: 431; Sells 1998). In the Turkish case, we see that the 
CUP was secular in the earliest days of their rule, but as ideology radicalised there is 
a distinct turn towards Islam to provide further legitimacy for the institution ot 
extremist policies and to provide a further element of structure for the ideology itself. 
Thus, though the nation and anti-nation are generally associated with different 
religious groups, that association had to be cultivated by national elites over the 
course of the conflict, as will be seen further in the next chapter. The German case is 
perhaps the most complex in its relationship with religion. Fiom a policy 
perspective, the enmity between the Nazi state and both the Lutheian and, more 
emphatically, the Catholic church grew over the course of Nazi reign
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Religion can also be one of the factors influencing the 3) alliances of the anti-nation 
with surrounding states. The anti-nation is often allied, either realistically or 
fictionally, with other national enemies; when these enemies are perceived as directly 
threatening the nation, particularly during times of war, the threat of the ‘enemy 
within’ is exponentially increased. This serves to be particularly true regarding the 
Armenians in Turkey and their perceived alliance with Russia. Nonetheless, illusory 
political and ethnical alliances can be of equal weight regarding the importance of 
alliances in distinguishing the anti-nation from the remaining other-groups; for 
example, the perceived association between Jews and Bolsheviks was critical for the 
radicalisation of anti-Jewish policy (Kallis 2008: Ch. 3).
To say that the anti-nation 4) usually includes individuals from a range o f economic 
and social backgrounds is merely to imply that the anti-nation is not restricted to a 
class or political group. Unlike cases of politicide, classicide and gendercide (Mann 
2001: 210; Jones 2004) where the victims are members of one particular political, 
class or gender group, the anti-nation usually has victims from a large range and 
variety of groups -  the one exception, as discussed above, usually being religion.
Lastly, in each of my three cases, there is a strong perception of 5) historical 
animosity between the nation and anti-nation; to what extent this perception is true 
rather than another ideologically constructed myth will vary. For instance, there is a 
long-standing history of anti-Semitism throughout Europe predating the medieval 
period and continued through the Russian pogroms of the late 19 century, the Nazis 
were able to build on this animosity to further assure the Gennan public of the 
‘rightness’ of Nazi policy regarding the Jews. This can be contrasted with the moie 
constructed history of violence between Muslims and Serbs in Yugoslavia where the 
two groups had lived in relative peace since Ottoman rule . Nonetheless, the 
perception of historical violence allowed national elites to drive a further wedge
28 For more information on the history of anti-Semitism in early Europe see Abel (1975), 
(1986) and Coppa (2006); For more information on the history of Yugoslavia see p ( 
Judah (1997; 2000) and Malcolm (1996; 1998).
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between the nation and this particular other-group, further singling out the anti­
nation from the remaining other-groups.
Conclusion
This first chapter on the anti-nation has set out to introduce the idea of the anti-nation 
to the dialogue of genocide studies and to emphasise the difference between the anti­
nation and mere otherness. Each of my cases suggests that the identification of 
other-groups is not enough to fulfill the ideological goals of the nation. Even in 
cases where an enemy is not historically identified, such as in Yugoslavia, one is 
likely to appear in order to achieve legitimacy for other national goals (Staub 1989:
17). Robert Lifton argues that in situations of extreme trauma, regimes promising 
revitalization and renewal of the nation culminate in genocidal ideologies bent on 
destroying a ‘designated victim’ who appears to threaten the nation (in McCormack 
2003: 282). In societies where ethnicity is foundational to nationality, ethnicity is 
also used to justify the identification of this designated victim. Often, these are cases 
where ethnic labels are transformed to serve new frameworks of identity, returning to 
their ‘ethnic past’ in order to fulfill the quest for authenticity (Appadurai 2002 
[1998]: 287; Smith 1998: 194).
While the nation is regarded as the pinnacle of the ethnic and racial order, the anti­
nation is portrayed as a malevolent disease, infecting the Volk, particularly in cases 
with a tangible racial order, such as the Holocaust and, to a lesser extent, the 
Armenian genocide. For example, a letter published in the Armenian press at the 
start of the first world war expresses this policy with distressing clarity, reading that 
the “Turkish sword to date has cut down millions of gâvurs [infidels], nor has it lost 
its intention to cut down millions more hereafter. Know this: that the Turks have 
committed themselves, and have vowed to subdue and to clean up the Aimenian 
gâvurs who have become tubercular microbes for us (Balakian 2003. 173).
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In this chapter, we have seen that ideology serves to provide a structure in which 
anti-nation identities develop. As that structure is forced to shift due to varying geo­
political changes, ideology as agency is constrained though at varying levels between 
cases. If it is true that there is a variance in the level of otherness present in 
radicalising states, then further analysis is necessary into how the idea of the anti­
nation affects the cumulative radicalisation process of ideology. The next chapter 
leaves this discussion on otherness and focuses instead on what role the anti-nation 
plays in radicalisation, determining the ways in which it remains static and how 
increasingly extreme policies bring about increasingly extreme ideological change.
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The anti-nation: ideological development
Introduction
The previous chapter introduced and defined the concept of the anti-nation; next, in 
order to explore the validity of the concept, I propose to explore the presence of the 
anti-nation in radicalising ideologies by focusing on two questions; 1) Are there any 
recurring themes or patterns in ideology as it relates to the anti-nation? and 2) What 
are the key elements of the relationship between anti-nation ideology and policy? In 
short, referring back to the discussion in Chapter Two regarding structure and 
agency, my goal here is to further discover the ways in which the structure of 
radicalising ideology reflects, projects, absorbs and disseminates patterns and themes 
relating to the anti-nation; equally, I am interested in addressing the ways in which 
the agency of state elites both effects and is effected by structural shifts that pertain 
to the anti-nation.
The purpose of this second anti-nation chapter is to discover the main themes 
regarding the anti-nation in each time period of each of my three case studies. I am 
seeking to ascertain whether or not ideology is a vehicle for dehumanisation and if 
my cases demonstrate the ideological objectification of the anti-nation as a threat 
whose elimination will allow the nation to flourish. This analysis becomes even 
more critical when viewed in light of radicalising policies and events in each case.
Building on the last chapter that established the anti-nation as different from various 
other-groups central to the regions involved, I move on to each of my three cases, 
using time periods demarcated by key developments in the ideological dynamisation 
process set out in Chapters Two and Four. The analysis section focuses on the key 
themes arising in each case in comparative perspective, discussing the similarities 
and differences thematically in light of geopolitical change before drawing out key 
conclusions in my final section.
Chapter Six: Ideological development o f the anti-nation
Turkey
‘How will these weak people undertake this three-month long trip through rain und 
heat, without money, without a guide, without wagons? Are we to go without a word? 
In Europe, we are nothing. Food o f the Volk disbursed’
(Joseph Melchisedekian, Bishop of the Catholic Armenians in R14088/Ab.28584 14.06.1915) 
Armenians under the late Ottoman State
As mentioned in Chapter Five, under the Ottoman Empire, the acceptance of 
Christian peoples in a Muslim state was considered routine, provided the non- 
Muslims were fully cognisant of their unequal status. Classified as gdvur (infidel) 
and rajah (cattle), Armenians were not allowed to own weapons, were legally 
required to allow Turks and Kurds house and quarter for as long as necessary, for 
themselves and for any livestock; Armenians were also expected to be deferential in 
public, pay higher taxes than Turks or Kurds and have no legal standing under the 
law when their case was put against a Muslim (Bryce, Toynbee, and Sarafian 2000: 
617; Astourian 1990: 117 - 120). Nonetheless, the Ottomans, with policies of taking 
Armenian women as wives or otherwise into their households, had engineered a 
system through which Armenians could be Ottomanised, particularly if taught to be 
so at an early age. ‘Boy collection’, or the abduction of Armenian boys by Ottoman 
officials became ever more popular throughout the Empire. Young children would 
be taken from their families, forced to convert to Islam, reared in Ottoman 
households and put to work in the Ottoman military or civil service. Massacres, 
particularly in the mid and late 1890s, were used to force the Armenians into 
continued submission, regardless of European pressure to institute reforms promised 
in the Berlin Treaty, repealing many of these policies (Isyar2005. 354, Akqam 2006. 
47; Balakian 2003: ch. 4; Bloxham 2005: ch. 1). Thus, a practise of what Table 3.1 
classifies as partial violent repression was carried out through the eaily twentieth 
century.
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Even the abjection of the Armenians was a reason for further spite: ‘Armenians are a 
degenerate community.. .always servile,’ cast Abdul Hamid II in 1896. Around this 
time period he also began claiming that Armenians were wealthier and better 
educated than theii Turkish compatriots, note that, as we will see in the German case, 
this perception of wealth does not diminish perceptions of inequality, but rather 
enhances it. In this case, education and wealth were claimed to have been obtained 
at the expense of the Turkish nation, else such a ‘degenerate community’ would not 
be able to rise to such an elevated lifestyle (Akpam 2006: 43; Melson 1996: 159). 
Both Christians and Armenians were seen as having a stronger hold over land and 
goods than the Turks and Kurds, the Turks because of national conscription into the 
army and the Kurds because they were typically nomadic. Note again that these 
claims portrayed the Armenians as having secured wealth in a time when the 
Ottoman state was in economic disrepair, particularly when compared against the 
growing European market; in 1913, real wages of workers in London were 2.7 times 
higher than workers in Istanbul (Ozmucur and Pamuk 2002: 312 - 313). This 
suggests that these early characterisations of a thriving Armenian community later 
provided the CUP with an excuse to institute anti-scapegoat policies, regardless of 
the ‘real’ state of the Armenians who were suffering the same economic limitations 
as their Muslim neighbours.
Economic instability throughout the Ottoman Empire and claims of Armenian wealth 
made anti-Armenian antagonism easier to foster. This was helped by Armenian 
uprisings in the late nineteenth century in certain geographical enclaves. Most of 
these uprisings were bids for regional security against marauding bands ot Kurds and 
Circassians, easily quelled by Ottoman forces; these skirmishes, however, often 
resulted in Armenian massacres29 during which the Armenians were criticised tor 
acting in their own defence, calling such actions bids for complete self-rule. This 
idea was consistently supported by Tanin, the first Turkish newspaper mn under the
' For an in depth look at the massacres from 1894 -  1896 see Melson (1982), Kirakossian (2004; 
007) and Lewy (2005).
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CUP, claiming that Armenians had one goal, to destroy the country. At their first 
organised public action held in Istanbul in 1895, the CUP flew flyers reading 
Muslims and our most beloved Turkish compatriots! The Armenians have become 
so bold as to assault the Sublime Porte, which is our country’s greatest place and 
which is respected and recognised by all Europeans’ (in Ak9am 2006: 27, 33, 50, 60 
-61). Through these uprisings, the anti-nation is portrayed as being directly 
aggressive and malevolent in its action towards the nation.
Thus, even before the CUP had taken power the groundwork for genocide had 
already been established in the faltering Ottoman Empire. Already present was the 
portrayal of the Armenians as a degenerate and faulted peoples, hoarding their ill- 
gotten wealth from their Ottoman betters. Incensed by a loss of territory throughout 
the nineteenth century, Turks mistrusted Armenians and feared they would make a 
bid for their own independence. This would in turn reduce Ottoman power and 
sovereignty on the international stage as well as damage the ideals of Ottomanism 
prominent at the time.
1 9 0 8 -1 9 1 2
As described in Chapter Three, the CUP took control of the government in July 
1908. This resulted in some significant changes in both policy and ideology in the 
Ottoman Empire. As mentioned earlier, the CUP had come to power through the 
support of other non-Turkish groups, including the main Armenian political party, 
the Armenian Dashnak Revolutionary Federation. The key issue at hand was to 
restrain the power of the Sultan, ensure the reinstitution of the Parliament which had 
been disbanded after the Treaty of Berlin and to enforce the Constitution, this 
included measures of equality and the extension of civil rights and liberties to groups 
such as Jews, the Orthodox and the Armenians. Some of these measutes were acted 
upon, as will be discussed in this section, but as the nationalism fostered by the 
Social Darwinist machinations of the CUP began to expand, most of the promised 
reforms and liberalisations for other-groups faltered and floundered.
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Shortly after the Young Turks’ ascension to power, Bulgaria declared independence 
from the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
further weakening the Empire and strengthening the Turkish desire to strengthen 
their own borders and sovereignty. Due to the common association of Armenians 
being in league with the Christian European community, these independence 
movements resulted in the expression of stronger nationalistic aims, finally 
provoking a counterrevolution on 12 April 1909, supported by the Mohammedan 
Union and various Islamic seminary students, calling for the implementation of 
Islamic law (Balakian 2003: 145 - 149; Akpam 2006: 61 - 64). The counterrevolution 
was quelled a mere eleven days later and relative peace ensued. However, the 
counterrevolution was to have ramifications felt throughout the empire; one of these 
is in the massacre at Adana in April 1909.
A result of developments at national and local levels and miscommunications from 
Istanbul, the massacre in Adana stands as the first massacre where the rationale for 
killing is revenge. In this case, when news of a counterrevolution reached Adana, 
Islamic religious authorities led the massacre to gain revenge for the rights given to 
Christians under the 1908 Constitution. These rights, it was argued, led to the 
deterioration of Turkish rights as they were Muslims, a trait inherently tied to their 
ethnicity by this point in the eyes of the CUP. Based on the understanding that 
Armenians had a higher standard of life than Turks, the massacre gave the 
perpetrators an opportunity to act on their jealousy and ‘taking revenge’ for these 
‘crimes’ during a time of immense uncertainty and change in a border region of the 
Turkish homeland. The claim of Armenian provocation was not used until after the 
first round of the massacre had taken place when the CUP sent their troops in to 
‘quell’ the killing -  resulting in the deaths of some 15-20,000 Armenians (Balakian 
2003: ch. 12; see also Akpam 2006: 69).
What we see here is direct interaction between ideology and events. In this case, the 
CUP sacrificed an ideological platfonn of Constitutional reform and minority rights 
on the altar of an organic nationalist movement sparked by a loss of territory. Here,
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events have directly influenced the way ideology has radicalised. The massacre of 
Adana occurred in the wake of Bulgarian independence and Austrian annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, Young Turk nationalists 
feared a further loss of empire in Anatolia, where the Armenians might secede and 
create an independent state if the rights allocated Christians in the 1908 Constitution 
were granted (Staub 1989: 182).
The majority of Anatolia’s wealth was in the hands of the Armenians; nor was it 
limited to Armenian regions. Most of Istanbul’s international commerce was 
completed by Christians (Mann 2005: 115, 123 - 124, 127). This situation led to the 
popular perception that Armenians were rich with wealth made from Turkish labour, 
giving Armenians the power and the (unearned) ability to become independent. The 
CUP then began crafting an economic plan ‘freeing’ the Armenians from their 
wealth, which would in turn ‘liberate the Turkish nation’; reform was based around 
state spending and taxation (Astourian 1990: 127; Ahmad 1969: 118 - 122) and 
would further inhibit the Armenians from seeking independence. Thus, we see the 
early steps of the ideological dehumanisation process arising out of a fear for 
economic collapse.
As a consequence of this fear and the need for further legitimacy, the CUP tightened 
its reign on the Armenians, suppressing all hopes of equality. In 1909, a consequence 
of the counterrevolution, a series of laws were passed, ‘The Law of Associations’, 
the ‘Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition’, and the ‘Law on the 
Conscription of non-Muslims’. These laws restricted the formation of political 
associations using nationality or ethnicity, formed special units ensuring the 
disarmament of Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians and ensured Christians were 
drafted into the army; as they were generally disarmed (‘Law for the Prevention of 
Brigandage and Sedition’) most Armenian men were used for hard labour (Ahmad 
1969: 23, 62; Isyar 2005: 346 - 347). These laws are critical steps in the relationship 
between ideology and policy as these legal restrictions of rights and freedoms were 
newly institutionalised reflections of radicalising anti-Armenian ideology. The
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institution of these legal changes is also one of the early anti-Armenian policy shifts 
effected under CUP leadership. While these laws are clearly a part of the 
radicalisation process of events, they also play a role in the radicalisation process of 
ideology: state elites radicalise propaganda which encourages policy changes; in 
order to add legitimacy to the policy changes, these new laws ensue. The resulting 
legalisation of anti-Armenian policy legitimises the ideological structure.
The introduction of these sorts of policies and increased violence against Armenians 
is a reflection of an ideological change occurring within the CUP. This change had 
to do with a move away from Ottomanism to the more Social Darwinist-driven 
Turkism. Historian Yusuf Akcura asks the key question of the time: Within the 
broad expanses of the Ottoman realm, there are two civilisations, two ways of 
looking at life and the world, two very different philosophies colliding. Is their 
coexistence at all possible?’ (in Akgam 2006: 71 - 72). Within Ottomanism, there 
were institutionalised ways to ‘become’ Turkish, but with Turkism, those policies 
were dismissed. Ethnicity can not be changed (Isyar 2005: 354). Though the 
Armenians pleaded with European powers to force the Turkish hand, by 1912 any 
shared mandate between the Young Turks and Armenians had disintegrated 
(R14077/Ab.257 1913); all Armenian schools and societies were closed, anyone who 
had ‘worked against the Government at any time’ were to be arrested and sent out of 
Turkey proper and ‘into the provinces such as Baghdad or Mosul’ before being killed 
‘either on the road or there’ (in Balakian 2003: 189 - 190).
1 9 1 2 -1 9 1 4
After the loss of the Balkan wars, Arab influence in the CUP expanded (Ahmad 
1969: 135; Carmichael 2010: 1 - 2), helped by the CUP’s desire to distance 
themselves from the bitterness of defeat represented by a Christianised Europe.
While there were some practical elements to this shift, such as the use of Arabic in 
schools, the critical element is that it marks the shift from Ottomanism to Islamic 
Turkism:
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How could it be that Turkey, a Muslim state, ever had an aversion 
to Arabic, its religious language? Was it not realised that hostility 
to Arabic meant hostility to Islam? We love Arabic as the language 
of the Quran and of the Prophet. We love it because Muslim 
civilisation and Arabic are inseparable, and to turn away from 
Arabic is to turn away from thirteen hundred years of learning and 
civilisation. One thing is clear: Arabic is more widespread and has 
more vitality than any other Islamic language. In denying this 
claim a Turk.. .wipes out his own civilisation and his own 
past.. .The Ottoman Government has taken a step in the right 
direction, but this step must be followed by others. Greater 
attention must be paid to Arabic not only in Arab-speaking areas 
buy everywhere else. The Government should do this, not as the 
rule of a few million Arabs, but as a Muslim state.
(Babanzade Ismail Hakki in Tanin 21 April 1913 in Ahmad 1969:
136)
This Islamic focus seated itself nicely in the ideas of Pan-Turanism, mostly because 
both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism were expansionist ideologies, focused on 
ensuring the aggrandisement of the homeland (Ahmad 1969: 154). This brought 
about further emphasis on the idea that the anti-nation sought rebellion which would 
destroy the homeland necessary for the secure establishment of a Turkish state.
Thus, despite continual pleas that the Armenians wanted to remain under Turkish 
control and despite sustained, if mild, pressure from Europe to reform its Armenian 
policies (R14077/Ab.2888 8.02.1913; R 14077 1913), the entrance and subsequent 
loss of the Balkan wars only served to radicalise anti-Armenian ideology, 
particularly emphasising the need to separate the anti-nation from the nation in order 
to maintain national culture. This encouraged regiments, particularly Kurds who had 
stayed behind from the front, to continue Armenian persecutions (R14079/Ab. 12669 
25.06.1913). Whilst certain Western individuals did act in favour of the Armenians, 
the effect of European and American pressure on Turkey to reform sparked a battle 
over sovereignty. Europeans began to demand the implementation of certain rights 
granted under the Berlin Treaty and discussed again at the London Conference of 25 
April 1913. These included the installation of an European over-commissioner, who 
would report not to the Turks but directly to the European powers, local reforms
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dealing with justice and finances as well as reprimands for the compensation of 
robbed and looted land- and property-owners (R14078/Ab.9798 10.05.1913).
Naturally, reform was expressed in such a way as to restrict Turk sovereignty. Thus, 
claims that ‘no one has the right to combine the name of the Armenian race in the 
internal affairs of Turkey,’ became the rationale for continuous disregard for 
Armenian life (Nr.l939/B.223-225 1913). The Young Turks continued linking the 
Armenian anti-nation with these external enemies and began using the Armenian 
massacres as a way to assure sovereignty in their new state. The Armenians were 
blamed for the increase in international pressure, claiming that their ‘religious and 
ethnographic ties’ gave them the foundational elements to ‘build a enigmatic political 
propaganda in greater Asia’ based particularly off of a Russian alliance 
(R14078/Ab.4311 1913). Melson notes that some scholars, basing their evidence on 
these demands for Armenian self-administration and the pro-Russian sympathies of 
some political voices, conclude that the Ottoman decision to attack was a direct 
result of provocation (Melson 1982: 485; see also Lewis 1961; Shaw and Shaw 
1976).
In fact, official Turkish history claims that the deportations of Armenians beginning 
in late 1913 -  early 1914 were prompted by Armenians volunteering to fight with 
Russian gangs who had supposedly been staging uprisings around the country, thus 
sparking the claim that Armenians were outlaws and not ‘true Ottomans’ (Akçam 
2006: 140, 196). Thus, Armenians continued to be portrayed as a national threat, 
attempting at every turn to undermine CUP sovereignty and the establishment of a 
secure state which would, in the fulfilment of Turkish propaganda, usher in a new 
utopia.
In order to secure Turkey from the anti-nation, dehumanising measures were further 
being instituted against the Armenians. Numerous Armenian women were tattooed 
as proof of their Armenian status and were sent into slavery; members of the military 
and police force increased their incomes by selling Armenian women as slaves in
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markets across the Ottoman Empire (Derderian 2005: 11). In order to deal with ‘that 
pack of dog lice’ (demonstrator, 1912, in Dadrian 2004: 189), the Special 
Organisation (SO) was instructed to assault and massacre border villages, 
particularly in Anatolia; the systemic deportation of Armenians from ‘problem’ 
regions began, resulting in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands into the desert 
(Tachjian 2009: 65; Akçam 2006: 140, 147; Balakian 2003: 258).
Thus, as November 1914 approached and Russia began to move to declare war on 
the Young Turk state, the Armenians found themselves cast as enemies, siding with 
the Russians regardless of the fact that most Armenians declared they had no 
intention of doing so (R14077/Ab.l987 29.01.1913). Stories of Christian terrors 
against Muslims were brought down from the Balkans by Muslim refugees after the 
loss of the Balkan Wars. The only way to solve the ‘Armenian threat’ then was to 
‘remove them.. .and send them somewhere else’ (Enver Pasha in Alcçam 2006: 152). 
Through their lack of allegiance and allies, the anti-nation were portrayed as having 
brought their fate upon themselves (R14084/Ab.5647 15.03.1914; see also Mann 
2005: 114); thus, at the dawn of the First World War, the ideological foundations 
have radicalised to such an extent as to make the leap to genocide ideologically 
feasible.
1 9 1 4 -1 9 1 5
Though certain anti-Armenian policies had begun being institutionalised before the 
onset of WWI, the war provided greater legitimacy for further radicalisation of anti­
nation policy. The CUP leadership looked upon the war as an opportunity to rid 
itself of its internal enemies whilst eradicating international pressure: ‘the Porte 
[wants] to take advantage of the World War to thoroughly get rid of its internal 
enemies, the indigenous Christians, without being disturbed by foreign diplomatic 
intervention; that is also in the interest of the allies of Turkey, the Germans, because 
Turkey would in this way be strengthened’ (Talat Pasha in Astourian 1990: 116). 
Again, as we see in the section above, the intention here is to remove the anti-nation
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from the nation, using any and all means possible, but has not yet moved from an 
ideology of sustained persecution genocide to one of total genocide.
The move to total genocide, did drastically increase with the onset of WWI, partially 
due to the perceived alliance between Russia and Armenia. Just as in the Balkan 
Wars, proportional number of Armenians did fight alongside the Russians; most of 
these Armenians were Russian Armenians, but some Ottoman Armenians did 
participate in the war on the side of the Allied forces (New York Times 1915; 
Bloxham 2005: 73, 84 - 85; Astourian 1990: 133). This, even today, has become a 
rationalising factor for Turkish atrocities. However, the total number of Armenian 
volunteers was minimal, somewhere in the range of 4,000 -  8,000, a number dwarfed 
by over 200,000+ conscripts and volunteers present in the Turkish army (Mann 
2005: 136; Akgam 2006: 196). Regardless of the actual number of Armenians 
fighting on either side, the mere fact that any Armenians were fighting against the 
Turks provided a rationale to continue persecutions by linking the internal enemy of 
the anti-nation with the external enemy of the aggressor state and repeatedly 
expressing the key fear of Armenian insurrection and independence.
The war also hampered European pressure on Turkish reform; the Entente powers 
needed the Ottoman alliance and the Allies no longer had the influence to voice their 
complaints on the Armenian Question. Again, the idea that the Armenians would 
have to persevere through the hardships they had brought upon themselves by posing 
as a threat surfaced and is peppered throughout Turkish and European writings at the 
time (R14084/Ab.5647 15.03.1914; R14086/Ab.l2110 16.07.1915; Bloxham 2005: 
95). By mid-1915, Armenian deportation was openly discussed, being victoriously 
announced in May 1915 by Enver Pasha (R14086/Ab. 17493 31.05.1915); while it 
became seemingly necessary to rid the homeland of the anti-nation, that deportation 
was synonymous with annihilation was never openly admitted in Turk propaganda.
In their official documents, the Germans tellingly referred to the deportations and 
massacres as ‘wiping out’ (ausrottung), suggesting that the Armenian genocide was
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generally accepted as an open secret (R14086/Ab. 17667 6.06.1915; see also Akparn 
2006: 9)
‘Armenians in Turkey must and were going to be killed. They had grown.. .in wealth 
and numbers until they had become a menace to the ruling Turkish race; 
extermination [is] the only remedy,’ as the Governor of Harput explained to German 
vice-consul in Erzerum, Max Scheubner-Richter (in Akpam 2006: 150). This is an 
obvious difference to the language used in previous sections; the focus has shifted 
from one of distancing the anti-nation from the nation, to a focus on the destruction 
of the anti-nation. The military losses of the first few months of WWI was 
propagandised as being due to ‘a treacherous deception, to a conspiracy of 
murderous criminals, to our fighting units being stabbed in the back by the traitors 
among us’ (in reports and leaflets distributed by Ministry of War in Akpam 2006: 
125), leading to a standard of ‘Repressing and Revenge! ’ justified by Armenian 
action in the war (Konst./Ankara.l71/Ab.6381 09.1915). Claiming that all Armenian 
officials were spies, the 10 Commandments called for the Armenians to be ‘driven 
out absolutely’ from government jobs and enjoining Turks in the military to ‘kill off 
in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army’ (in Balakian 2003: 189 - 190). 
This was made easier by the continued dehumanisation of Armenians. Not only 
classed as spies, traitors, cowards and outlaws, the anti-nation was now regularly 
termed as ‘things’ rather than ‘humans’. This is of particular note in relation to 
women and young girls because of their lesser status as female and their role as 
symbols of the future of Armenian life (Konst./Ankara.l70 19.08.1915; Tachjian 
2009).
By February 1915, the two hundred thousand Armenian men conscripted into the 
army had been turned into forced labourers or had been murdered. This continued 
through to the deportations in early April and further to the ‘official’ starting point of 
the genocide when, on 24 and 25 April, several hundred Armenian societal leaders 
and intellectuals were deported from Constantinople and summarily killed (Astourian 
1990: 113). Those Armenians being deported were often attacked by the killing
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squads organised by the SO, the Teshkilat-I Makhsusiye. The 10 Commandments, the 
centrepiece of a secret CUP meeting held in December 1914 or January 1915 had 
explicitly stated that Turks were to ‘apply measures to extenninate all males under 
50, priests and teachers; leave girls and children to be Islamised’ and to ‘Carry away 
the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off from 
all connection with their native place’ (in Balakian 2003: 189 - 190; see also Melson 
1996: 160). The women left behind were often forced to convert and marry their 
aggressors, or, at the very least become their slaves or concubines; this trend, 
however, was openly criticised only months later at the height of the genocide by the 
CUP leadership who had ‘decided to extenninate entirely all the Armenians living in 
Turkey., .without regard for women, children [or] the infimT (Talaat Pasha, 15 
September 1915 in Derderian 2005: 4). They then went on to ‘strictly forbid this and 
enjoin the dispatch of women of this kind into the desert, after they have been 
separated from their husbands’ (Talaat Pasha, 29 September 1915 in Derderian 2005: 
4). Rape and group rape was prolific and often public (Biyce, Toynbee, and Sarafian 
2000: 128, 196, 551, 583), also adding to the dehumanised nature of the archetype 
Armenian. These types of public pronouncements and policies made the secret of 
genocide harder to keep; indeed, plans to hide the genocide were slowly falling away 
as ideology and policy was reaching its radicalised zenith.
post - 1915
Throughout the conflict, like the Jews and Bosniaks of my other two cases, the 
Armenians plead with Europe to intercede for them, a plea unanswered in the 
Turkish case even after the open realisation that this was not mere civil unrest, but 
that what was occurring amounted instead to ‘the elimination of 
Armenians’(Konst./B. 191 30.06.1915; R14092/Ab. 18623 7.07.1916). Deportees 
were denied any help offered ‘in money, food or any other form’ (R14086/Ab.l2110 
16.07.1915; R14090 27.12.1915). Turkish sovereignty had been solidified; 
Armenians were now portrayed as ‘their ‘herd’, to be exploited or slaughtered, 
according to their good pleasure. No system of foreign control or supervision, single
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or joint, will serve’ (Price 1918). This language of dehumanisation was reinforced 
and radicalised by the treatment of deportees. Generally sent into the desert without 
food or water, the impression of the deportees was of inhuman corpses, rather than 
that of the healthy, hearty Turkish men and women portrayed as members of the 
nation (see Ch Seven). This was further reinforced during the later years of killing 
when particularly women and children, were subject to medical ‘experiments’ and 
atrocities. The writings of Dr. Mehmed Resid, Ittihadist and governor of Diyarbekir, 
reflect this very well; he himself was charged with war crimes after the conflict:
Even though I am a physician, I cannot ignore my nationhood. I 
came into this world a Turk. My national identification takes 
precedence over everything else.. .Armenian traitors had found a 
niche for themselves in the bosom of the fatherland; they were 
dangerous microbes. Isn’t it the duty of a doctor to destroy these 
microbes?
(Resid, January 1919 in Dadrian 1986: 175).
Thus, we are presented with a self-reinforcing dehumanisation where policies of 
dehumanisation act in such a way as to fulfil the ideological perspective. In this 
case, similar to the Holocaust and to the Balkan case, CUP ideology expressed 
Armenians as sick, crippled beings often in a worse state than death; the resultant 
policies of ‘cleansing’ enacted because of this assessment then went on to fulfil these 
perceptions by forcing the anti-nation to crippling illness and death. Though no 
longer attempting to show Armenians as thriving during times of national decline, 
Turks continued to link Armenians with the persecuting Russian troops, who were 
attempting to ‘wipe out man for man’(R14099/Ab.15733 12.04.1918). The Turks 
alleged that the establishment of an Armenian national council suggested by its 
European allies akin to the foundation of a fully recognised independent state, 
serving to further legitimate their actions as they ‘could not allow their [Turkish] 
rights to be tested’ (R11053/Ab.31351 5.07.1918). In short, like my other two cases, 
the extermination of the Armenians ‘was not merely being carried out with an eye 
toward military considerations’ (R14087 27.07.1915), but also toward the ethnic 
ideological considerations of a genocidal state.
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Germany
‘One single cohabitation o f  a Jew with an Aryan woman is sufficient to poison her 
blood forever. Together with the 'alien albumen' she has absorbed the alien soul. 
Never again will she be able to bear purely Aryan children, even when married to an 
Aryan. They will all be bastards, with a dual soul and a body o f  a mixed breed’
(Julius Streicher 1934, 'German People's Health Through Blood and Soil' in
Tribunals 10.01.1946c)
1 9 1 8 -1 9 3 3
As discussed in Chapters Two and Five, the problem of the Jewish Question was 
established in German ideology and culture well before any genocidal policies were 
actually implemented. Before Hitler became Chancellor, however, the only strategy 
for approaching the subject was to restrict Jewish legal and civil rights. In a similar 
style to the Turkish case, regarding Jews through the lens of Social Darwinism was 
established on a policy level in the late 1800s when Jews were publicly deprived of 
full citizenship and began being regarded as a racial, rather than a religious, group 
(Mann 2005: 65).
The Weimar Republic, already perceived as a weak political institution due to its 
inability to win the support of the military and civil service branches (Evans 2004:
97, 102), did little to dissuade the German populace from the anti-Semitism rife 
throughout Europe at the time and much study has been done regarding the question 
of continuity from this time period through WWII30. Most notable, of course, is 
Fritz Fischer’s G riff nach der Weltmacht (1962) followed more recently by his From 
Kaiserreich to Third Reich (1986) in which he posits that the policy platforms and
30 This is not to say, however, that all politicians in the Weimar state system supported these policies 
or were acceptable under the NSDAP. O f the members o f the Weimar Reichstag, approximately 
eighty were persecuted and summarily killed by the Nazi regime; well over one hundred and fifty 
were exiled from the Reich (Burleigh 2001: 155).
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policies of pre-WWI Germany were not so radically different as those established in 
the pre-WWIl years of the NSDAP. Though met with indignation in the early days 
of its publication, the continuity of certain ideological aspects are hard to ignore; 
more recently, other key scholars such as Dirk Walter (1999) have built Fischer’s 
work, pointing out that in a post-WWI Germany, Jewish violence and persecution 
was widespread. Media discourse, policies present in cultural activities such as 
recreation spots and the lack of persecution towards antisemitic crimes all helped 
foster an attitude of derogation under the Weimar Regime. More radical activists 
burned synagogues and some vacation resorts began excluding Jewish guests (Borut 
2000; Burleigh 2001: 329). Panayi suggests that much of this persecution was due to 
a perception of Jewish wealth in a time of dire economic need and to their prominent 
position in the arts sector of German society (2001: 220 - 221).
As we will see further in Chapter Seven, the NSDAP used these stereotypes to build 
up the idea of the German Volk ‘revamping the sagging morale of the lower middle 
class’ (Kershaw 1989: 93). One of the ways the Nazis went about establishing this 
change was to cast the anti-nation as national traitors, profiteering from German 
defeat in the First World War (Staub 1989: 92; Cecil 1972: 70 - 75). Thus, the Jews, 
in a similar situation as the Armenians after the Balkan Wars, were perceived as 
‘picking a fight’ against Germany. Identifying Jews as blood-suckers and 
extortionists, and building on the perception of the lesser status of members of the 
anti-nation, Julius Streicher and Alfred Rosenberg set to work the propaganda 
machine, assuring both Jews and Gennans that
Jewry wanted this battle. It shall have it until it realises that the 
Germany of the brown battalions is not a country of cowardice and 
surrender. Jewry will have to fight until we have won 
victory.. .National Socialists! Defeat the enemy of the world. Even 
if the world is full of devils, we shall succeed in the end.
(Streicher 30 March 1933 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c)
Along with Hitler’s inflammatory messages in speeches and in Mein K am pf these 
two men were primarily responsible for the further popularisation of anti-Semitism in
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the founding years of Nazi ideology, promising German freedom would only come 
about when ‘the Jew has been excluded from the life of the German people’ 
(Streicher 1922 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c); if this exclusion did not occur ‘the Jew 
would really devour the peoples of the earth’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 411). All German 
devastation was attached somehow to Jewish ‘contamination’: ‘The Jew today is the 
great agitator for the complete destruction of Germany. Wherever in the world we 
read of attacks against Germany, Jews are their fabricators, just as in peacetime and 
Marxists systematically stirred up hatred against Germany’ (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 568, 
512; see also Cecil 1972: 72). Thus, we see Nazi elites serving as instalments for 
ideology as agency, moving within a structure partly of their own making, partly 
inherited from ideologies of previous regimes as discussed in earlier chapters.
This trend of associating Communism, Marxism and Judaism is typical of early 
Gernian ideology, as the early years of Nazism focused primarily on defeating 
political opponents; this is also the reason Goering gives for the establishment of 
concentration camps. The camps were not necessarily a place to hold Jews, but 
instead ‘a lightning measure against the functionaries of the Communist Party who 
were attacking [Germans] in the thousands, and who, since they were taken into 
protective custody, were not put in prison. But it was necessary, as I said, to erect a 
camp for them — one, two, or three camps’ (in Tribunals 18.03.1946; see also Mann 
2005: 185). Nonetheless, the Nazis were not necessarily understated in their 
dehumanisation of Jews in the early stages of their ideology. Mein K am pf again 
provides numerous examples where Hitler has equated Jews with poisoners, the 
plague, tuberculosis, putrefaction, maggots and parasites (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 38,
211 -212,276,307, 506).
1933 - 1935
After Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship, little changed in the first few years that had 
not been established ideologically in the early years of the NSDAP; equally 
noteworthy is that antisemitism had played a rather subdued role in Hitler’s quasi­
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election (Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 114). Bloxham and Kushner summarise this 
well, saying ‘in no way was the murder of the Jews a necessary outcome of Nazi (or 
German or occidental) antisemitism as of the year 1933.. .The logic of the view to 
which Hitler and many of his coterie subscribed, of Jews as a defiling and subversive 
‘racial’ element, was always their exclusion from the ‘Aryan’, and particularly 
German community, but exclusion did not instantly equate to murder’ (2008: 71).
In fact, it is interesting to note that during this time period, the Nazis did relatively 
little to implement policies dealing with the ‘Jewish Question’. Though there was 
still an ideological assumption of the ‘badness’ of the Jews and an increase in 
stereotypical propaganda, the only attempts to change policy were discussions on 
restricting Jewish civil rights and liberties (Kershaw 2000: 101). While the earliest 
period of NSDAP power was peppered with antisemitic actions such as riots, 
boycotts and the exclusion of Jews and other-groups from cultural activities, actual 
killings were few and these were often persecuted in the courts (Nolzen 2002: 250 - 
251, 254 - 255; Evans 2004: Ch. 6). Again, the focus on the time was on 
implementing policies and focusing on the aspects of ideology that would ensure the 
political and social consolidation of power under the NSDAP (Jick 1998: 158 - 159; 
Kallis 2008: 16; Nolzen 2002: 248).
Ideologically, much antisemitic discourse remained the same. Der Völkischer 
Beobachter continued to link Jews to Marxism and portray them as rich money- 
wasters, seeking to disrupt the struggling German economy; they were explicitly 
blamed for mobbings and murders both in Germany and abroad (Völkischer 
Beobachter 1933b, 1933c). Streicher, in speeches and articles represented the Jews 
as forcing anti-Semitic policies into action, as they did not recognise the strength of 
the anti-nation (Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Propaganda avers that Jews would attempt 
to poison the Volk with their ‘alien albumen’ by raping German women who would 
then never be able to bear ‘pure’ German children, thus endangering the heart of the 
culture-bearing aspect of the nation (Deutsche Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden 
in Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Though this type of dehumanising language is present in
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corner-stone texts such as Mein K am pf there is a change in the frequency and 
popularity of using scientific language to describe Jews. While previous to the 
Nazis’ ascension to power much of this sort of language was kept out of the 
mainstream press, this changes soon after Hitler comes to office (NSDAP 1933a, 
1933d, 1933g, 1933e).
193 5- 1938
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Nuremberg Laws are exceptional due to the fact 
that this is the first time under the NSDAP where the ideology of antisemitism is 
expressed through policy changes and, thus, becomes institutionalised as legal 
practise in a way reminiscent of the series of laws passed under the Turks in 19093'. 
Until the passing of the Nuremberg Laws, direct physical assaults were seemingly 
regionally variable, occurring via pressure from the SA or from particular Nazi party 
members seeking to radicalise anti-Jewish policy within their sphere of influence 
(Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 116). The Laws themselves, while restricting the 
liberties and freedoms of Jews, were another step towards dehumanising the anti­
nation altogether. As with so much of Nazi policy, the institution of the Nuremberg 
Laws was not the result of a long, drawn out policy plan, but was instead the 
outcome of hasty, last-minute decision making. Though there had been discussions 
of dealing legally with the ‘Jewish Problem’, little evidence suggests any policies 
had been thoroughly debated (Burleigh 2001: 294)
Making Jewish-German marriages illegal, stripping Jews of the right to fly the Reich 
flag and of their German citizenship were all policy initiatives following from 
ideological precepts. This was rationalised as protection against the anti-nation who 
would otherwise persecute the nation to an heretofore unknown degree (Völkischer 
Beobachter 1935c, 1935e, 1935f). Goering rationalises this radicalisation thus:
31 See Mazower (1999) for further insights into the Nazi’s use o f  the legal system and its role in a 
genocidal state.
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I believe that if, in this connection, many a hard word which was 
said by us against Jews and Jewry were to be brought up, I should 
still be in a position to produce magazines, books, newspapers, and 
speeches in which the expressions and insults coming from the 
other side were far in excess. All that obviously was bound to lead 
to an intensification
(Tribunals 14.03.1946)
In short, the Jews had brought this upon themselves; if they had not been attacking 
the Volk then they would not themselves have been attacked.
Books with titles like Don’t Trust the Fox in the Green Meadow Nor the Jew on His 
Oath, (Trau keinem Fuchs a u f griiner Heid und keinem Jiid a u f seinem Eid) were 
funded by Streicher’s propaganda machine and pitched to children because ‘no one 
should be allowed to grow up in the midst of our people without this knowledge of 
the frightfulness and dangerousness of the Jew’ (1937 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c). 
Another new trend in the evolution of this ideology is the portrayal of the anti-nation 
as ritualistic killers of Germans, particularly of German children, who had been 
killed by Jews in the most gruesome ways imaginable (Tribunals 10.01.1946c). 
Portrayed thus, Jews were not only persecuting the current generation of Germans, 
but were directly, purposefully attacking future generations of the Reich. This 
desecration could not be allowed to occur.
How to go about preventing these occurrences, however, was still not fully formed in 
either ideology or policy at the time. The HJ (.Hitlerjugend) slowly began 
incorporating anti-Jewish action into their activities and teachings, including the 
vandalisation of Jewish graveyards and other properties (Nolzen 2002: 269; Burleigh 
2001: 237) The most popular policy idea was of forced Jewish immigration ‘to 
countries where the Jews wanted to go’ (von Schirach in Tribunals 24.05.1946).
This then inspired policies encouraging Jews to emigrate from Germany; ghettos and 
concentration camps were built as ‘holding camps’ for Jews waiting to be exported 
from the Reich (as in Bergen-Belsen, erected as late as 1943) and to provide slave 
labour for rebuilding the Reich and its war machine, thus ‘removing the most
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dangerous element of disorder directed against [the Reich]’ (Goering in Tribunals 
13.03.1946; Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 9, 135; Evans 2005: 81 - 90).
1938 -1941
The effects of Kristallnacht on the Jewish community were immediate and striking. 
Nolzen sums it up well: ‘more than 680 Jews were killed or committed suicide; 
nearly 30,000 were interned in concentration camps. Nearly 200 synagogues were 
set on fire or devastated; and more than 7,500 Jewish-owned enterprises were 
destroyed. This had all happened within hours’ (2002: 271). Though still an 
outcome of a policy focused on getting Jews to remove themselves from Germany, 
Kristallnacht saw the beginning of large-scale state-empowered violence against the 
Jews in such as way as had not occurred before under the Nazis. Much of this 
violence occurred concurrently with an increased level of media focus on the
32certainty of Germany going to war, which in turn led to an increased level of fear . 
Similarly, expulsions of Russian, Hungarian, Romany and Polish Jews during this 
time period show the coordination of the branches of the Nazi state in their ability to 
pursue policies resulting in mass murder (Milton 1990: 274). Here we see again this 
relationship between ideology and events. In this case, it is the ideological belief in 
the necessity of separating the anti-nation from the nation that spurs policy changes 
regarding these expulsionary measures taken against the Jews.
The inverse relationship is seen upon German entry into WWII. Being blamed for 
forcing Germany’s hand to war, the Jews were seen as profiting from the deaths of 
Germans on the battlefield, and thus having brought their own destruction down 
upon their heads (Hitler in Time Magazine 1939), just as the Armenians had been 
blamed upon Turkish entrance into WWI. Der Stiirmer articles between 1938 and 
1940 urged that only when world Jewry had been annihilated would the Jewish 
problem have been solved, and predicted that fifty years hence the Jewish graves
32 Much writing has been done on the relationship between fear and mass death. Some o f the best 
examples on this topic are found in Shaw (2003), Snyder (2000), Winter (2003a; 2003b) and Mann 
(2001; 1993; 2005).
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‘will proclaim that this people of murderers and criminals has after all met its 
deserved fate’; Der Völkischer Beobachter began to openly discuss ‘a neat separation 
of Germans and Jews’ as a solution to the Jewish Question. All avenues of the press 
were personally encouraged by Hitler to publish more ‘enlightening articles on the 
Jewish question’ in order to ‘educate’ Germans about the risk posed by Jews 
(Tribunals 29.04.1946, 01.10.1946g; Völkischer Beobachter 1938e).
Nonetheless, until approximately 1940 -  early 1941, there was still a possibility of 
some Jews could avoid extermination by forced migration. ‘The forced emigrations 
of 1938 and 1939 from Germany and Austria, which seemed so cruel at the time, 
saved Jewish lives. ‘Exterminationist anti-Semitism,’ if one could use such a term, 
then meant forced emigration, not mass murder’ (Jick 1998: 160). Between late 
1940 and mid-1941, however, the institutionalisation of policy for the concentration 
of all Jews in ghettos became rote; by this time Jewish registration, economic 
discriminations and decrees compelling Jews to wear the Star of David, sporadic 
arrests and detention in camps was de rigueur (Tribunals 01.10.1946m; Völkischer 
Beobachter 1938f; Tribunals 02.01.1946; Kershaw 1989: 97).
The implementation of these policies would inherently benefit the Reich as they 
would then come into control of the wealth of the Jews and take revenge on them for 
the perceived advances Jews had made in times of national decline. This would 
result in ‘healing this sickness among the people’ and the ‘joining together of Greater 
Germany in defiance of the world’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1938e, 1938f; Tribunals 
30.09.1946j, 30.09.19461). Separating the anti-nation from the nation would also 
rescue the nation from the persecution of the enemy within in this time of war. The 
state of war initiated a shift in ideology wherein the fear of the outer enemy, the 
Allied forces fighting against the Germans, was linked directly with the fear towards 
the inner enemy, the Jews. The media began to preach that the Jews’ desire was to 
‘kill all Hitlerites’ and that ‘the Jews of all the world hate [Germans] because we are 
a stronger state with a stronger army’ (Völkischer Beobachter 1938f; Tribunals 
10.01.1946c). Not only did Streicher continue printing articles of Jewish murder 
around the world as in earlier time periods, but in 1938 Der Völkischer Beobachter
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began to focus on malcontent in Palestine, claiming that ‘Concentration camps in 
Palestine are full! The blood price of four months [of war]: 1,089 Arabs slain [by 
Jews]... in hand-to-hand combat’, and other articles written in such a way to suggest 
that it was the Germans who would next fall to Jewish retaliation (Völkischer 
Beobachter 1938e; see also Völkischer Beobachter 1938b, 1938d; Tribunals 
15.01.1946a).
These suggestions were paired with increased radicalisation of propaganda which 
continued to strip away the human nature of the Jews. Der Stürmer went so far as to 
associate the anti-nation with ‘a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of 
diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind,’ and, in February 1940, 
published a letter from one of its readers comparing Jews with swarms of locusts 
(Tribunals 01.10.1946g, 10.01.1946c). Der Völkischer Beobachter ‘educated’ their 
readers about Jews’ inability to ‘keep their sicknesses out of the air’ and the danger 
of the Jewish bacillus (Völkischer Beobachter 1938b, 1938g).
By this time the difference between the other-groups presented in Chapter Five is 
becoming quite clear: the Nazis were beginning to outline brutal policies for groups 
they labelled subhuman, particularly during this time the mentally ill, incurably sick 
and handicapped; but, in order to fulfd their ideological platform, they were 
consistently downgrading Jews to ‘nonhuman’ status, not only in ideological terms, 
but in policy terms as well (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: 5). As discussed in the above 
section, integrating the Nuremberg laws into state and cultural practice, Jews were 
excluded from normal German day-to-day activities; after the outbreak of war, the 
rounding up of Jews into ghettos and camps further entrenched ideas of the Jew as 
something non-human. In fact, the conditions within both camps and ghettos were 
contributing factors furthering the dehumanisation of the anti-nation. Illness and 
death were rife, poor living conditions meant that it was indeed hard to keep 
‘sickness out of the air’; levels of contagion from disease were high and cleanliness,
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due to the depraved living conditions, was devastatingly low33. All of these things 
went on to reinforce the ideologically presupposed idea that it was necessary that 
Jews be separate, apart from the German nation.
This exclusion is part of the dynamic process of the radicalisation of state policy and 
ideology in which the ‘state is both instrument of genocide through its administrative 
and executive organs and instrumental is er of its citizens and other resources towards 
genocide’ (Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 63). The work of the Einsatzgmppen in late 
spring of 1941, the first institutionalised measure of mass murder, is without doubt 
an outcome of this instrumentalisation as well as a visible outcome of the centralised 
power of the state (as an instrument) predicated on and encouraged by radicalising 
ideology. By late summer 1941, Nazi ideology had shifted to such a degree that mere 
separation was no longer enough to secure the further existence of the nation.
post - 1941
Mid -  late 1941 saw a shift in many types of policy, from the end of the Sino- 
German cooperation to the invasion of the Soviet Union and the declaration of war 
on Germany by the United States. Equally, there is a mirrored shift in anti-nation 
ideology. No longer was it enough to simply remove the anti-nation from the 
homeland; forced emigration was not ‘safe’ enough. ‘Jews must either be 
exterminated or taken to concentration camps’ (Ribbentrop in Tribunals 01.10.1946c; 
see also Tribunals 01.10.1946g). Thus, the extermination of the Jews by extreme 
murder began being implemented as the answer to the Jewish Question with the 
transition of Auschwitz-Birkenau from concentration camp to extermination camp in 
1941. 1942 thus became the beginning of the ‘final solution’ of the Jewish Question 
and, though it was far from static, continuing throughout the end of the Second 
World War (Kallis 2008: Ch. 7; Tribunals 02.01.1946).
33 For excellent work on ghettos and concentration camps during the Nazi regimes see Adelson, 
Lapides and Web (1989), Haydecker (1990), Kay (1939), Mommsen (1991), Pasternak (2006), Mayer 
(1990). Schelvis (2007), Roland (1992), Schulze (2005) and Writte and Tyas (2001).
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Reaching the peak of anti-Semitic ideology and policy, however, did little to stem the 
propagandised belief that Jews were still thriving in times of national struggle. In a 
January 1944 radio broadcast, Fritzsche declared that
it is revealed clearly once more that not a new system of 
government, not a young nationalism, and not a new and well- 
applied socialism brought about this war. The guilty ones are 
exclusively the Jews and the plutocrats.. .This clique of Jews and 
plutocrats have invested their money in armaments and they had to 
see to it that they would get their interests and sinking funds; hence 
they unleashed this war.
(Tribunals 23.01.1946b)
Statements like this one point not only to Jewish wealth, but again to the idea that the 
Jews were at fault for the war, thus bringing the idea that the anti-nation deserves to 
be condemned once again to the forefront of Nazi ideology.
This was made easier by the continued idea that Jews were tormenting the Germans 
and posed an immediate threat from the Soviet Union, Poland, the United States and 
the United Kingdom; thus, the elimination of Jews from Europe was seen, as von 
Schirach neatly puts it, as ‘an active contribution to European culture’ (15 September 
1942 in Tribunals 24.05.1946; see also Tribunals 15.01.1946b; Völkischer 
Beobachter 1941c). Just as the Turks associated the Armenians with their Russian 
enemies, through the end of the war the Nazis persisted in equating the Jews as the 
internal enemy with the Marxist/Bolshevik/Communist external enemy of the Soviet 
Union, making such claims as that ‘Jewry.. .has by now placed itself unreservedly on 
the side of Bolshevism’ and that the ‘international Jewish-Democratic-Bolshevistic 
campaign of incitement against Germany still finds cover in this or that fox's lair or 
rat hole’(Fritzsche 1941 and 1945 in Tribunals 23.01,1946b); Goering also played on 
this theme, famously stating: ‘If we lose the war, you [Germans] will be 
annihilated.. .This is not the Second World War. This is a great race war. It is about 
whether the German and Aryan will survive or if the Jew will rule the world, and that 
is why we are fighting abroad’ (4 October 1942 in Herf 2005: 57). In fact, there was 
a tangible sense through Nazi propaganda that WWII was being fought between 
Germany and an actual Jewish conspiracy (Herf 2005: 52).
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Associations such as this with scheming foxes and disease-bearing rats were, as in 
previous times, popular in propaganda throughout the end of the war. In a series of 
speeches in 1943, Himmler applauded the Gennans for their ruthlessness in the 
extermination of the anti-nation, describing it as ‘delousing’; this process ‘was not 
cruel -  if one remembers that even innocent creatures of nature, such as hares and 
deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by them’ (Hitler in Tribunals 
21.03.1946; Himmler in Tribunals 30.09.19461). Like in the Turkish case, even after 
the end of the war, key Nazi ideologues such as Streicher and Fritzsche persisted in 
their anti-Semitic diatribes throughout the course of the Tribunals, rarely expressing 
remorse. In his work on the Holocaust, Jeffrey Herf points out that ‘two key verbs 
and nouns were the core of this language of mass murder.. .they were the verbs 
vernichten and ausrotten, which are synonyms for ‘annihilate’, ‘exterminate’, ‘totally 
destroy’ and ‘kill” (2005: 55)34. These two words also pepper documents relating to 
the Armenian genocide and give us a very clear picture of the intention of policy 
makers in the latter stages of radicalisation. This stands in contrast to the Yugoslav 
case which, as a case of partial genocide, is arguably more dynamic in the 
complexity of its anti-nation ideology. Nonetheless, further examination of 
Yugoslavia in light of the other two cases brings some interesting points to light.
The Balkans
W e are witnessing the birth o f  a Muslim bastard on the territory o f  the land o f  our 
grandfathers ’
(Serb deputy in Silber and Little 1997: 220)
34 Though ausrotten  and vernichten  are both used circumspectly to discuss the killing o f  the Jews, 
Herf goes on to mention that when used in the context o f  propaganda, they are usually in terms o f  
something the Jews will do or are currently doing to the German nation (2005: 55); this, o f  course, 
further instilled fear o f  the Jews into the greater German society.
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19 74- 1987
Unlike the Turks and the Nazis, the Serbs took longer to identify an anti-nation; the 
polyethnic status of Yugoslavia under Tito was generally more effective than that of 
the Ottoman Empire. There were some inequalities between national and non­
national groups as the communists were hesitant to give any other-group the same 
status as Slovenes, Serbs or Croats, claiming that doing so would create problems on 
the regional level in the republics and provinces arising out of the right to self- 
determination provided in the Constitution. As described in Chapter Five, however, 
the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina became more active in governmental 
administration in the 1960s; this was noted with a certain degree of negativity from 
Serbs at the time, though these nay-sayers were generally quieted through pressure 
from above (Judah 1997: 150 - 156). It was not until the new 1974 Constitution was 
written and more rights were granted to other-groups that things began to change in 
some sectors of the Serbian and Croatian nationalist wings.
Tito’s death proved catastrophic for Yugoslavia; no longer having the ideological tie 
to a strong leader, national factions began to take a stronger line, particularly in 
Serbia. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the 1974 Constitution gave Kosovo (amongst 
others) greater autonomy; this caused Serbian nationalists grave concern. In a way 
that is reminiscent of Nazi claims against Jews in the early stages of ideological 
development, Serbs in Serbia began to claim that Serbs in Kosovo were being subject 
to genocide, that Serbian women were being raped at the hands of Kosovar men and 
that the entire non-Muslim community in Kosovo was being repressed and 
intimidated; these claims were then upheld by the state, the press and the Serbian 
Orthodox Church (Carmichael 2010: 8; IT-00-39&40/1 2008). One of the various 
outcomes of these claims was the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (SANU) 
Memorandum of 1986.
The Memorandum’s primary focus was to assure its readers that under Tito’s 
governance, Serbia and the Serbian people were discriminated against time and time
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again (Banac 1994: 150). It was Kosovo, rather than Bosnia, who was at fault for 
taunting Serbia; the document largely overlooks the role Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 
resident Bosniaks played in national decline. Quite a lot of this has to do with the 
fact that at the time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was still considered politically cowed 
under the thumb of Serbian influence. Serbs still held a majority in many areas 
across Bosnia-Herzegovina, though in states on the Bosnia-Herzegovina/Croatia 
border this was beginning to shift. The Memorandum itself, disturbing, but quite 
innocuous on its own as merely one draft memorandum, was not originally intended 
for popular use. It was instead a calling to return to the original Communist 
principles and intended for its readership to be the supreme political bodies of 
Yugoslavia and Serbia. It was, however, leaked relatively soon after its release and 
was met with vehement aggression in the pro-Yugoslav press, particularly in 
Belgrade. It was only when Milosevic took power a year later in 1987 that the 
ideological ideals expressed in this document became the foundation for a political 
policy platform (Pavkovic 1994: 445, 446).
198 7-1 991
As discussed in Chapters Two and Seven and in a similar way to the Turkish case, 
one of the key metres of national distinction in Yugoslavia is religion. After being 
mildly repressed by Tito’s communist regime, the late 1980s saw a renewed interest 
in using religion to further nationalist goals posited by nationalist leaders, Milosevic 
in particular. ‘Milosevic who was first to realise that Tito was dead, was also the 
first communist leader since the Croatian Spring to break the taboo of speaking to an 
audience consisting solely of one ethnic group (Serbs) and openly using 
ethnonational rhetoric’ (Malesevic 2006: 177). 1987 and 1988 were years of 
aggression against the Catholic Church and the Islamic community (Banac 1994:
161; Mirkovic 1996: 194). In fact, these religious identities, and in particular the 
Islamic identity, was critical in identifying the anti-nation. As Carmichael explains, 
‘a rise in religious consciousness may not wholly explain the occurrence of violence 
in these regions, secessionists and politicians eager to redraw boundaries cynically
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exploited the idea of a ideological purpose and traditional identities under threat to 
motivate and legitimise armed resistance’ (2010: 16).
Unlike in my other two cases, there is no clear identification of the anti-nation at the 
earlier stages of ideological progression; the focus is instead largely based around a 
religious identity35. In the 1960s and 1970s, the focus was on obtaining equal civil 
rights and liberties fo r  Muslims in Yugoslavia; by the late 1980s, the primary 
professed ideological ‘enemy’ to Serbs had shifted away from ‘Muslims’ as a whole 
to ‘Kosovars’ as a group. On one hand, there is no real ideological distinction 
between Muslims; the Muslims were the ideological enemy, regardless of whether 
they came from Albania, Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, 
however, there is a crucial distinction between Kosovar and Bosniak based in 
geography, history and, to a large extent, geo-political importance. Scholars have 
claimed that the Serbs had a particular tendency to react to ideologically inspired 
fears due to years of Ottoman rule and the genocidal action they suffered under the 
Ustashas during WWII, particularly when fear was couched in terms of Islamic 
encroachment (Carmichael 2010: 9). Nonetheless, it was not until Croatian 
independence seemed imminent that relations between the nation and Bosniaks came 
to a head.
The election of the HDZ in April 1990 convinced many Serbs living in Croatia that 
Tudjman would soon begin to install the institutions of fascism if and when Croatia 
became independent of Yugoslavia; particularly Serbs in boarder areas like Krajina, 
‘understood fascism above all to be a state system promoting virulent Croatian 
nationalism, and the revival of Croat national sentiment in any form was ipso facto  
interpreted by them as the return of fascism’ (Glenny 1996: 11). In the spring of 
1991, when conflict in the border regions of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia 
had already begun, the JNA issued mobilisation orders to the men of Bosnia-
35 As explained in Chapters Four and Five, religious identity here does not mean to entail any amount 
o f faith, but was used as a marker distinguishing one group from another. It is a cultural marker 
which maintained an ethnic connection. For more information, see Bringa (1995).
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Herzegovina. The regional government issued orders alerting the population to 
ignore this call, as the non-Serbs in the administration almost unanimously opposed 
it. Thus, very few Bosniaks or Croats entered the JNA; Bosnian Serbs, however, 
responded en masse, once again solidifying the differences between Serbs, Muslims 
and Croats (IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-99-36-1 1999). The Bosnian Serb alliance with 
the JNA became further enmeshed after the student riots of 9 and 10 March 1991, 
when the JNA was called on to halt the rioting which had started in protest to the 
Serbian regime’s increasingly extremist rhetoric (Ramet 2001: 154). Milosevic 
responded soon after, saying
Serbia and the Serbian people are faced with one of the greatest 
evils of their history: the challenge of disunity and internal conflict.
This evil, which as more than once caused so much damage and 
claimed so many victims, more than once sapped our strength, has 
always come hand in hand with those who would take away out 
freedom and dignity...All who love Serbia dare not ignore this fact, 
especially at a time when we are confronted by the vampiroid, 
fascistoid forces of the Ustasha, Albanian secessionists and all 
other forces in the anti-Serbian coalition which threaten the 
people’s rights and freedoms.
(Milosevic, March 1991, in Glenny 1996: 57)
This was spoken amidst Milosevic’s political offensive, in which he sent out orders 
to party units urging them to take action against internal and external enemies and 
highlighting the need to separate the anti-nation from the nation due to fears that the 
anti-nation would continue persecuting the nation; a feat made easier through the 
‘demo network’ Milosevic established in the early years of his presidency. These 
‘networks’ were made of previously unemployed male youths, paid to travel, attend 
pro-Serb rallies and generally encourage hysteria. These demonstrations were 
generally instituted in order to convey the idea among Serbs that Serbs outside Serbia 
proper were being persecuted and that it was necessary to reunite ‘the People, the 
State Authorities and the Church’ (Pavkovic 2000: 89 - 90; see also Gagnon 1995:
146 - 147; Banac 1994: 153). Note also that, regardless of the fact that multiple Serb 
nationalist ideologies were beginning to be established, the SDS begins speaking on 
behalf of all Serb groups, including Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Serbs and Kosovar 
Serbs (Baibaker 1996: 73, 74 - 75).
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In these early stages then, the Balkan path to anti-nation identification radicalises in a 
different way from the Turkish and German case, a key difference between a case of 
ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes and cases of total genocide. Nonetheless, 
certain aspects of the iterative nature of ideology reveals itself in a similar way to 
that of my other two cases. Here, the ideological structure preceding Milosevic’s rise 
allowed and supported a mistrust of Muslims, centred in the late 1980s around the 
Kosovars. As the geopolitical theatre shifted, ideology was constrained within that 
established structure; this necessitated the ideological identification of an 
exaggerated link between Kosovar and Bosniak in history and religion the two 
regional groups previously only tenuously shared.
1991 - 1 9 9 2
By 1991, the shifting political atmosphere begins to have direct ramifications on anti­
nation ideology in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite calls to abstain from doing so, 
Germany was adamant in its decision to recognise Croatia if they announced 
independence (Malcolm 1996: 223), causing Serbian fear of a new Ustasha-like 
regime to become even further entrenched and encouraged the growth of what 
Michael Mann calls ‘defensive ethnic nationalism’ (2005: 375). For many, including 
radical leaders such as Mladic, the creation of a newly independent Croatia was 
perceived as being synonymous with the ‘establishment of an ultranationalist regime 
that threatened the liberties, livelihoods and ...the lives of Croatian Serbs’ (Brubaker 
1996: 71 - 72).
Furthermore, a population census taken and published in 1991 in the Bosanska 
Krajina region showed that Serbs outnumbered Bosniaks by only 127,358 and that 
Serbs had lost the majority in certain key towns in this region (in IT-99-36-1 1999). 
The implication of such publications was to rouse Bosnian Serbs into the belief that 
Muslims were taking over, undermining the nation and forcing them out of their 
national homeland; in short, the claim was that Serbs were being bred out, a similar 
claim to that of the Nazis about the Jews in the latter years of their ideological
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radicalisation. Biljana Plavsic, in the newspaper Borba, ardently claimed that ‘rape 
is the war strategy of Muslims and Croats against Serbs. Islam considers this 
something normal’ (in Oberschall 2007: 102). Beginning in 1991, the SDS (Serbian 
Democratic Party) and other Serb nationalist leaders in the ARK region 
(Autonomous Region of Krajina), called the SAO (Serbian Autonomous Region) 
Krajina by the Bosnian Serbs, began disseminating propaganda portraying Bosniaks 
and Bosnian Croats as fanatics intending to commit genocide on the Serbian nation 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to gain control of the region (IT-99-36-1 1999). This 
lead directly to a heightened sense of fear, particularly for Bosnian Serbs, and began 
cementing the idea that the Serbs were in fear of national desecration into Serb 
ideology at the time. As the majority of the non-Serb citizens in most of the ARK 
areas were Muslim, a majority of this propaganda related directly to them; Serbs 
were particularly quick to use their Muslim identities as a rational behind the 
killings). The municipality of Prijedor, for instance, out of the total population of 
112,543, 43.9% of the population were Bosniaks and only 5.6% were Croats. The 
42% of Serbs, already in the minority, began to fear for their lives (IT-97-24-PT 
2002a; IT-97-24-PT 2002b). As the war with Croatia went into 1992, pro-Serb 
propaganda became ever more visible as they were continually reminded of Serb 
massacres in WWII. The threat was that if they allowed the Muslims to remain, the 
same thing would occur again (IT-97-24 2008). Karadzic openly warned Muslims 
that they would be ‘destroyed’ if they sought independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(IT-00-3 9&40/1 2002b).
The beginning of the Croatian conflict also saw the opening of camps across the 
Serb-controlled regions, particularly in the ARK region. Most camps followed the 
routine established in the Omarska and Keraterm camps where the inmates were 
categorised into three groups. The ‘A’ group consisted of people considered to be 
leaders of the Muslim community or volunteers for a Bosnian militia or territorial 
defence group. Generally, these inmates were executed soon after their arrival to the 
camps. Group ‘B’ consisted of people drafted into military defence; Group ‘C’ was 
everyone else. Often, members of both groups B and C were exchanged for Serbs,
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either those taken prisoner or those living on Bosnian-held territory who wanted to 
relocate to Serbia (Silber and Little 1997: 251; Wood 2001: 68). This population 
exchange is mildly reminiscent of the Turkish and Nazi immigration and exile 
policies against the Armenians and Jews respectively; it again points to the fact that 
though ideology necessitated the separation of the anti-nation from the nation, 
inherently genocidal policies of total extermination were not the primary resort of 
these states.
Nonetheless, this process of internment served, as in the German Holocaust, to 
dehumanise the Bosniaks to an extreme degree, holding them in terrible conditions, 
subjecting them to untold horror, until their visage became a justification for Serb 
claims that Bosniaks were not ‘real men’ like Serbs. Often, at the executions 
occurring after the categorisations described above, Bosniaks were made to dig their 
own graves (Judah 1997: 240). Again, the point of these atrocities was not 
necessarily to rid the world of Bosniaks. Instead, the point was to ethnically cleanse 
the homeland; again, as discussed in Chapter Two, this is ethnic cleansing, not 
genocide (IT-99-36-1 1999; see also Melson 1996). In short, it mattered less to the 
Bosnian Serbs that the Muslims were allowed to exist, so long as they did not exist in 
Greater Serbia.
19 9 2- 1995
After the siege of Sarajevo began, non-Serbs in Bosnia reluctantly held an 
independence referendum that Bosnian Serbs were encouraged to boycott and thus 
undermine any legitimacy for independence claims. Thus, when the majority voted 
in favour of independence, the Serbs were able to claim the Muslim majority and 
Croat minority were destroying the Yugoslavia Serbs were attempting to preserve 
(IT-02-54-T 2002). The Serb propaganda machine continued to build on this 
foundation. ‘Muslim fundamentalists’ were charged with allying themselves with 
‘Croat fascists’ to wage a war of aggression against Bosnian Serbs, making it easy to 
exaggerate feelings of revenge in light of the WWII Ustasha massacres (Malesevic
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2006: 226). Attempts of defence or retaliation on the Bosnian side resulted only in a 
greater radicalisation of anti-nation policy, as seen in the attempt to retake Prijedor in 
May 1992. The Serb authorities used this to legitimise and accelerate the campaign 
to cleanse the area (IT-97-24-PT 2001).
Similarly to Germany in the mid-193Os, Serb-govemments in Bosnia-Herzegovinian 
towns began to institute various restrictions upon Muslims and Croats. In Celinac, 
for instance, Muslims could not swim or fish, gather in groups of more than three, 
drive cars, make phone calls in public places other than at their local post offices or 
leave without permission (Judah 1997: 204; Silber and Little 1997: 246). Between 
April and December 1992, a campaign to collect ‘illegally held weapons’ from 
‘Muslim and Croat extremists’ was instituted; many massacres and other atrocities 
occurred during these raids (IT-04-79-PTb 2005); ‘The Turks are going to be like 
walnuts in a Serbo-Croat nut-cracker’ (Bosnian Serb in Silber and Little 1997: 303).
During this time period, another ideological twist creeps into popular propaganda. In 
October 1992, a document was published, signed by SANU, the SPS and the Serbian 
Orthodox church claiming that Muslims (both Kosovar and Bosniak), Albanians and 
‘Romans’ (Croats) were reproducing at an unprecedented rate and that their intent 
was to outgrow Serbs in order to force them out of the geographical homeland of the 
Serbian nation (Salzman 1998: 350, 351). The ideological ramifications this had on 
the nation will be discussed further in Chapter Seven; for the anti-nation, however, 
the results were catastrophic. This sort of fear resulted in the excessive use of rape as 
a tool of war in the Bosnian tragedy36. Roy Gutman recounts the popular belief that 
Muslim men would attempt to ‘remove [a Serbian woman] from her own family, to 
impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take 
even him away from her’ in order to raise a ‘generation of janissaries’, or Christians 
raised by Muslims (1993: x), as we saw in the Armenian case. ‘To be successful
36 An encouraging amount o f work has been done in this field, by scholars o f  politics, war and gender 
alike. For more information see Hayden (2000), Campbell (1998), Nikoliac-Ristanoviac (2000), 
Fletcher (1993) and Engle (2005).
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[S erb ian  n a tio n a lism ] h ad  to  d ep ic t  B o sn ia k s  and B o sn ia n  C roats as b lo o d th irsty  
U sta sh a s  and O ttom an -era  ja n is sa r ie s , h e ll b en t on  recrea tin g  a fa sc is t  era  
‘In d ep en d en t S tate o f  C ro a tia ’ (N D H ) or an Is la m ic  s ta te ’ (M a le s e v ic  2 0 0 6 :  2 1 2 ) .  
T h is , th en , ad d ed  to  th e s e n se  o f  ju s t if ic a t io n  for S erb ian  cr im es o f  m a ss  rape and  
eth n ic  c le a n s in g , p articu lar ly  w h e n  v ie w e d  a g a in st a b ack d rop , fo u n d  in  b o th  o f  m y  
oth er tw o  c a s e s , o f  ‘w e  are o n ly  d o in g  to  th em  w h a t th ey  h a v e  d o n e  to  u s . ’ T h u s, as 
m e n tio n e d  in  C hap ters T w o  and T h ree, there are r a d ic a lis in g  sh ifts  in  th e  e v o lu t io n  
o f  id e o lo g y  o cc u r in g  in  th e  B a lk a n  c a se , th o u g h  th e se  sh ifts  d o  d iffe r  so m e w h a t  as  
eth n ic  c le a n s in g  an d  g e n o c id e  h a v e  d ifferen t a im s and p e r c e iv e d  o u tc o m e s .
Analysis
‘The moment has finally come fo r  us to take revenge upon the Turks here! ’
(R atk o  M la d ic  1995  in I T -0 4 - 8 0 - 1 2 0 0 5 )
T h e  co n sid er a tio n s  se t forth  in  th e p rev io u s  se c t io n s  p ro v id e  a v a n ta g e  p o in t to  
a c c o m p lish  th e tw o  p rim ary g o a ls  o f  th is ch ap ter, n a m e ly  to  a n a ly se  th e ro le  o f  the  
an ti-n a tio n  in the d e v e lo p m e n t o f  id e o lo g y  and, thu s, a llo w  u s to  id en tify  a n y  k ey  
th e m e s  p erp etu ated  th rou gh ou t a ll three c a s e s  w h e n  d isc u sse d  in co m p a ra tiv e  form .
In ord er to  fu lf il th e se  g o a ls , le t  u s return to  th e T u rk ish  ca se . Im m e d ia te ly  so m e  
in te re stin g  p o in ts  c o m e  to  lig h t, th e first o f  w h ic h  is th e e s ta b lish e d  p er sp e c t iv e  o f  the  
A rm en ia n s  as h a v in g  u n eq u a l sta tu s, b o th  cu ltu ra lly  and le g a lly . B y  th e b e g in n in g  o f  
th e B a lk a n  W ars, th e id ea  o f  the d eh u m a n ised  an ti-n a tion  h as a lread y  b een  
n o rm a lise d  w ith in  th e la n g u a g e  o f  C U P  id e o lo g y . T h is  b e c o m e s  th e fo u n d a tio n  for  
further p erc ep tio n s  and p o lic ie s  o f  d eh u m a n isa tio n  to  b e  im p lem en te d  o v e r  the  
co u rse  o f  th e c o n flic t .
T h is  id ea  o f  the d eh u m a n ised  A rm en ian  is  further ex a cerb a ted  b y  the p op u lar  
p erc ep tio n  o f  the A rm en ia n  as w e a lth y  d uring  a tim e o f  e c o n o m ic  h ard sh ip , 
so m e th in g  that is p articu lar ly  e f fe c t iv e  in  th e ear ly  s ta g e s  o f  id e o lo g ic a l
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ra d ic a lisa tio n  in  th is  ca se . T h e p ortrayal o f  A rm en ia n  s u c c e s s  in th e  E u rop ean  trade  
area as a d irect threat to  O tto m a n /Is la m ist  in flu e n c e  in  th e area w a s  cr itica l to  
a m a ss in g  p op u lar su p p ort for  in c r e a s in g ly  a g g r e s s iv e  a n ti-A rm en ia n  p o lic ie s .  A s  
a n ti-n a tio n  a g g r e ss io n  is  fo rm a lise d , th is  a sp ec t o f  id e o lo g y  in  th e T u rk ish  c a se  
d im in ish e s , su g g e s t in g  that there is  an in v er se  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  id e o lo g y  and  
p o lic y  regard in g  th is  particu lar th em e . C er ta in ly  th is  re la tio n sh ip  is r e f le c t iv e  o f  th e  
g r o w in g  p ercep tio n  that th e A rm en ia n s  sh o u ld  b e  en tire ly  r e m o v e d  from  T u rk ish  
s o c ie ty . D u e  p rim arily  to  the m u lti-e th n ic  nature o f  th e O ttom an  sta te , th is  th e m e  is 
s lo w  to  em e rg e , but is  stro n g  in the latter yea rs o f  e sc a la tio n . N o te ,  h o w e v e r , that th e  
fo c u s  w a s  g e n e r a lly  o n  th e to ta l rem o v a l o f  th e A rm en ia n s  from  th e h o m e la n d , rather  
than th eir  c o m p le te  era d ica tio n  (C o h en  2 0 0 1 : 190 - 191; R 1 4 0 8 6 /A b .2 3 2 4 4  
3 1 .0 7 .1 9 1 5 ) .
T h e  third  p o in t o f  in terest in  th e T u rk ish  c a se  is th e p e r c e iv e d  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  
th e  A rm en ia n  an ti-n a tion  and ex tern a l sta tes . B e g in n in g  w ith  the u p r is in g s  in  th e la te  
18 0 0 s , th e  A rm en ia n s  are p e r s is ten tly  id e n tifie d  as an in tern al e n e m y , d a m a g in g  the  
n ation , th ro u g h o u t th e tim e  p erio d  c o v e r e d  b y  m y  a n a ly s is ;  it is  w orth  n o tin g , 
h o w e v e r , that there are s p e c if ic  sp ik e s  o f  id e o lo g ic a l e m p h a sis  p la c e d  on  th is p o in t, 
first u p o n  th e ou tb reak  o f  the B a lk a n  W ars an d  se c o n d ly  d u rin g  th e ear ly  y ea rs o f  
W W I. D u r in g  th e se  t im e s , th e A rm en ia n s are d ire c tly  a sso c ia te d  w ith  ex tern a l 
e n e m ie s  d u e to th e ir  p e r c e iv e d  r e lig io u s  tie s . M u ch  o f  th is  p ercep tio n  o f  the  
A rm en ia n s  as th e n a tio n a l p ersecu to r  is  fo u n d e d  on  th e ear ly  u p r is in g s  as d esc r ib ed  
in  C hap ters F ou r and F iv e . T h e se  u p r isin g s, w h e n  p a ired  w ith  th e s ig n if ic a n t  
red u ctio n  in territory w h ic h  w il l  b e  further d isc u sse d  in C h ap ter E ig h t, h e lp ed  
es ta b lish  a fear for  th e further red u ctio n  o f  em p ire  th rou gh  th e lo s s  o f  A n a to lia .
U n lik e  th e A rm en ia n s  in  T u rk ey , th e Z io n is t  m o v e m e n t  fo r  an in d e p e n d en t J e w ish  
h o m e la n d  p la y ed  p ra ctic a lly  n o  ro le  in G erm an  p rop agan d a  re la tin g  to  th e a n ti­
n a tion . N o n e th e le s s , there is  st ill a g ro w in g  p ercep tio n  o f  th e n e c e s s ity  to  r e m o v e  all 
a sp ec ts  o f  Jew ry  from  th e G erm an  n ation . E arly  o n  in th e N a z i ’s re ig n , there are 
h in ts that J ew s and G erm an s sh o u ld  n o t e x is t  in the sa m e p la ce ; u ltim a te ly , u n til th e
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arm am en t and b u ild -u p  to  W W II b e g in s  in  earn est b e tw e e n  19 3 5  and 1 9 3 8 , th e  o n ly  
c lea r  id ea  regard in g  th e sep ara tion  o f  J ew s from  G erm an s is th e p h y s ic a l sep a ra tio n  
o f  th e tw o  en titie s . T h is  m ea n s r o u g h ly  th e sep ara tion  o f  J e w s  w ith in  G erm a n y  and  
th e  sep ara tion  o f  J ew s from  G erm a n y  (B lo x h a m  and K u sh n er  2 0 0 4 :  7 2 ) . O n ce  
arm am en t b e g in s  and w a r lo o m s , the sh ift  a w a y  from  territoria l s e g r e g a tio n  in  
G erm a n y  to  ex term in a tio n  b e g in s  to  m ak e i t s e l f  fe lt  in  N a z i id e o lo g y . B y  1 9 4 2  -  
1 9 4 3 , th e h e ig h t o f  G erm an  id e o lo g ic a l  ra d ic a lisa tio n , it b e c a m e  id e o lo g ic a lly  c lea r  
that J ew s m u st n o t o n ly  l iv e  apart from  G erm an s, but that th e y  m u st b e  en tire ly  
erad ica ted . T h is  is the o n ly  c a se  w h e re  th e id e o lo g y  regard in g  sep a ra tio n  g o e s  to  
su ch  an  ex trem e.
T h e n e e d  for  su ch  ex tr em e sep ara tion  is  p resen ted  as b e in g  d u e  to  th e d a m a g e  the  
J e w s h a v e  d o n e  th rou gh  their p ersec u tio n  o f  th e G erm an  n a tion . S im ila r  to  the  
T u rk ish  ca se , th e J e w s  are su p p o se d  to  h a v e  co m m itte d  e g r e g io u s  acts  d e m e a n in g  
th e  G e n n a n  sta te and th e G e n n a n  Volk th rou gh  th eir  a s so c ia t io n  w ith  ex tern a l and  
oth er in tern al e n e m ie s , s p e c if ic a lly , C o m m u n ists  and M a rx ists . In  G erm a n y , 1 9 3 8  
se r v e s  as th e a p ex  o f  ra d ica lisa tio n  o n  th is  th em e. F rom  th is  h e ig h t, it d o e s  d e cr ea se  
as G erm a n y  g e ts  e m b ro iled  in w ar, but I w o u ld  su g g e s t  th is is  d u e to  th e fa ct that it 
w a s  v er y  im p ortan t to G erm an y  to  sh o w  th e y  w er e  w in n in g  th e ‘w a r ’ a g a in st the  
J e w ish  ‘o p p o n e n ts ’ (T rib u n a ls 1 8 .0 3 .1 9 4 6 ;  D a w id o w ic z  1 9 7 5 ).
N a z i id e o lo g y  w a s  p articu lar ly  c lea r  o f  th e s e lf - fu lf i l l in g  nature o f  a n ti-S e m itic  
p o lic y . B y  th is  I m ea n  that a n ti-J ew ish  p o lic ie s  w e r e  im p le m e n te d  in su ch  a w a y  as 
to  su g g e s t  that th e J ew s b rou gh t th e a ctio n  on  th e m se lv e s  b y  a c tin g  in  a certa in  w a y ,  
in  p articu lar w a s  th e p ercep tio n  that, lik e  A rm en ia n s in  th e  T u rk ish  c a s e , th e J ew s  
w er e  th r iv in g  d u rin g  th e  e c o n o m ic  d ep ress io n  G e n n a n y  su ffer ed  in th e la te  19 2 0 s  
and ear ly  1 9 3 0 s. R eg a r d le ss  o f  th e fa ct that J ew s rep resen ted  o n ly  2%  o f  G erm an  
b ank ers and sto ck b ro k ers, J ew s ‘h ad  b e c o m e  en ta n g le d  in  p op u lar  [G erm an ] 
c o n sc io u s n e s s  w ith  b o th  n a tio n a lism  and c la ss  c o n f l ic t ’ (M an n  2 0 0 4 :  141 , 2 2 8 ) .  T h is  
id ea  in cr ea se s  in  p o p u la rity  u ntil th e A n sc h lu ss ;  u p o n  en tran ce in  W W II, th is th em e
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d e c lin e s , o n ly  to  b e resu rrected  aga in  at th e en d  o f  th e w a r w h e n  th e J e w s  w e r e  o n c e  
a g a in  lin k ed  w ith  G e r m a n y ’s ex tern a l e n e m ie s .
T h e fin a l p o in t, re su rfa c in g  tim e  and a g a in  in th e G erm an  ca se , is th e N a z i ’s ex tr em e  
d eh u m a n isa tio n  o f  th e J ew s. T h o u g h  in  ea c h  o f  m y  th ree c a s e s , th e a n ti-n a tio n  is 
co m p a red  to  n o n -h u m a n  e le m e n ts , b e  th e y  ca ttle , a lie n s , v a m p ir es  or rats; th e N a z is ,  
a lo n g  w ith  th e se  a ff il ia t io n s , had  a p articu lar fo c u s  o n  a sso c ia t in g  J ew s w ith  
sc ie n tif ic  and  m ed ic a l te r m in o lo g y  -  g ro w th s , p a ra sites , m ic r o b e s , g er m s. I su g g e s t  
th is  h as to  d o  w ith  recen t b reak th rou gh s in  s c ie n tif ic  k n o w le d g e , so m e th in g  w h ic h  
m o st o f  th e W estern  w o r ld  w a s  taken  w ith  at th e tim e , p a ired  w ith  th e ex tr em e  S o c ia l  
D a rw in is t  te n d e n c ie s  o f  th e org a n ic  N a z i m o v e m e n t. E q u a lly , it is  in te re stin g  that 
th e la n g u a g e  o f  d eh u m a n isa tio n  b e g in s  at an  e x tr e m e ly  h ig h  le v e l  an d  rem a in s  
th ro u g h o u t the c o n flic t .
T h is  is  d ifferen t than  in th e B a lk a n  c a se  w h ere  the d eh u m a n isa tio n  o f  th e a n ti-n a tio n  
b e g in s  q u ite  s lo w ly ,  but c o n tin u e s  to  s w e ll  in  im p o rta n ce  at ea c h  d iffer en t p er io d  
a d d ressed  in m y  a n a ly sis;  th u s, it is s im ila r  to  th e a s so c ia t io n  o f  th e  B o sn ia k s  as the  
p ersecu to r  o f  th e n a tion . S im ila r ly  to  ea ch  o f  th e o th er tw o  c a s e s , it w a s  S erb ian  
en tran ce in to  w ar w ith  C roatia  that se rv e d  as the prim ary ra d ic a lise r  fo r  th is  th e m e ,  
as there is a large r ise  in a n ti-B o sn ia k  p rop agan d a , m irrorin g  a sh ift  occu rr in g  in  
B o sn ia n -S er b  p rop agan d a. C ru cia l h ere w a s  th e ro le  o f  th e r e lig io u s  m y th , draw n  
u p on  b y  e lite s  q u ite  s e le c t iv e ly , d e m o n is in g  M u s lim s  as a ttem p tin g  to d estro y  the  
p ersec u ted  Serb  (G a g n o n  1995: 141 ). T h u s, m o re  than  in  e ith er  o f  m y  o th er tw o  
c a s e s , is  th e p ercep tio n  o f  the B o sn ia k s  as b e in g  a h isto r ic a l e n e m y , as w e ll  as h a v in g  
ex tern a l lin k s. T h is  t ie s  in to  th e fact that, as w e  sa w  a b o v e , th o u g h  there is a late  
id en tific a tio n  o f  th e B o sn ia k s  as the an ti-n a tio n , th is id e n tific a tio n  is  p rec ed ed  b y  an  
ear ly  m istru st o f  o th er M u slim  g rou p s d ue m o stly  to  u n rest in  o th er parts o f  the  
reg io n . S e a m le ss  id e o lo g ic a l a ffilia tio n  o f  K o so v a r  to  B o sn ia k  m irrors th e in tern al 
en e m y /e x te r n a l e n e m y  re la tio n sh ip s  fo u n d  in m y  o th er tw o  c a s e s . M o re  s im ila r ly , 
B o sn ia k s  had  b eg u n  a c c e p tin g  h elp  from  the greater  M u s lim  c o m m u n ity  (B r in g a
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1 9 9 5 ), la r g e ly  b a sed  on  their a ffil ia t io n  w ith  a r e lig io u s  id en tity  w h ic h  h ad  b e c o m e  
m o re o f  an e th n ic  m arker than an in d ica tor  o f  faith .
S e c o n d ly , th e  S erb s a lso , as d o  th e  T urks an d  G erm an s, p ortray th e B o s n ia k  a n ti­
n a tio n  as th r iv in g  d u rin g  a tim e  o f  n a tio n a l stru g g le . U n lik e  o th er a sp e c ts  o f  
id e o lo g y  in  th is  ca se , th is  p o in t is  p articu lar ly  stro n g  in  th e ear ly  y ea rs o f  
ra d ic a lisa tio n  d e c lin e s  o v e r  th e co u rse  o f  th e c o n flic t . B o s n ia k  en cr o a ch m en t on  
g o v er n m e n ta l a d m in istra tion  is e s ta b lish e d  ear ly  in  th e ra d ic a lisa tio n  p er io d  as  
M u slim s  w er e  th r iv in g  p o lit ic a lly  in  a tim e  w h e re  S erb ian  in f lu e n c e  w a s  w a n in g ;  
th ere is a lso  a sp ik e  in  th is trend  late 1991 and ear ly  1 9 9 2  d u rin g  th e in d e p e n d e n c e  
m o v e m e n ts  w h e n  S erb s w e r e  w a tc h in g  th e  b rea k d o w n  o f  their  p o lit ic a l sp h ere  o f  
p o w er . A fte r  th is p o in t, h o w e v e r , th e th em e o f  n a tion a l d e c lin e  d e c r e a se s  th ro u g h o u t  
th e  co u rse  o f  th e co n flic t.
L a stly , there is  the fa c t that th rou gh ou t th e B a lk a n  c o n f lic t , th e  d r ive  to  sep ara te  the  
n a tio n  from  th e an ti-n a tion  is  p aram oun t. It sh o u ld  b e n o te d , h o w e v e r , that u n lik e  in 
m y  other tw o  c a s e s , th is  g o a l w a s  sh ared  a cro ss  S erb s and C roats a lik e , w ith  B o sn ia -  
H e r z e g o v in a  rem a in in g  th e o n ly  re g io n  c o m m itte d  to  th e m u lti-cu ltu ra l id e a lism  
e s ta b lish e d  u nd er T ito . T h eir  o w n  g o a l o f  e s ta b lish in g  a B o s n ia k  re g io n  e v o lv e d  
o n ly  after years o f  p ersec u tio n  at the h an d s o f  B o sn ia n  S erb s and B o s n ia n  C roats  
a lik e . E q u a lly , S erb  id e o lo g y  w a s  le s s  s p e c if ic  ab ou t th e era d ica tio n  o f  B o sn ia k s  
fro m  the h o m e la n d  and  m ore  c o n sc io u s  o f  th e era d ica tio n  o f  a ll o th er-g ro u p s from  
th e h o m ela n d . K e ep  in m in d , h o w e v e r , that in  real term s th is  m ea n t a s ig n if ic a n t ly  
h ig h e r  n u m b er o f  d ea th s and p ersec u tio n  a g a in st B o sn ia k s  than  a g a in st o th er  g ro u p s, 
as sh o w n  in  C hap ters F ou r and F iv e . E q u a lly , th is  h o m e la n d -d r iv en  ap p roach  to  
an ti-n a tion  p o lic y  m irrors that o f  th e T urks rather than  th e N a z is  in  that the  
id e o lo g ic a l fo c u s  w a s  o n  th e erad ica tion  o f  p e o p le s  from  th e h o m e la n d  rather than  
th e c o m p le te  d estru ction  o f  th e an ti-n a tion  from  th e  en tire  earth.
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Conclusion
T h is  ch ap ter and th e p rev io u s  ch ap ter h a v e  sh o w n  that th e id e n tific a t io n  o f  an 
ex tr em e o u t-grou p  b e y o n d  th e b o u n d s o f  ord in ary  o th er-g ro u p s is p resen t in  a ll th ree  
c a se s  o f  g e n o c id e ;  th is  id en tific a tio n  has c o m e  ab ou t m a in ly  th rou gh  p o lit ic a l e l ite s  
b u ild in g  on  b e lie f s  o f  h isto r ica l c la im s  o f  d iffe r e n c e  and in ju stice . In ord er to  re c t ify  
th e se  ‘w r o n g  d o in g s ’ and to  ju s t ify  the e lim in a tio n  o f  th e a n ti-n a tio n , n a tion a l e l ite s  
se e k  to  id e o lo g ic a lly  strip  th e an ti-n a tion  o f  attr ibu tes that w o u ld  e l ic it  a m erc ifu l  
re sp o n se  fro m  th e n ation .
O n  a m ore  m ic r o -le v e l, h o w e v e r , e v id e n c e  from  ea c h  o f  m y  th ree c a s e  s tu d ie s  
d em o n stra tes  that th e id e o lo g ic a l p ro g re ss io n  o f  ra d ic a lisa tio n  o cc u r s  p rim arily  in  
fou r  w a y s: 1) a persistent perception o f the anti-nation thriving in times o f  national 
decline; it is  h ere w h ere  w e  se e  th e e c o n o m ic  ten s io n  o f  n a tio n  v s . a n ti-n a tio n  c o m e  
in to  p la y . T h e se  s ter eo ty p e s  w ere  cr itica l to a m a ss in g  p op u lar  a g g r e s s io n  a g a in st  the  
an ti-n a tion . In ea ch  o f  th ese  c a s e s , the id ea  o f  th e  a n ti-n a tio n  th r iv in g  d u rin g  t im e s  o f  
n a tio n a l d e c lin e  is  e s ta b lish e d  b e fo re  id e o lo g y  b e c o m e s  g e n o c id a l. W h at is a lso  
n o te w o r th y  is that u p on  en tran ce in to  w ar in ea ch  c a s e , there is a n o ta b le  sh ift  
b e tw e e n  h o w  m u ch  e m p h a sis  is p la ce d  on  th is th em e.
W e  th en  m o v e  o n  to  2 )  the reinforced dehumanisation o f  the anti-nation through 
propaganda as well as through policy. R ein fo r c e d  d eh u m a n isa tio n , p a ired  w ith  th e  
c h a o s  en su in g  from  w ar, is  the th em e K ersh a w  id e n tif ie s  as p r o v id in g  th e c o n te x t  in  
w h ic h  m a ss  k illin g  d e v e lo p s  (1 9 8 9 : 106; se e  a lso  A sto u r ia n  1990: 125); th eft, rape, 
s la v e  lab our, u n m itig a te d  a b u se  and the so c ie ta l re str ic tio n s o f  th e a n ti-n a tio n  p resen t  
in  ea ch  o f  m y  c a se s  p ro v id e  re in fo r ce d  policies o f  d eh u m a n isa tio n  w h ic h , p a ired  w ith  
th e  language o f  d eh u m a n isa tio n  p resen t in  p rop agan d a  fu lf ils  K e r sh a w ’s criteria .
T h is  th em e , perh ap s m ore than a n y  other, p ro v id es  a p ictu re for th e ‘ratchet -  e f f e c t ’ 
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  id e o lo g y  and p o lic y  in  in c r e a s in g ly  g e n o c id a l sta tes. T h o u g h  
th e u se  o f  d eh u m a n ised  la n g u a g e  is p resen t in  ea ch  o f  m y  three c a s e s  in  th e ear ly  
s ta g e s  o f  id e o lo g ic a l d e v e lo p m e n t, the ra d ica lisa tio n  o f  p o lic y  a llo w s  for  a greater,
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and, e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  Y u g o s la v  c a s e , fa ster  ra d ic a lisa tio n  id e o lo g y . T h u s, w e  se e  
that it is n ot m er e ly  a rh etor ica l ra d ic a lisa tio n , but is ra d ic a lisa tio n  b a sed  on  th e  
e f fe c ts  o f  p rev io u s  p o lic ie s  o f  restr ic tion  an d  d eg ra d a tio n  in  so c ie ty .
T h ird ly , w e  se e  ra d ic a lis in g  sta tes  3 ) project the anti-nation as an historical, present 
and future national persecutor. O f  a ll the th e m e s  d isc u sse d  in th is  ch ap ter, th is  is  
p erh ap s th e  s tro n g est an d  m o st  in flu e n tia l. T h is  in co rp o ra tes  S ta u b ’s id ea  that 
‘p erpetrators c o m e  to b e lie v e  e ith er that th e v ic t im s  h a v e  so m e th in g  th e y  w a n t  
o r ...s ta n d  in th e w a y  o f  so m e th in g  th ey  w a n t’ (1 9 8 9 :  2 3 )  an d  K a u fm a n n ’s id ea  that 
in v en te d  ta les  o f  a g g r e ss io n  p lan n ed  b y  th e a n ti-n a tio n  or o ccu rr in g  a g a in st  the  
n a tio n  p ro v id e  n a tion a l h ard -lin ers w ith  an ‘u n a n sw era b le  a rg u m en t’ (1 9 9 6 :  142)  
regard in g  th e n e c e s s ity  fo r  in crea sed  p ersec u tio n . T h is  ca n  b e  m a n ife s te d  in  a 
v a r ie ty  o f  d ifferen t w a y s  in c lu d in g  m ilitary  p ersec u tio n , p o lit ic a l p ersec u tio n  and  
cu ltural p ersecu tio n . I w a n t to  n o te , h o w e v e r , that a g a in  th e a n ti-n a tio n  is ca st as  
so m e th in g  m ore  than  a m ere e n em y . A n  e n e m y  can  b e  a p a ss iv e  th in g , but 
ra d ic a lis in g  id e o lo g y  in  th e se  three c a se s  p resen ts  th e a n ti-n a tio n  as an a c t iv e  
im m e d ia te  threat. T h e an ti-n a tion  is a c t iv e ly  a c tin g  con trary  to , u n d erm in in g  and  
tra ito ro u sly  p e rsec u tin g  th e n ation . In  short, ca s tin g  th e a n ti-n a tio n  as b oth  h isto r ica l 
and fu ture p ersecu to r  p ro v id es  th e n a tion  w ith  ju s t if ic a t io n  for  r e v e n g e  and  
p ro tec tio n . R e b e c c a  W e st su m s up the r a d ic a lise d  id e o lo g y  w e ll  sa y in g , ‘h a v in g  
se e n  w h a t T u rk ish  co n q u e st  m ea n s to  th e  S la v , it is  certa in  th e y  w er e  ju s t if ie d  in th e ir  
cr im e. A  m an  is  n o t a m an  i f  h e  w ill  n ot sa v e  h is  s e e d ’ ( in  Judah 1997: 7 8 ). 
P rop agan d a  regard in g  th is th em e sh ifts  s im ila r ly  in  ea c h  case: ea c h  tim e th e n a tio n  
p rep ares to  en ter  w ar, th e a sso c ia t io n  o f  th e a n ti-n a tio n  as th e n a tio n a l p ersecu to r  
r ise s .
T h e la st m ain  th e m e  regard in g  th e an ti-n a tion  a r is in g  from  m y  resea rch  is  4 )  the 
perceived necessity ofphysically separating the anti-nation from the nation. B y  
ca s tin g  m em b ers o f  the an ti-n a tion  as a fe s ter in g  sore or as a d ise a s e , th e p o lit ic a l  
e lite  in stitu tin g  g e n o c id a l id e o lo g y  gath ers su pp ort from  the m em b e rs  o f  th e ir  n ation . 
In th is  w a y , g e n o c id a l id e o lo g y  b oth  d e f in e s  and ju s t if ie s  th e n eed  for  th e e lim in a tio n
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o f  its c h o se n  v ic tim s; th e a n ti-n a tio n  is ca st as an in v a d er  o f  th e n a tio n a l h o m e la n d  
and as su ch , th e y  are d en ied  the righ ts o f  c it iz e n s  o f  th e  sta te  and p la c e d  o u ts id e  the  
rea lm  o f  th e n a tio n ’s m ora l o b lig a tio n . A s  M o s s e  f in d s , . .a  p erson  d o o m e d  to  a life  
o f  cr im in a lity  m u st b e  k ille d  as th is [is] th e o n ly  w a y  to  p ro tect s o c ie ty . C ap ita l 
p u n ish m en t w o u ld  th erefo re  b y  part o f  a p r o c e ss  o f  ‘d e lib era te  s e le c t io n ,’ w h ic h  
m ig h t se rv e  su p p lem e n t and stren gth en  natural s e le c t io n ” (1 9 8 5 :  84; s e e  a lso  S n y d er  
2 0 0 0 :  67; W a ller  2 0 0 2 : 2 3 7 ;  B r e u illy  2 0 0 1 : 10 3 ). In th is  lig h t, m ere  c o e x is te n c e  is  
n ot en o u g h  to  sa v e  th e h o m e la n d  from  d estru ctio n  b y  th e  a n ti-n a tio n . B y  id e n tify in g  
th e an ti-n a tion  in  su ch  a w a y , it a llo w s  th e n a tio n  to  e a s ily  ju s t ify  th e  im p lem en ta tio n  
o f  g e n o c id a l p o lic y  on  m u ltip le  le v e ls ,  v a ry in g  at th e d iffer en t s ta g e s  e s ta b lish ed  in  
th is  a n a ly s is .
A n ti-n a tio n  id e o lo g y  then  is at o n c e  a b e lie v a b le  structural fra m ew o rk  and a ‘c y n ic a l,  
u tilitar ian  p o lit ic a l in stru m en t’(H e r f  2 0 0 5 :  5 4 ) o f  a g e n c y . It is a lso  f le x ib le , d y n a m ic  
and at t im e s  at o d d s w ith  p o lic y  in it ia tiv es . It a lso , as su g g e s te d  in C h ap ter T w o , is a 
k e y  p articipan t in  the d y n a m ic isa tio n  p r o c e ss  o f  p o lic y  -  an id e o lo g ic a l b e l ie f  in stils  
fear d em a n d in g  that p o lic ie s  b e put in  p la c e  to  se cu re  th e n a tio n  fro m  th e  an ti-n a tion ;  
th is  then  further se g r e g a te s  the an ti-n a tion  and restr ic ts  c iv il  r igh ts and hum an  
lib er ties , le a d in g  to  a life  regard ed  as le s s  v a lu a b le  than a ‘n o r m a l’ life ; th is  then  
le a d s  to  str ife , p o v er ty , p ersec u tio n  and acts o f  d eh u m a n isa tio n  w h ic h  then  re in fo r ce  
th e la n g u a g e  o f  d eh u m a n isa tio n  p resen t in  the o r ig in a l id e o lo g y . E n co u ra g in g  an 
id e o lo g ic a l state o f  fear o f  th e  a n ti-n a tio n  then  p ro v id ed  th e se  ra d ic a lis in g  sta tes  w ith  
th e m ora l r e sp o n s ib ility  to  act a g g r e s s iv e ly  a g a in st th e an ti-n a tio n , b y  co m m ittin g  
g e n o c id a l a g g r e ss io n , th e se  perpetrator sta tes w e r e  a b le  to  p resen t th e m se lv e s  to  their  
c o n st itu e n c ie s  as fu lf il l in g  th e ir  m ora l o b lig a tio n ; th rough  that fu lf ilm e n t th e y  h o p e d  
to  a c h ie v e  le g it im a c y  and further secu re  their p o w e r  b a se . T o  w h a t ex te n t th is  sa m e  
c y c lic a l  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  p o lic y  and id e o lo g y  e x is ts  in  th e o th er tw o  p rim ary  
th e m e s  o f  id e o lo g y  is  o f  k een  in terest and w ill  b e  d isc u sse d  in th e n e x t  tw o  ch ap ters.
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